Bin Laden’s True Legacy


Published on May 5, 2016

May 2 marked the five-year anniversary of the U.S. raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. In the wake of that operation, we noted that while bin Laden’s death fulfilled a sense of vengeance and closure for the 9/11 attacks, in the big picture, it was going to have little effect on the trajectory of the wider jihadist movement. A man was dead, but the ideology of jihadism was going to continue to pose a threat.

The jihadist movement has progressed closer to bin Laden’s vision for the world in the past five years than it had in the almost 10 years between 9/11 and his death. An arc of jihad now spreads from West Africa through the Middle East and into Southeast Asia. Reflecting on bin Laden’s demise provides a reminder not to lose sight of the forest — the wider jihadist movement — by focusing on the trees — individuals and groups.

The Vision

Bin Laden aspired to a world ruled by a Muslim caliph who would be guided by the principles of Sharia. To get there, he envisioned the establishment of a series of Islamic emirates practicing “true Islam” that eventually would expand into a global caliphate. Until his death, bin Laden maintained that jihadists should focus primarily on attacking what he termed the far enemies — the United States and its “European crusader allies.” He believed that until they were driven out of the Muslim world, it would be impossible to establish such emirates because the United States and its allies would overthrow “true Muslim” leaders as they did Mullah Mohammad Omar and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Furthermore, unless the far enemies were stopped, they would continue to support the “apostate” governments, such as those in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, that did not share bin Laden’s interpretation of Islam.

Bin Laden’s strategy centered on use of spectacular terrorist attacks to draw the United States into invading the Muslim world. He believed that once the United States invaded, Muslims would be compelled to join a defensive jihad to fight the “crusader armies” in a long war of attrition. Bin Laden believed that this action would lead to the collapse of the U.S. economy and government in much the same way he believed the jihad in Afghanistan had precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. In his plan, once the United States and its allies were defeated, local uprisings would be able to overthrow the corrupt governments in the Muslim world, clearing the way for the global caliphate to rise.

Realizing the Vision

Bin Laden and al Qaeda’s early attacks against the United States such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings and the failed Millennium bombing plot did not provoke the desired U.S. response. But the spectacular 9/11 attacks certainly struck the proper chord, prompting the United States to invade Afghanistan in 2001 and topple the Taliban government. The reaction was fierce and fast, and a large number of al Qaeda and other foreign jihadists fled Afghanistan. Many settled in the friendlier confines of Pakistan’s wild Pashtun areas, while some fled to other havens in the region. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his followers relocated to northern Iraq, a lawless region that had thrown off the yoke of Saddam Hussein’s rule.

But the stricken American behemoth was not finished. In 2003, the United States invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam, who had absolutely no connection to the 9/11 attacks. This proved a boon to the jihadist cause. While Afghanistan was a relative backwater, Iraq was seen as the heart of the historical Muslim world, and therefore alluring to those wanting to fight a defensive jihad. It also helped that Iraq was wedged between Iran and Syria, two countries hostile to the United States that would aid jihadists in their efforts to bleed the United States and drive its troops out of the region.

Iraq quickly became a jihadist magnet, and as money poured in, the number of foreign fighters traveling there rapidly surpassed the number that were in Afghanistan. This infusion of men and cash (Iraq was already awash with weapons) helped dramatically increase al-Zarqawi’s profile. He merged his Jamaat al-Tawhid and Jihad group into al Qaeda, but as we have noted since 2005, the marriage was precarious from the beginning.

Other jihadist groups adopted the al Qaeda ideology and even its brand name, and soon there were franchises in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Algeria and sympathetic or aligned groups in the Philippines, Indonesia, Somalia and Nigeria. Grassroots cells and lone attackers sprung up across the globe. Some groups conducted noteworthy attacks in places such as Bali, Madrid and London. But mostly, jihadists did not make any appreciable headway and struggled merely to survive. The places where jihadists were able to thrive were mostly wild or ungoverned, such as along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in Somalia, the deserts of the Sahel and Yemen, and the Indonesian/Philippine archipelago.


Even though al-Zarqawi’s group had proclaimed an “Islamic State in Iraq” a few months after his death in 2006, by 2010 the group had been severely damaged and was in danger of annihilation. But 2011 was about to bring dramatic change. First, the United States was in the middle of a drawdown that would remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by December 2011. Second, events in Tunisia in December 2010 sparked a regional uprising, later called the Arab Spring. The wave of protests that broke across the region would not only result in the overthrows of rulers such as Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh and Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi, but also led to civil wars in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Mali. Even in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt where the existing order was not overthrown, the uprisings would provide room for jihadist groups to gain a foothold and grow.

But in most places, the Arab Spring itself did not inspire the growing acceptance of jihadist ideology as much as the failure of democratic reform efforts and the government counteractions that threw many into the arms of the jihadists. When nonviolent protests are met with violence, it is hard to keep protesters from responding in kind, and that is what happened in Syria, Libya, Yemen and even Iraq, where Shiite authority violently put down Sunni protests. This spiral of violence provided a recruiting bonanza for jihadist groups.

This created a no-win situation for the United States and its allies. They intervened on the side of the crowds in Libya and helped smash Libya’s army, plunging the country into anarchy as fighting erupted along regional, tribal, religious and ethnic lines. In Syria, the United States and its allies helped equip and train anti-government forces but did not directly intervene as in Libya. Nevertheless, Syria still fell into the same sort of chaos, and jihadists have benefitted greatly from the resulting civil war. Syria became such a large jihadist prize that a nasty fight erupted over who would control the jihadist movement there, leading the Islamic State to break from al Qaeda and engage it in open combat.

The division would eventually spread globally, with the Islamic State and al Qaeda each competing for primacy — and ideological control of the jihadist movement. In Libya, Somalia and Afghanistan, this struggle has shifted from ideological battles to armed conflict. In many ways this struggle mirrors those waged between Marxist and Maoist ideologues for the leadership of the communist world. It is hard to see an end to the Islamic State-al Qaeda conflict, and we are skeptical of claims that al Qaeda and the Islamic State could eventually patch up their differences and reunite.

The Future

People and governments alike tend to focus on personalities such as bin Laden and self-declared caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and groups such as the core of the al Qaeda and the Islamic State organizations. In fact, governments struggle greatly in combatting more amorphous targets, such as movements and ideologies. But there is a danger that by focusing on the trees, one can miss the forest.

Certainly, governments must continue to apply all the tools of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism against these jihadist groups and their leadership, but it is also crucial to recognize that the world simply cannot kill or arrest its way out of this problem. The broader jihadist movement, whether inside the arc of jihad or in other parts of the globe, will continue to pose a threat until the ideology of jihadism is defeated as Marxism and Maoism largely were. The struggle is going to require strong U.S. leadership and cooperation from an array of regional allies and alliances.

Despite the internal al Qaeda/Islamic State conflict, overall the jihadist movement is larger and casts a wider shadow now than it ever has. The number of foreign fighters who have flocked to Syria, Libya and elsewhere in recent years has far surpassed the number of fighters who made similar jihad pilgrimages in past decades.

The realization of bin Laden’s dreams is nowhere close, but the jihadists’ utopian vision of a just and secure society ruled under Sharia remains especially appealing to Muslims who are living under a dictatorship, kleptocracy, or anarchy in the case of Afghanistan after the fall of the Mohammed Najibullah administration. However, this utopianism quickly fades once it meets reality. People who have lived under jihadist rule in Afghanistan, Yemen, Mali, Libya, Somalia and Syria have learned that oppression and corruption do not disappear in a jihadist society — they merely take on a new form. Jihadist polities have consequently proved to be unpopular and short-lived, and the jihadist dream of creating lasting emirates is clearly more delusional than practical.

The modern form of jihadism that bin Laden helped nurture and propagate will eventually be relegated to history’s rubbish bin of failed ideologies where it will languish next to Marxism and Maoism. But until that happens, jihadists will continue to kill and destroy, much like the communists who went before them. The death and destruction that jihadists will leave in their wake as the ideology withers will be his true legacy.



Situação na Síria é ‘repugnante’


Com centenas de milhares de civis mortos, milhões de deslocados e famílias dilaceradas, o chefe de ajuda humanitária da ONU descreveu a situação na Síria como “repugnante”, e disse que a comunidade global deveria estar envergonhada com o fato de isso estar acontecendo “debaixo de seus olhos”.

“Não é preciso que eu diga a cada membro do Conselho de Segurança que o impacto de cinco longos anos de conflito na Síria desafia o entendimento, quiçá a descrição”, disse Stephen O’Brien, ao corpo de 15 membros durante sessão mensal para atualização sobre as questões humanitárias.

O’Brien disse que para muitos sírios, a vida está miserável. “Deliberadamente privados de comida e remédios, muitos enfrentam condições desoladoras de fome e miséria. Precisamos nos envergonhar de que isso esteja acontecendo debaixo dos nossos olhos”, lamentou.

Apesar do enorme desafio, as equipes humanitárias da ONU continuaram a entregar ajuda a milhões de pessoas pelo país.De acordo com o chefe da ajuda humanitária, o Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA) atingiu 3,7 milhões de pessoas em março. Já o Fundo das Nações Unidas para a Infância (UNICEF) e a Organização Mundial de Saúde (OMS) realizaram uma campanha contra a poliomielite em março e atingiram mais de 2,1 milhões de crianças. Nesta semana, o UNICEF, a OMS e parceiros iniciaram outra campanha e imunização para atingir 2 milhões de crianças em áreas sitiadas ou de difícil acesso.

Fonte: ONU Brasil.

Brazil: A Door Opens for Syrian Refugees

Published on Mar 30, 2016

A humanitarian visa programme offered by Brazil to Syrian refugees has helped resettle more than 2000 people. In a matter of a 18 months Talal and his family have managed to start over and open a restaurant.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

What makes a bunch of teenagers from Brighton go to Syria?

Published on Mar 31, 2016

Why Ibrahim Kamara and brothers Abdullah, Jaffar and Amer Deghayes left their homes in Brighton to travel to Syria to join an al-Qaida affiliated group ?

The Guardian


Hybrid Wars 2. Testing the Theory – Syria & Ukraine

Posted originally in: 11/03/2016


The author’s book, “Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach To Regime Change” (available for free PDF download here), thoroughly makes the case that Syria and Ukraine are the US’ first victims of Hybrid War, but the scope of the article is to express how the abovementioned innovations not included in the original publication have been importantly at play all along. The purpose is to prove that the newly discovered facets can seamlessly be interwoven into the overall theory and used to enhance one’s comprehension of it as a result, thus positioning studied observers to more accurately project the future battlegrounds in which Hybrid Wars are most likely to be fought.

This part of the research thus follows the theoretical model that was just set out before it, in that it elaborates on the geostrategic-economic determinants that were behind the Wars on Syria and Ukraine, before touching on the socio-political structural vulnerabilities that the US attempted to exploit to various degrees of success. The last part incorporates the idea of social and structural preconditioning and briefly discusses how it was present in each case.

Geostrategic Determinants


The traditionally secular Arab Republic was sucked into the US’ theater-wide Color Revolution scheme when the “Arab Spring” was unleashed in 2011. To concisely summarize the strategic underpinnings of this grandiose operation, the concept was for the US to assist a transnational Muslim Brotherhood clique in coming to power from Algeria to Syria via a series of synchronized regime change operations against rival states (Syria), untrustworthy partners (Libya), and strategic proxy states set for inevitable leadership transitions (Egypt, Yemen). The resultant strategic environment was supposed to resemble Cold War-era Eastern Europe, in that each of the states would have been led by the same party (the Muslim Brotherhood instead of the Communist Party) and controlled by proxy via an external patron, in this case a joint condominium presided over by Turkey and Qatar on the US’ Lead From Behind behalf.

This loosely organized ideological ‘confederation’ would have been disjointed enough to be manageable via simple divide-and-rule tactics (thus preventing it from ever independently organizing against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States), but easily provoked into sectarian hatred for mobilizing against Iran and its regional interests, thereby making it an extremely flexible tool for promoting American grand strategy in the Mideast. Given the chaotic origins of this geopolitical gambit, it was predetermined that elements of it wouldn’t go according to plan and that only the partial realization of this project could realistically occur during the first attempt, which is precisely what happened when the Syrian people defiantly withstood the Hybrid War assault against them and courageously fought in defense of their secular civilization-state.

It can be argued that Syria was always seen as the most strategic prize out of all the “Arab Spring”-affected states, and this is proven by the desperate nearly five-year-long Hybrid War that the US unleashed against it in response to its initial regime change attempt failing there. In comparison, Egypt, the most populous Arab state, has only had to deal with low-level Qatari-managed terrorism in the Sinai ever since it overthrew the American-imposed Muslim Brotherhood government. The reason for this glaring discrepancy of relative importance to American grand strategic goals is attributable to the geo-economic determinants behind the War on Syria, which will be expostulated upon shortly.


The geostrategic determinants behind the War on Ukraine are much more straightforward than those behind the War on Syria, and they’ve mostly already been spoken about earlier when describing the “Reverse Brzezinski” stratagem of geopolitical entrapment. Part of the motivation behind overthrowing the Ukrainian government and ushering in the subsequent anti-Russian pogroms was to lure Russia into an interventionist trap à la 1979 Afghanistan, and the War on Donbass was the epitome of this attempt. Washington failed to achieve its objective in this regard, but it was much more successful in turning the entire territory of Ukraine into a geopolitical weapon against Russia.

Brzezinski famously quipped that “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire”, and while he had a whole different conception in mind when he said that (his thinking was that Russia would try to “imperially re-Sovietize” the region), geopolitically speaking, his quote holds a lot of fundamental truth to it. The Russian Federation’s national security is to a large extent determined by events in Ukraine, especially as it relates to its broad western periphery, and a hostile government in Kiev that becomes amenable to hosting US “missile defense” infrastructure (which is really a euphemism for increasing the chances that the US can neutralize Russia’s second-strike capability and thus put it in a position of nuclear blackmail) would pose a major strategic threat. To rephrase Brzezinski and make his quote more objectively accurate, “If the West succeeds in manipulating Ukraine into becoming a long-term enemy of Russia, then Moscow would be faced with a major geopolitical obstacle to its future multipolar ambitions.”

The dire scenario of Ukraine hosting US or NATO “missile defense” units has yet to play out in full, but the country is still making leaps towards “Shadow NATO” membership whereby it becomes a de-facto part of the organization without the formal mutual defense guarantees. The increased military cooperation between Kiev and Washington, and by extension, between Ukraine and the bloc, is premised on aggressive maneuvering against Russian strategic interests. Nevertheless, this isn’t as bad as it could have been, since American strategic planners had naively assumed that the Pentagon would have already had control of Crimea by this time, and therefore would have been able to position their “missile defense” units and other destabilizing technologies right on Russia’s doorstep. The ultimate fallacy in the West’s thinking during the Hybrid War preparations was that Russia would back down from defending its civilizational, humanitarian, and geostrategic interests in Crimea (or that if it did so, it would be pulled into a “Reverse Brzezinski” quagmire), which as history now attests, was an epic miscalculation on par with the worst the US has ever made.

Geo-Economic Determinants


Syria is so significant from the perspective of American grand strategy because it was supposed to be the end terminal for the Friendship Pipeline shared between it, Iran, and Iraq. This gas route would have allowed Iran to access the European market and completely nullify the sanctions regime that the US had built against it at that time. Contemporaneous with this project was a competing one by Qatar to send its own gas through Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and thenceforth to the EU, either through LNG or via Turkey. President Assad astutely rejected the Gulf proposal out of loyalty to his country’s long-established Iranian ally, and the War and Syria as waged through the post-“Arab Spring” Hybrid War against it was supported so fiercely by the US and the Gulf States specifically to punish the country for its refusal to become a unipolar satellite.

If it would have been completed, the Friendship Pipeline would have been one of the world’s most important multipolar transnational connective projects, in that it would have revolutionized regional geopolitics by providing an energy and investment corridor linking Iran with the EU. It would have thus entailed a significant alteration in the Mideast’s balance of power and played to the absolute detriment of the US and its Gulf allies. Understanding the acute threat that the Friendship Pipeline posed its decades-long hegemonic dominance over the region, the US committed itself to making sure that the project would never materialize no matter what, ergo one of the partial reasons behind the creation of ISIL smack dab in the middle of the expected transit zone. Seen from this perspective, it’s much clearer why the US would prioritize the destabilization of Syria over that of Egypt, and would actually be willing to pour innumerable resources into this endeavor and organize a global proxy coalition to help achieve it.


The US’ determination in capturing Ukraine was inspired by much more than just geostrategic thinking, since those imperatives intersected with contemporaneous geo-economic realities. At the time that the urban terrorist campaign popularly known as “EuroMaidan” was initiated, Ukraine was forced by the US into an artificial “civilizational choice” between the EU and Russia. Moscow had been advancing three interlinked multipolar transnational connective projects – gas and oil sales to the EU, the Eurasian Union, and the Eurasian Land Bridge (energy, institutional, and economic, respectively) – that Washington was eager to weaken at all costs. Recalling Brzezinski’s earlier cited quip about Ukraine and the author’s rephrasing of it, the words now make a lot more sense, as without Ukraine as a part of this interconnected web of projects, the entire whole becomes substantially weaker than if it were otherwise.

As it relates to each of the projects, Ukraine’s removal from the equation: obstructs the Russian-EU energy trade and creates unexpected complications for both sides; leaves a sizeable marketplace and labor force outside the scope of the customs union; and necessitates an infrastructural refocusing solely on relatively smaller and less economically important Belarus, which thus becomes a geopolitical chokepoint that figures even greater than before into the West’s anti-Russian schemes. As an added ‘benefit’ of poaching Ukraine from the Russian integrational orbit, the US was able to set into motion a chain of thematically preconceived events (excluding Crimea’s reunification, of course) that instigated the New Cold War it was eager to spark.

It wanted to do so in order to create seemingly insurmountable obstacles between Russia and the EU, knowing that the expected security dilemmas (in military, energy, economic, and strategic terms) would dramatically impede cooperation between them and make Brussels all the more vulnerable to being cajoled into the US’ massive unipolar power plays that it was planning. In order to maintain its hegemonic position over Europe, the US had to engineer a scenario that would split Russia and the EU long enough and in as intense of a manner as possible so as increase the chances that the three following categorical projects of control could be imposed on Europe: NATO’s permanent on-alert deployment in the east (military); US LNG exports to the EU and the newly attractive appeal of non-Russian energy routes such as the Southern Gas Corridor (energy); and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which, among other privileges it grants the US, makes it impossible for the EU to conduct any further Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) without Washington’s approval (economic).

Altogether, these three interlocked factors are intended to bolster the grandest of the US’ strategic objectives, which in a mutually interrelated manner, also increases the prospects for their own success. This is the artificially engineered “clash of civilizations” between the West and Eurasia-Russia, whereby the US expects the EU to henceforth cobble in fear before Russia and consequently rush into Uncle Sam’s arms as the ‘defender of Western civilization’. It is this ultimate plan that the US wants to fulfill in Europe, since its successful implementation alongside its three key components (the military, energy, and economic facets earlier described) would create the conditions for multi-generational hegemonic dominance over Europe, and thus spiking the odds that multipolarity’s counter-offense against the US will be a drawn-out, decades-long affair.

Socio-Political Structural Vulnerabilities – Syria


At least 90% of Syria’s population is Arab while the remaining 10% or so is mostly Kurdish. From the Hybrid War perspective, one would assume that this state of affairs might be useful in destabilizing the state, but several factors prevented it from reaching its American-anticipated potential. Firstly, the Syrian population is very patriotic due to their civilizational heritage and galvanized opposition to Israel. As a result, while there’s obviously a plurality of personal political opinion among the mostly mono-ethnic society, there was never any real possibility that they would violently turn against the state, hence the need to import such a vast number of international terrorists and mercenaries to the battlefield to satisfy this Hybrid War ‘requirement’.

Concerning the Kurds, they’ve never had a history of anti-government rebellion unlike their Turkish and Iraqi counterparts, thus implying that their state of affairs in Syria was manageable and nowhere near as bad as Western information outlets try to retroactively paint it as. Even if they could have been conjured up into a radical anti-government mass, their relatively minor role in national affairs and obscure geographic distance from any relevant power centers would have precluded them from becoming a significant Hybrid War asset, although they’d be an effective strategic supplement to any Arab terrorists based closer to the primary population centers. As is known, however, the Kurds have remained loyal to Damascus and have not broken with the government, thus adding confirmation to the thesis that they were content with their original status and not prone to “rebel”.

In sum, the ethnic components of the US’ Hybrid War planning against Syria failed to live up to their anticipated potential, indicating that pre-war intelligence assessments were cripplingly distorted in underestimating the unifying pull of Syrian Patriotism.


Syria’s population is overwhelmingly Sunni but also has an important Alawite minority that has traditionally held various leadership positions in the government and military. This never was an issue before, but externally managed social preconditioning (in this instance, organized by the Gulf States) acclimatized parts of the population to sectarian thinking and began laying the psychological foundation for takfiri tension to take root among some domestic elements after the Color Revolution stage was initiated in early 2011. Afterwards, even though sectarianism was never a factor in Syrian society before and still isn’t a major force to this day (despite almost five years of “religiously” motivated terrorist provocations), it would be used as a rallying cry for replenishing the ranks of foreign jihadists and as a ‘plausible’ cover for the US and its allies to allege that President Assad doesn’t ‘represent the people’ and must therefore be overthrown.


Syrian history is thousands of years old and represents one of the richest civilizations of all time. Consequently, this imbues the country’s citizens with an unshakeable sense of patriotism that would later reveal itself to be one of the strongest defenses against Hybrid War (civilizational solidarity). It’s obvious that this would have been discovered by American strategists in their preparatory research on Syria, but they likely underrated its importance, figuring that they could successfully provoke a return to the destabilizing coup-after-coup post-independence years prior to the late Hafez Assad’s Presidency. On the contrary, the vast majority of Syrians had grown to sincerely appreciate the contributions of the Assad family to their country’s stability and success, and they never wanted to do anything that could return the country to the dark years that preceded the first family’s political rise.


The brief legacy of separate administrative boundaries during a period of the French occupation provided the geopolitical precedent for the US to resurrect a formal or federalized division of Syria. Even though the historical memory of this time is largely lost on the psyche of contemporary Syrians (save for the mandate-era flag that represents the anti-government terrorists), that doesn’t mean that there’s no possibility of externally enforcing it on them in the future and “historically justifying” it after the fact. The Russian anti-terrorist intervention in Syria neutralized the possibility of the country’s formal fragmentation, but the ongoing Race for Raqqa means that the force which captures the terrorists’ ‘capital’ will hold the best cards in determining the post-war internal makeup of the state, opening the possibility for the US and its proxies to force a federalized ‘solution’ on Syria that could create largely autonomous zones of pro-American support.

Socio-Economic Disparity:

Pre-war Syria had a relatively balanced distribution of socio-economic indicators, despite adhering to the globally stereotypical ‘rule’ of the urban areas being more developed than the rural ones. Though the rural areas comprise most of the country’s geographic area, only a fraction of the population inhabited them, with most Syrians living along the western-based north-south corridor of Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus, while a strategically important population also inhabits coastal Latakia. Up until 2011, Syria had been showing years of steady economic growth, and there’s no reason to believe that this would have abated had it not been for the Hybrid War against it. Therefore, although socio-economic disparities surely existed in Syria before the war, they were properly managed by the government (owing in part to the semi-socialist nature of the state) and weren’t a factor that the US could exploit.

Physical Geography:

This is the one characteristic that works out most to the advantage of Hybrid War against Syria. The Color Revolution component was concentrated in the heavily populated western-based north-south corridor that was written about above, while the Unconventional Warfare part thrived in the rural regions outside this area. The authorities understandably had difficulty balancing between urban and rural security needs, and the absurd amount of support that the US and its Gulf allies were channeling to the terrorists via Turkey temporarily threw the military off balance and resulted in the stalemate that marked the first few years of the conflict (with some dramatic back-and-forth changes from time to time). As this was happening and the Syrian Arab Army was focused on the pressing security matters challenging it along the population corridor, ISIL was able to make swift conventional military advances along the logistically accommodating plains and deserts of the east and rapidly set up its “caliphate’, the consequences of which are driving the present-day course of events in the country.

Socio-Political Structural Vulnerabilities – Ukraine


Ukraine’s demographic divide between East and West, Russians and Ukrainians, is well known and has been heavily discussed. In the context of Hybrid War, this almost clean-cut geographic distribution (with the exception of the Russian plurality in Odessa and majority in Crimea) was a godsend to American strategic planners, since it created an ingrained demographic dichotomy that could easily be exploited when the time was ripe.


Here too is an almost perfect geographic divide between East and West, with the Russian Orthodox and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches representing the two critical population groups in the country. Further west are the Uniate and Catholic Churches, corresponding mostly to the former lands of the interwar Second Polish Republic. Christian sectarianism wasn’t the most visible rallying cry behind EuroMaidan, but its radical adherents used the coup’s success as cover for destroying Russian Orthodox Churches and other religious property in a nationwide campaign that sought to prompt the ethnic and cultural cleansing of the Russian population.


The modern Ukrainian state is an artificial amalgam of territories bequeathed to it by successive Russian and Soviet leaders. Its inherently unnatural origins curse it with a perpetually questionable existence, and the territorial aggrandizement after World War II complicated this even further. The most nationalist chunk of modern-day Ukraine used to be part of interwar Poland, and before that, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, thus giving its inhabitants a diametrically different historical memory than those in the central or eastern portions of the state.

The Hungarian and Romanian minority communities that live in the newly added areas (acquired from Czechoslovakia and Romania, respectively) also have a natural degree of identity “separateness” from the state that only needed an externally ‘nudged’ destabilization to bring it fully to the surface.

As was argued in Hybrid War and confirmed by Newsweek’s reporting just days before the coup (suspiciously deleted from their website but referenceable on, the historic ethno-religiously separate region of Western Ukraine was in full-scale armed rebellion against the President Yanukovich, and it’s no coincidence that the Unconventional Warfare aspect of that regime change campaign began in this specific part of the country.

Administrative Borders:

Ukraine’s domestic divisions coincide quite neatly with its administrative borders on many occasions – be they the ethnic divide, Christian sectarianism, historic regions, or electoral results – and this served as the ultimate asymmetrical multiplier that convinced American strategists that Hybrid War could easily be rolled out in Ukraine. Had it not been for the unexpected coup in late February 2014, it’s very possible that the US would have sought to exploit the unprecedented overlap of socio-political vulnerabilities in Ukraine in order to physically separate the western part of the country from the pro-government remainder of the rump state, but only in the event that Yanukovich would have been able to indefinitely hold out against the regime change terrorists and consolidate his holdings in the rest of the non-“rebel”-controlled areas of the country.

Socio-Economic Disparity:

Ukraine is similar to Syria in the sense that it also had a near-even distribution of socio-economic indicators, however, unlike the Arab Republic and its modest wealth, the Eastern European state equally spread poverty among its citizens. The large amount of Ukrainians in poverty or very close to it created an enormous recruiting pool for anti-government ‘activists’ to be culled by the NGO masterminds of the EuroMaidan Color Revolution, and the absence of any civilizational or national patriotism (excluding the hardcore fascist perversion epitomized by Pravy Sektor and company) meant that there were no societal safeguards in preventing the emergence of multiple “rent-a-riots” from being organized beforehand and deployed when the time was ‘right’.

Physical Geography:

The only unique part of pre-war Ukraine’s mostly standardized plains geography was Crimea, which functioned more like an island than the peninsula that it technically is. This ironically worked out to the US’ severe disadvantage when the autonomous republic’s favorable geography helped its inhabitants defend themselves long enough to vote to secede from the failing Ukrainian state and correct Khrushchev’s historical wrong by finally reuniting with their brethren in Russia. The same geographic facilitating factors weren’t in play with Donbass, which thus inhibited the patriots’ defense of their territory and made them much more vulnerable to Kiev’s multiple offensives against them. In the pre-coup environment, Ukraine’s easily traversable geography would have been ideal for the enabling the western “revolutionaries” to make a swift, ISIL-like lunge at Kiev once they accumulated enough stolen weaponry, equipment, and vehicles from the numerous police stations and military barracks that they were seizing at the time.


It’s beyond the scope of the present research to discuss the social preconditioning aspects of Hybrid War in detail, but they can generally be assumed to comprise the social/mass media-education-NGO triad. The specifics about structural preconditioning are a bit different, as aside from sanctions pressure, the other majorly discussed element described in Part I (i.e. the energy market disruption) didn’t occur until last year and thus wasn’t a factor in the run-up to either of the two examined Hybrid Wars. Still, other more distinct elements were certainly in play for each of the two states, with Ukraine’s coffers being bled dry by endemic and parasitic corruption and Syria having to perennially balance its military needs in defending against Israel with its social commitment to the population (a tightrope act that it managed quite well over the decades).

Source: Oriental Review

Syria – How The Palmyra Victory Changes the Narrative

Posted originally in: 28/03/2016


The liberation of Palmyra is a decisive turning point in the war on Syria. While there were earlier military successes by the Syrian Arab Army and its allies, the publicity value of securing the valued Roman ruins of Palmyra is much higher than any earlier victory. It will change some of the false narratives of the conflict.

The Syrian government is no longer “the Assad regime” and the Syrian Arab Army no longer the “Assad forces”. Ban Ki Moon, the head of the United Nations, congratulated the Syrian government to its success:

In a news conference in Jordan, Ban said he was “encouraged” that the UNESCO world heritage site is out of extremist hands and that the Syrian government “is now able to preserve and protect this human common cultural asset”.

One important part of liberating Palmyra was the use of Russian electronic warfare equipment to interfere with electromagnetic signals around Palmyra. The Islamic State rigged the ruins with improvised explosive devices but was unable to remotely detonate them.

The myth that the Syrian and Russian government are in cahoots with the Islamic State, told by various propagandist as well as the British and U.S. government, has now proven to be false. But other false claims are still made:

Lost in the celebrations was a discussion of how Palmyra had fallen in the first place. When the Islamic State captured the city in May, the militants faced little resistance from Syrian troops. At the time, residents said officers and militiamen had fled into orchards outside the city, leaving conscripted soldiers and residents to face the militants alone.

That depiction of the battle is pure nonsense. The Islamic State offensive that ended with its occupation of Palmyra took thirteen days from May 13 to May 26 2015. Heavy fighting and several Syrian army counter offensives took place during those days. After the Islamic State finally captured the city, the Syrian army immediately prepared for a larger operation to regain the city. This was launched successfully in July 2015 but for lack of air support the gains made were again lost a week later.

Throughout the 2015 fighting around Palmyra the U.S. air force, which claimed to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, did not intervene at all. ISIS was free to resupply through the open east-Syrian desert.

The sole reason that the Islamic State could successfully attack Palmyra was a very large ongoing attack by al-Qaeda Jihadists and CIA mercenary forces on the Syrian government forces in Idleb governate. The Syrian army moved troops from Palmyra to defend Idleb and Latakia and the forces left behind were no longer large enough to repel the Islamic State attack.

The attack on Idleb, for which the CIA allowed its proxy forces to directly cooperated with al-Qaeda, was supported by electronic warfare from Turkey which disrupted the Syrian military communication. The attack and the obvious cooperation between the Jihadists and Turkish and U.S. secret services was the reason that Russia and Iran decided to intervene in the conflict with their own forces. It had crossed their red line.

What followed was the roll up of all “rebels” that posed an immediate danger to the Syrian government. After Turkey ambushed a Russian jet all “rebel” forces supported by Turkey became priority targets. When the success of large scale offensives in Latakia and around Aleppo was established, Russia imposed a cease fire on the U.S. supported forces and on the Syria government. This cease fire freed up the Syrian, Iranian and Russian forces needed to successfully take back Palmyra. From there on the attack will progress eastward to Deir Ezzor and later on to Raqqa.

The Palmyra victory was the biggest defeat yet of the Islamic State. It poses a problem for the Obama administration:

Washington has endeavored to portray the battle against Islamic State as a project of the United States and its allies, while accusing Moscow of attacking “moderate” rebels instead of the extremists. Palmyra seems to embody an alternative narrative.

Congratulations, though still with loads of obligatory anti-Assad rhetoric, are now coming from unexpected corners like the conservative mayor of London:

I cannot conceal my elation as the news comes in from Palmyra and it is reported that the Syrian army is genuinely back in control of the entire Unesco site.

There may be booby traps in the ruins, but the terrorists are at last on the run. Hooray, I say. Bravo – and keep going.

I concur.

Source: Moon of Alabama

Guerras Híbridas” Abordagem adaptativa pós-tudo da ‘mudança de regime’

Entreouvido na Vila Vudu:

Em 1964, tudo que aí se lê era arroz com feijão, e as famílias discutiam essas questões à mesa, em casa, no trabalho, na universidade, na feira (pelo menos, com certeza, em Porto Alegre/RS), e todo mundo sabia que a razão pela qual não há golpes nos EUA, é que nos EUA não há embaixada dos EUA. .

Mas, hoje, analfabetizadas na/pela universidade da ditadura dos anos 70-80 e na/pela universidade da tucanaria da privataria nos anos 80-90, 2000, as pessoas já não conhecem, sequer, o Manual de Golpes da CIA, que se atualiza, mas, melhorar, não melhora.

Então aí vai: ABC de golpe, hoje chamado “Guerra Híbrida”.

E o Brasil estamos no olho do furacão, mais uma vez.

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4/3/2016, Andrew Korybko, Oriental Review

  1. A lei da Guerra Híbrida

Guerra Híbrida é um dos mais significativos desenvolvimentos estratégicos que os EUA jamais promoveram ou encabeçaram, e a transição das Revoluções Coloridas para Guerras Não Convencionais certamente dominará as tendências a serem empregadas para desestabilizar países, nas próximas décadas.

Os não habituados a abordar a geopolítica a partir da perspectiva da Guerra Híbrida podem ter alguma dificuldade para compreender onde devem ocorrer as próximas, mas na verdade é fácil identificar as regiões e os países mais expostos ao risco dessa nova modalidade de agressão pelos EUA.

A chave para acertar nessa previsão é aceitar que Guerras Híbridas são conflitos assimétricos, cuja meta é sabotar interesses geoeconômicos concretos. A partir desse ponto, torna-se relativamente fácil apontar onde os EUA atacarão a seguir.

Essa série de artigos começa por expor os padrões que há por trás da Guerra Híbrida, conduzindo o leitor na direção de compreender melhor seus contornos estratégicos. Depois, demonstrarei que o quadro previamente elaborado já foi posto em ação durante as guerras dos EUA contra a Síria e a Ucrânia – os dois primeiros estados vítimas da Guerra Híbrida dos norte-americanos. Na parte seguinte, revisarei todas as lições que já devemos ter aprendido até aqui, e as aplicarei para prever os próximos teatros de Guerra Híbrida movida pelos EUA e, neles, os gatilhos geopolíticos mais vulneráveis e expostos. Artigos futuros portanto serão dedicados àquelas regiões, para mostrar por que são estrategicamente e sociopoliticamente tão vulneráveis a se tornarem as próximas vítimas da guerra pós-moderna que os EUA já fazem contra o mundo.

O padrão geral da Guerra Híbrida


Primeira coisa que se tem de saber sobre Guerras Híbridas é que nunca, em tempo algum, haverá Guerra Híbrida contra aliado dos EUA ou em lugar onde os EUA já tenham implantado interesses infraestruturais. Os processos caóticos disparados durante o golpe pós-moderno para mudança de regime não podem ser plenamente controlados e, potencialmente, poderiam gerar o mesmo tipo de revide geopolítico contra os EUA que Washington tenta direta ou indiretamente canalizar na direção de seus rivais multipolares.

Correspondentemente, aí está a razão pela qual os EUA jamais tentarão Guerra Híbrida onde haja interesses seus definidos como “grandes demais para falir”, embora essa avaliação seja sempre contemporaneamente relativa e possa mudar rapidamente, conforme as circunstâncias geopolíticas. Ainda assim, a regra geral a não esquecer é que os EUA jamais sabotarão intencionalmente seus próprios interesses, a menos que haja algum benefício de terra arrasada numa retirada; nesse contexto, pode-se pensar numa destruição da Arábia Saudita, se algum dia os EUA forem expulsos do Oriente Médio.

Determinantes geoestratégico-econômicos:

Antes de tratar dos fundamentos geoeconômicos da Guerra Híbrida, é importante registrar que os EUA também têm objetivos geoestratégicos (por exemplo, prender a Rússia num atoleiro predeterminado). O “Brzezinski Reverso”, como o autor o tem chamado, é aplicável simultaneamente à Europa Oriental, através do Donbass; ao Cáucaso, através de Nagorno-Karabakh; e à Ásia Central, através do Fergana Valley, e se for sincronizado mediante provocações cronometricamente coordenadas, nesse caso essa tríade de armadilhas podem-se comprovar letalmente eficientes para manter permanentemente enredado o urso russo.

Esse esquema maquiavélico sempre permanecerá como um risco, porque se baseia numa realidade geopolítica irrefutável, e o melhor que Moscou pode fazer é tentar impedir a conflagração concomitante de sua periferia pós-soviética, ou rapidamente e adequadamente responder, no momento em que elas emergem, às crises que os EUA provocam.

Os elementos geoestratégicos da Guerra Híbrida são portanto de algum modo não explicáveis a partir dos elementos geoeconômicos, especialmente no caso da Rússia. De fato, para tornar o padrão examinado mais amplamente pertinente a outros alvos, como China e Irã, é preciso omitir o estratagema “Brzezinski Reverso” como pré-requisito e, em vez de focar nele, dar mais atenção às motivações econômicas que os EUA têm em cada caso.

O grande objetivo por trás de toda e qualquer Guerra Híbrida é esfacelar projetos multipolares transnacionais conectivos, mediante conflitos de identidade provocados de fora para dentro (étnicos, religiosos, regionais, políticos, etc.), dentro de um estado de trânsito tomado como alvo.

Esse padrão pode ser claramente visto na Síria e na Ucrânia, e é a Lei da Guerra Híbrida. As específicas táticas e tecnologias sociais utilizadas em cada desestabilização podem variar, mas o conceito estratégico permanece fiel a essa concepção básica.

Tomando em conta esse objetivo final, é agora possível andar do teórico ao prático, e começar a traçar as rotas geográficas de vários projetos sobre os quais os EUA querem fazer mira.

Para qualificar, os projetos multipolares transnacionais conectivos a serem tomados por alvo podem ser (a) de base na energia, ou (b) projetos institucionais ou (c) econômicos, e quanto mais essas três categorias se superpuserem, mais provável que um cenário de Guerra Híbrida esteja sendo planejado para aquele determinado país.

Vulnerabilidades sociopolíticas estruturais:

Uma vez que os EUA tenham identificado seu alvo, começam a procurar por vulnerabilidades estruturais que explorarão na Guerra Híbrida vindoura. Contextualmente, essas vulnerabilidades não são objetos físicos a serem sabotados, como usinas de energia e estradas (embora essas também sejam listadas, mas por diferentes equipes de desestabilização), mas características sociopolíticas a serem manipuladas para enfatizar ‘sedutoramente’ uma dada ‘fissura’ de demografia no tecido nacional existente e, assim, ‘legitimar’ a revolta dos envolvidos, provocada de fora do país, contra as autoridades locais.

As vulnerabilidades estruturais abaixo listadas são as que mais se veem relacionadas à preparação para uma Guerra Híbrida; e se cada uma dessas puder ser associada a uma específica área geográfica, cresce a probabilidade de que seja usada para galvanizar os polos opostos na construção de uma Revolução Colorida e para demarcações territoriais preliminares para a Guerra Não Convencional:


* etnicidade;

* religião;

* história;

* regiões administrativas;

* desigualdades socioeconômicas;

* geografia física.

Quanto maior a sobreposição que se possa obter entre esses diferentes fatores, mais potente a energia potencial da Guerra Híbrida; e cada variável que se sobrepõe multiplica exponencialmente a viabilidade geral de toda a campanha e sua chance de ‘permanecer no poder’.


As Guerras Híbridas são sempre precedidas por um período de precondicionamento societal e estrutural. O precondicionamento societal tem a ver com aspectos informacionais e de soft power que maximizam a aceitação, por grupos demográficos chaves, da desestabilização que logo terá início, e os levam a crer que algum tipo de ação (ou aceitação passiva de ação empreendida por outros) é indispensável para alterar o presente estado de coisas

[A frase já viralizada, que Aécio Neves/seus marketeiros distribuíram ontem pelo Twitter: “Isso é inadmissível” – tão perfeitamente oca de significação relevante quanto o “Eu amo muito isso”, da propaganda das lojas McDonald –, é exemplo de ação que aspira a precondicionar a sociedade para uma ‘mudança’ suposta necessária e inadiável (NTs)].

O segundo tipo de precondicionamento, aqui dito “estrutural” tem a ver com os variados truques aos quais os EUA recorrem, para empurrar o governo alvo a agravar, sem que essa seja sua intenção, as várias diferenças políticas que já tenham sido identificadas, com o objetivo de criar clivagens de ressentimento identitário que, então, tornam todo o grupo mais suscetível ao precondicionamento societal e à ação subsequente de ONGs que coordenarão a organização política (a grande maioria das ONGs encarregadas dessa parte do ‘projeto’ são ligadas à Soros Foundation e/ou ao National Endowment for Democracy, do Congresso dos EUA).

[Aqui, bom exemplo é a ‘discussão’ que a mídia comercial dominante está promovendo no Brasil nesse momento, em torno de “Impeachment é golpe”/”Impeachment é legal”. Evidentemente, impeachment sem causa criminosa comprovada é golpe; e impeachment como definido na Constituição Federal, que exige causa criminosa comprovada, também evidentemente é legal e não é golpe. Sem explicar nenhuma dessas realidades, a mídia comercial põe-se a recolher opiniões de magistrados, o mais recente o ex-ministro do STF Eros Grau, que ‘declaram’ que “impeachment não é golpe”, sem nada acrescentar. – Assim, precisamente, é o golpe que se ‘ensina’ que não haveria. A confusão é total e, como se explica nesse artigo, é buscada. É golpe (NTs).]

Para expandir as táticas de precondicionamento estrutural, um dos meios mais frequentemente empregados e globalmente reconhecidos são as sanções. O objetivo implícito das sanções (embora nem sempre alcançado) sempre foi “tornar a vida mais difícil” para o cidadão médio, de tal modo que ele/ela torne-se mais permeável à ideia da mudança de regime e, assim, possa ser mais facilmente induzido/a a agir movido/a por impulsos que lhe foram instilados de fora.

Menos conhecidos, contudo, são os métodos mais oblíquos para alcançar esse objetivo, mas hoje implementados praticamente em todo o planeta, que envolvem o poder que os EUA têm para afetar algumas das funções orçamentárias dos estados-alvos de golpe, a saber, a renda com que podem contar e em que, precisamente, essa renda é gasta.

A queda global nos preços da energia e das commodities atingiu com extraordinária dureza os estados exportadores, muitos dos quais são desproporcionalmente dependentes da venda daqueles recursos para cumprir suas metas fiscais; e a queda na renda, em quase todos os casos, leva a cortes em gastos sociais.

Paralelamente, alguns estados enfrentam ameaças à sua segurança fabricadas nos EUA às quais são obrigadas a responder com urgência, o que exige deles ainda maios gastos não previstos, dessa vez para seus programas de defesa, dinheiro que, sem as ‘ameaças à segurança’ seria gasto e programas sociais.

Individualmente tomadas, cada uma dessas ‘trilhas’ visa a forçar o estado-alvo de golpe a ter de cortar gastos, o que cria dificuldades novas e serve como incubadora para as condições de médio prazo necessárias para o sucesso de uma Revolução Colorida – primeiro estágio de uma Guerra Híbrida.

No caso de um estado entrar em situação de, ao mesmo tempo, redução na arrecadação e aumento não planejado de gastos para defesa, que force cortes de gastos sociais, pode acontecer de a Revolução Colorida converter-se em projeto não mais de médio, mas de curto prazo, dependendo da severidade da crise doméstica resultante e do sucesso que as ONGs inspiradas e mantidas pelos EUA alcancem na organização política de blocos de oposição ao governo.******

Fonte: Oriental Review