The cause of the tension on the Korean Peninsula: a North Korean perspective

N. Korean researcher argues that the DPRK was forced to pursue a nuclear program by U.S. hostility

Kim Kwang Hak
April 7th, 2017

This article was contributed to NK News by the DPRK’s Institute of American Studies under the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While it has been edited for content and to conform with most aspects of NK News style, the North Korean state media custom of lower-casing the first letters in “north” and “south” Korea – reflecting the view that they are legitimately one nation – has been maintained. 

Throughout the centuries the Korean Peninsula has been drawn to a vortex of the vicious cycle of the escalation of the tension year after year.

There surely exists a problem on the Korean Peninsula, which has drawn the attentions and interests of the world and also made a number of politicians, policymakers and experts argue over the “solutions” for some decades.

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Full text of Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s World War II anniversary statement


The following is the official English-language translation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo’s statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII as endorsed by Japan’s cabinet on Friday:

“On the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, we must calmly reflect upon the road to war, the path we have taken since it ended, and the era of the 20th century. We must learn from the lessons of history the wisdom for our future.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, center, and wife Akie, behind him, pay respects at the grave of his late father and Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe in Yamaguchi prefecture, Japan, on Friday

More than one hundred years ago, vast colonies possessed mainly by the Western powers stretched out across the world. With their overwhelming supremacy in technology, waves of colonial rule surged toward Asia in the 19th century. There is no doubt that the resultant sense of crisis drove Japan forward to achieve modernization. Japan built a constitutional government earlier than any other nation in Asia. The country preserved its independence throughout. The Japan-Russia War gave encouragement to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa.

After World War I, which embroiled the world, the movement for self-determination gained momentum and put brakes on colonization that had been underway. It was a horrible war that claimed as many as ten million lives. With a strong desire for peace stirred in them, people founded the League of Nations and brought forth the General Treaty for Renunciation of War. There emerged in the international community a new tide of outlawing war itself.

At the beginning, Japan, too, kept steps with other nations. However, with the Great Depression setting in and the Western countries launching economic blocs by involving colonial economies, Japan’s economy suffered a major blow. In such circumstances, Japan’s sense of isolation deepened and it attempted to overcome its diplomatic and economic deadlock through the use of force. Its domestic political system could not serve as a brake to stop such attempts. In this way, Japan lost sight of the overall trends in the world.

With the Manchurian Incident, followed by the withdrawal from the League of Nations, Japan gradually transformed itself into a challenger to the new international order that the international community sought to establish after tremendous sacrifices. Japan took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war.

And, seventy years ago, Japan was defeated.

On the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, I bow my head deeply before the souls of all those who perished both at home and abroad. I express my feelings of profound grief and my eternal, sincere condolences.

More than three million of our compatriots lost their lives during the war: on the battlefields worrying about the future of their homeland and wishing for the happiness of their families; in remote foreign countries after the war, in extreme cold or heat, suffering from starvation and disease. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the air raids on Tokyo and other cities, and the ground battles in Okinawa, among others, took a heavy toll among ordinary citizens without mercy.

Also in countries that fought against Japan, countless lives were lost among young people with promising futures. In China, Southeast Asia, the Pacific islands and elsewhere that became the battlefields, numerous innocent citizens suffered and fell victim to battles as well as hardships such as severe deprivation of food. We must never forget that there were women behind the battlefields whose honour and dignity were severely injured.

Upon the innocent people did our country inflict immeasurable damage and suffering. History is harsh. What is done cannot be undone. Each and every one of them had his or her life, dream, and beloved family. When I squarely contemplate this obvious fact, even now, I find myself speechless and my heart is rent with the utmost grief.

The peace we enjoy today exists only upon such precious sacrifices. And therein lies the origin of postwar Japan.

We must never again repeat the devastation of war.

Incident, aggression, war — we shall never again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. We shall abandon colonial rule forever and respect the right of self-determination of all peoples throughout the world.

With deep repentance for the war, Japan made that pledge. Upon it, we have created a free and democratic country, abided by the rule of law, and consistently upheld that pledge never to wage a war again. While taking silent pride in the path we have walked as a peace-loving nation for as long as seventy years, we remain determined never to deviate from this steadfast course.

Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war. In order to manifest such feelings through concrete actions, we have engraved in our hearts the histories of suffering of the people in Asia as our neighbours: those in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and Taiwan, the Republic of Korea and China, among others; and we have consistently devoted ourselves to the peace and prosperity of the region since the end of the war.

Such position articulated by the previous cabinets will remain unshakable into the future.

However, no matter what kind of efforts we may make, the sorrows of those who lost their family members and the painful memories of those who underwent immense sufferings by the destruction of war will never be healed.

Thus, we must take to heart the following.

The fact that more than six million Japanese repatriates managed to come home safely after the war from various parts of the Asia-Pacific and became the driving force behind Japan’s postwar reconstruction; the fact that nearly three thousand Japanese children left behind in China were able to grow up there and set foot on the soil of their homeland again; and the fact that former POWs of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia and other nations have visited Japan for many years to continue praying for the souls of the war dead on both sides.

How much emotional strugglemust have existed and what great efforts must have been necessary for the Chinese people who underwent all the sufferings of the war and for the former POWs who experienced unbearable sufferings caused by the Japanese military in order for them to be so tolerant nevertheless?

That is what we must turn our thoughts to reflect upon.

Thanks to suchmanifestation of tolerance, Japan was able to return to the international community in the postwar era. Taking this opportunity of the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan would like to express its heartfelt gratitude to all the nations and all the people who made every effort for reconciliation.

In Japan, the postwar generations now exceed eighty per cent of its population. We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize. Still, even so, we Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future.

Our parents’ and grandparents’ generations were able to survive in a devastated land in sheer poverty after the war. The future they brought about is the one our current generation inherited and the one we will hand down to the next generation. Together with the tireless efforts of our predecessors, this has only been possible through the goodwill and assistance extended to us that transcended hatred by a truly large number of countries, such as the United States, Australia, and European nations, which Japan had fiercely fought against as enemies.

We must pass this down from generation to generation into the future. We have the great responsibility to take the lessons of history deeply into our hearts, to carve out a better future, and to make all possible efforts for the peace and prosperity of Asia and the world.

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan attempted to break its deadlock with force. Upon this reflection, Japan will continue to firmly uphold the principle that any disputes must be settled peacefully and diplomatically based on the respect for the rule of law and not through the use of force, and to reach out to other countries in the world to do the same. As the only country to have ever suffered the devastation of atomic bombings during war, Japan will fulfil its responsibility in the international community, aiming at the non-proliferation and ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons.

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when the dignity and honour of many women were severely injured during wars in the 20th century. Upon this reflection, Japan wishes to be a country always at the side of such women’s injured hearts. Japan will lead the world in making the 21st century an era in which women’s human rights are not infringed upon.

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when forming economic blocs made the seeds of conflict thrive. Upon this reflection, Japan will continue to develop a free, fair and open international economic system that will not be influenced by the arbitrary intentions of any nation. We will strengthen assistance for developing countries, and lead the world toward further prosperity. Prosperity is the very foundation for peace. Japan will make even greater efforts to fight against poverty, which also serves as a hotbed of violence, and to provide opportunities for medical services, education, and self-reliance to all the people in the world.

We will engrave in our hearts the past, when Japan ended up becoming a challenger to the international order. Upon this reflection, Japan will firmly uphold basic values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights as unyielding values and, by working hand in hand with countries that share such values, hoist the flag of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” and contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world more than ever before.

Heading toward the 80th, the 90th and the centennial anniversary of the end of the war, we are determined to create such a Japan together with the Japanese people.”

August 14, 2015
Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan

Fonte: Asia Times

Nuclear Attack on Japan was Opposed by American Military Leadership – Gar Alperovitz on RAI (2/5)

Mr. Alperovitz tells Paul Jay that President Truman used the A-bomb to make a “diplomatic” point to the Soviet Union, not out of military necessity –  

January 24, 2014

JAY: And one more time, Gar is the Lionel R. Bauman Professor of Political Economy at the University of Maryland and the cofounder of the Democracy Collaborative. He’s also the author of several books, including America beyond Capitalism, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, and his most recent, What Then Must We Do? Straight Talk about the Next American Revolution.So thanks for joining us again.ALPEROVITZ: Thank you.JAY: So let’s jump to the chase about the bomb. Your basic thesis was that Japan had already–essentially was ready to negotiate its surrender, and the bomb was not necessary to end the war. The contrary narrative is the bomb saved thousands of American lives, and this is war, and this is what you do in war in order to save your soldiers.ALPEROVITZ: Yes. I think it’s very clear now that the atomic bomb was totally unnecessary. The reason I say that is the intelligence studies which were available to the president in July 1945–the bomb was used in August–said very clearly that when the Russians entered the war in Japan–and we had asked them to come help, and they were about to help, the first week of August–that’s the date they were supposed to come in. When that happens, this will precipitate a collapse and a crisis in Japan. They’re already trying to get out of the war. They know they can’t face the Russian army and us. That will end the war. The only thing you need to do is be sure to say you’re not going to harm their emperor, because he’s a god in their culture. And if you give that kind of assurance when the Russians come in, the war is over. American policy leaders understood that. They know that. Every historian whose studied it knows these documents are now available. So they had it available.And more important than that, the invasion, which might have cost 25,000 lives, 30,000–that’s the estimates (it was later exaggerated to 1 million)–couldn’t take place for another three months because of the weather, because of getting troops. So it was easy to test whether or not the intelligence was correct. The Russians were coming in. And we knew they were going to–everyone said that the war was going to end. That was the top military understanding. And they used the bomb anyway.So I think that’s–the story is pretty clear now. Most historians know the bomb was unnecessary. There is a big debate about why it was used.JAY: Well, that was my next question. So if it’s to make a political point, what’s the point?ALPEROVITZ: Well, the documents are less clear about this, but what looks to be–there are many, many documents that say, look, this is going to give me “a hammer on those boys”, meaning the Russians. That’s the president talking. Another one says this is the–.JAY: This is Truman.ALPEROVITZ: Truman. His secretary of war says, this is the “master card” of diplomacy against the Russians, the atomic bomb. There are many, many documents that strongly suggest–particularly the secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, understood that the bomb was more a diplomatic tool than a military tool. The chief of staff of the U.S. Army and the Combined Chiefs, General Marshall, said, this is not a military decision. It has nothing to do with the military. It may be a diplomatic, political, other kind of decision, but it’s not a military decision.So, interestingly, the military–and I mentioned this, I think, in our last discussion–virtually all the major American military leaders went public after the war saying the atomic bomb was totally unnecessary. Some called it barbaric. The president’s chief of staff went public. Can you imagine the chief of staff saying–and he was a good friend of the president–said, this is barbarism. I wasn’t taught to kill children and women. So that’s very clear.The strongest evidence is–and you can’t prove this with the available documents–that it was mainly aimed at the Russians because they wanted to use it as political pressure and a political weapon, both in Eastern Europe and in Asia, where the Cold War really was started.JAY: And even though the Americans had been asking the Russians to get involved in Japan for a long time, it must have not been something they wanted, “The Russians Win the War with Japan”–that would not be a headline they would like to see.ALPEROVITZ: Right. And, indeed, they wanted them in because the bomb was a theory until it was tested–might not work. Who knew? And how well would it work? So they were begging the Russians to come in. And the instance it worked, they went ahead and used it.Moreover, they had planned to give the emperor assurances so that they could end the war quickly. And as soon as the bomb worked, they took that out of the documents, too, that they asked the Japanese to surrender. It made a big propaganda thing. But they took out the key point that we wouldn’t harm their emperor-god. And everyone knew if you did that, they would keep fighting forever.So it’s not a very–it’s a very unpleasant story about American diplomacy, to say the least.JAY: Yeah, and the psyche and the potential sociopathy of the presidency and the opening of decades of Cold War that often brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.ALPEROVITZ: Yup. It’s the beginning of it all.The thing that I think’s important to understand, because these people were ordinary human beings–the president, his secretary of state, they were not evil guys. They were caught up in an ideology that somehow, if we followed American strategy, we could save the world from another war, and the Russians are, they believe, communist devils. So they were operating out of a framework of ideology that dominated their thinking to the extent that 300,000 civilians were burned unnecessarily, killed. But it’s a mistake to see them just as bad guys. Much more important is: how does American corporate capitalism develop that ideology? And what does it really take to reach much deeper than good guys and bad guys?JAY: There’s a great deal of detail one can get into on this, but–and as I say, we’re going to get into kind of other themes in the rest of the interview. But one part of this I think is important, because you can see it show up again and again in other examples. Your book established things fairly definitively. And since, there have been other books that have established and reinforced your findings, there have been other research. As you say, I think most historians that have studied this have come to the same conclusion, that the bomb wasn’t necessary to end the war.The mass media narrative, the educational narrative is the exact opposite. Any article that talks about this talks about the bomb saved American lives in such and such. Your entire critique is as if it never happened in most mass media.ALPEROVITZ: Mass media is true. Some–they’re now having–I get high school inquiries all the time from students who are being asked to write papers about this, and they’re being given–they wouldn’t get to me unless they were being given my research materials and so forth. So in various parts of the country, there’s something going on, and particularly the younger generation. But the mass media, except for one program done by ABC that I happened to work with and consult with, Peter Jennings, before he died, opened up this issue just once.JAY: And this is the media just knowing that their job is to make sure the American narrative is not questioned, the official narrative doesn’t get challenged?ALPEROVITZ: No, I think what happens–.JAY: Or are they ignorant of the work?ALPEROVITZ: Partly ignorant. I think what really happens is there are right-wing historians who, of course, disagree, and they write big, long books. And here’s another book–even though this is the common view in many parts of the world now outside the United States, the media people are caught between this guy and that guy, and they take the cautious road. They don’t know enough of the–they don’t want to make the judgments. They don’t want to dig deep enough into it.JAY: But there’s also partly not wanting to believe that your president is capable of such a thing.ALPEROVITZ: I think so, yes. That’s part of it as well.JAY: I mean, I remember having a discussion/debate with a relative of mine just before the Iraq War, and I was saying, there is simply no evidence of weapons of mass destruction. Just listen to Hans Blix. He’s saying there’s nothing there. Blix keeps saying, if you know where they are, tell me; I’ll go find them. And he–you know, this relative looks me in the eye and says, there is just no way I can believe that my president knowingly would start a war based on a lie. As much is he didn’t like Bush, he votes Democrat, he just couldn’t believe–.ALPEROVITZ: That’s right. I think that is true. I think you put your finger on something. It’s very hard to believe that people would have actually done this, because it is such a brutal and vicious thing to do.It goes further. And here’s how. This is what really caught me up. After the atomic bombs were used, after the Japanese had surrendered publicly (Radio Tokyo) but before their formal papers had passed–the war was over–the United States ordered, the president ordered the largest bombing raid in world history, 1,400 bombers. It did more damage than probably Hiroshima. But the sense that people would actually do that–. I remember putting that on my mirror [incompr.] I just couldn’t believe it either.JAY: And how do the right-wing historians rationalize this?ALPEROVITZ: They just ignore it. It’s just ignored.JAY: This idea that my president could never do such a thing, it’s a narrative that’s so protected–. You must know the example of–it came out in the Johnson tapes that Nixon had deliberately scuttled Johnson’s negotiations with the North Vietnamese. And Johnson was very close to an end of the Vietnam War, and Nixon sends an emissary to the North Vietnamese saying, if you sign with Johnson, I’m the next president. I’m not going to go along with the agreement, but I will make the deal with you. And so the North Vietnamese don’t make the deal with Johnson, and, of course, Nixon doesn’t make the deal, and tens of thousands of Americans are killed, but hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and Cambodians. And same thing; I mean, people say, well, could–would a president of mine really deliberately do such a thing? And the answer is: yeah.ALPEROVITZ: Yep. It is–and case by case. Some of them would–and some of them believing it was the right thing to do. I mean, that’s Truman. Truman thought he was doing good, not bad.So that’s–see, that’s what gets really–they actually do it. It’s very hard to believe. And then, how did they [incompr.]JAY: But Truman worked–you know, he’s Roosevelt’s vice president. Roosevelt says, we can work with the Russians. Roosevelt did work with the Russians. There’s a whole culture of–you know, even with–I mean, Wallace is on the outs by then, who was–had previously been Roosevelt’s vice president. But, I mean, it wasn’t such a–you know, but we had not gotten yet to McCarthyism and such. You know, Truman didn’t have to go there. But there’s a very deliberate attempt to create this hysteria.ALPEROVITZ: Yes. What Truman was–Truman was very different from Roosevelt from the beginning. I mean, during the war he publicly, in the Senate, made a speech saying, what we should do is aid the Russians so they can kill more of the Nazis and aid the Nazis to kill the Russians. I mean, he had a very different mentality, and his secretary of state had a different mentality. The whole Roosevelt crew was dumped out as soon as Roosevelt died, and that mentality came into office. It took them a long while to bring the country with them on lots of issues. It took them two or three years to really get the country behind them, because the country didn’t buy that. That was not accepted.JAY: Now, we were talking about the role of the media in kind of keeping to this official narrative. And I saw in The New York Times just the other day, there’s a story about Syria, and there’s a paragraph in the article, Syria having used chemical weapons, da-da-da-da-da. Now, as far–unless I missed something here, there is still no evidence that the Syrian government used the chemical weapons. Now, I’m fully–could believe that they could. I have no great illusions about Assad and the Syrian government. But as far as I know, there’s no evidence. And, in fact, there’s lots of evidence that it might have been somewhere on the opposition side used them. But it’s just–it’s that paragraph’s in the article, the Syrian government used chemical weapons ba-pa-da-bup-bup-ba, and it becomes the narrative.ALPEROVITZ: Yes, it does. I mean, on these issues the easy way to go for the press is to go that direction rather than to dig and oppose the conventional wisdom or the presidential–. And that gives them access. If you start raising questions–Seymour Hersh has been having trouble because he’s trying to raise these issues that–you know, the great investigative journalist is now having trouble getting some of his things out and he’s publicly going to using the London Review of Books.JAY: It’s still the echo of the Cold War, isn’t it? Like, if you get off the official narrative, then what’s your agenda?ALPEROVITZ: Yeah.JAY: You know, you’ve got your own political agenda. And, you know, there’s still this, you know, kind of Cold War mentality.ALPEROVITZ: You know, and journalists wanting to protect their access to key people in the government, who they need, they think, to get their stories rather than to dig, dig, dig. It’s best not to raise certain issues.JAY: Right. Okay. We’re going to move on now to the next segment, where we’re going to look at this–what Gar has been spending most of his time for the last few years working on, which is what would a new economy look like and what would America after capitalism look like, and also how do we get there.

Fonte: The Real News Network

Mas… E qual é o verdadeiro negócio com o Irã?


31/7/2015, The Saker, The Vineyard of the Saker

Tenho de começar a coluna com um mea culpa: desde pelo menos 2007, vivo a prever que os EUA atacarão o Irã; e até agora, sempre errei completamente. O ataque nunca aconteceu. Mas acertei, ou pelo menos espero ter acertado, nas razões pelas quais esse ataque não conseguiu se materializar, pelo menos até agora. Em termos puramente militares, um ataque contra o Irã não poderia ser bem-sucedido, porque o Irã tinha opções demais, para contra-ataque assimétrico. Mas as verdadeiras razões por trás do fracasso certo de qualquer ataque dos EUA contra o Irã estão enterradas sob uma montanha de mitos que cercam a questão nuclear iraniana. Hoje, proponho examinar, embora não muito profundamente, o maior desses mitos.

O mito: Irã trabalha num programa militar nuclear

Esse, claro, é o principal mito, a pedra basilar de todas as demais tolices que se escreveram sobre o Irã. A resiliência desse mito baseia-se num fator simples: é impossível provar uma premissa que comece com “não”. Assim como o Iraque jamais pôde provar que não tinha armas de destruição em massa, o Irã não pode provar que não tem programa militar nuclear. A comunidade de inteligência dos EUA mostrou nível de coragem realmente surpreendente quando, apesar da pressão imensa de neoconservadores que endossavam esse mito, a comunidade concluiu, no 2007 NIE, que o Irã tivera um programa nuclear no passado, mas parou de trabalhar nele. Mesmo assim, o bom-senso nos confirma o que se pode descrever como “prova circunstancial eloquente” de que o Irã não tem qualquer intenção de desenvolver alguma arma nuclear.

Para começar, desenvolver realmente uma arma nuclear não significaria que o Irã conseguiria usá-la, muito menos contra Israel. À parte a bomba propriamente dita, capacidade nuclear implica ter todos os seguintes itens:

– Possibilidade de testar a bomba nuclear (se não é testada, não tem qualquer serventia).

– Sistema de transporte e disparo (míssil, avião).

– Habilidades para proteger a bomba nuclear e o sistema de transporte/disparo contra ataque preventivo para desarmá-los.

– E o mais importante de tudo: uma estratégia de guerra, uma doutrina militar sobre como usar a capacidade nuclear.

Fato é que o Irã não tem como testar bomba alguma, sem que o planeta tome conhecimento. O Irã não tem sistema confiável e que sobreviva, para transportar e disparar a bomba; e, mais importante ainda, o Irã não pode nem cogitar de usar bomba atômica contra EUA ou Israel, sem sofrer ataque devastador de retaliação. Tenham em mente que, embora, com certeza total, os militares israelenses não tenham meios pelos quais ferir significativamente o Irã com armas convencionais, o estado judeu com certeza também total tem meios pelos quais ferir gravemente o Irã, com o vasto e sofisticado arsenal nuclear israelense. Em outras palavras, usar nukes seria suicídio para o Irã.

Pregadores e defensores do mito das armas nucleares iranianas vivem a citar a República Popular Democrática da Coreia, a “Coreia do Norte”, como “prova de que bombas atômicas são proteção eficaz contra ataques do Tio Sam”. O problema é que essa gente não presta atenção a uma diferença crucial: a capital da Coreia do Sul, Seul, está dentro da área de alcance dos tiros, e a RPDC tem vastíssima capacidade militar convencional, a qual, embora envelhecida e pouco sofisticada, mesmo assim pode causar dano terrível à Coreia do Sul e às forças dos EUA ali alocadas. Segundo a Wikipedia, a RPDC tem 9,495 milhões de pessoal ativo, da reserva e paramilitares (inclusive 180 mil soldados de forças especiais), o que faz da ‘Coreia do Norte’ a maior organização militar da face do planeta. E tudo isso, literalmente, a apenas uns poucos passos de caminhada de distância de Seul! Bem diferente disso, o Irã absolutamente não tem poder para projetar capacidades que tornariam possível atacar Israel.

Quando encurralados por argumentos lógicos irrespondíveis, os apoiadores/pregadores do mito do programa militar nuclear do Irã voltam sempre ao clichê super desgastado de “muçulmanos são fanáticos”, todos querendo “morrer por Alá” e toda a correspondente restante imbecilidade ‘ensinada’ ao público pelos veículos da imprensa-empresa. O problema aí é que há exatamente nenhuma prova, provas zero, que demonstre a dita “insanidade” dos líderes iranianos (e, não, não, Ahmadinejad jamais disse que o Irã varreria Israel do mapa). De fato, considerando que desde 1979 os EUA vêm fazendo tudo que seja imaginável para derrubar a República Islâmica ou, no mínimo, para criar um pretexto para poder atacá-la, eu diria que os iranianos são gente extremamente sofisticada e altamente inteligente. O modo como o Irã usou os neoconservadores norte-americanos para fazer os EUA atacarem o Iraque (o pior inimigo dos iranianos), em vez de o Irã ter de atacar, me parece movimento simplesmente brilhantíssimo. Não, os iranianos não são, absolutamente não, doidos; eles sabem que ter uma arma nuclear não ajudará a proteger o Irã; e eles sabem que jamais poderiam usá-la, sem determinar o fim da República Islâmica. Além disso, os que tanto acreditam que os muçulmanos sejam doidos com tendência ao suicídio nuclear, jamais tiveram a ideia de bombardear o Paquistão. Quero dizer: por que o Irã, sim, mas o Paquistão, não?

A realidade: o Irã é ameaça civilizacional à hegemonia dos EUA, a Israel e ao Reino da Arábia Saudita

Essa é a real razão de todas as tensões, agitar de sabres e histeria: o Irã representa enorme ameaça política, social, econômica, religiosa e até civilizacional aos EUA, a Israel e aos sauditas. Diferente do regime saudita obscurantista e totalitário, a República Islâmica é democrática, democracia islâmica, socialmente progressista, capaz de alcançar sucessos realmente espantosos, no plano econômico, científico e social, sob condições extremamente duras, que incluíram, desde sanções econômicas e políticas impostas pelos EUA, até uma devastadora guerra, que durou sete anos, contra o Iraque (integralmente apoiado e armado até os dentes por EUA, União Soviética e França). Oh, claro, o Irã não é sociedade perfeita e sem mácula, mas, comparado ao resto do Oriente Médio, é realmente um paraíso sobre a Terra.

Que o Irã tenha alcançado tudo que alcançou, em aberto e total desafio contra ambos, EUA e Israel, é absolutamente inaceitável para o Império Anglo-sionista. Só isso já basta, como razão para desejarem fazer ao Irã o que recentemente fizeram à Líbia e à Síria. Quanto aos sauditas, não só o reino medieval wahhabista deles aparece como ainda mais flagrantemente bárbaro, se comparado ao Irã, mas, também, há uma considerável minoria xiita que vive quase exatamente sobre os maiores campos de petróleo do reino. Na verdade, por alguma ironia do destino, se se examina um mapa da Arábia Saudita ou do Iraque, logo se vê que os xiitas vivem quase exatamente sobre os mais ricos campos de petróleo dos dois países. Por fim, o Irã é aliado natural do regime alawita na Síria e, especialmente, do Hezbollah no Líbano.

Um aspecto dos sucessos da República Islâmica é que o Irã esteve, como ainda está, trabalhando num programa nuclear para finalidades civis. Primeiro, o Irã sempre precisou de fonte alternativa de energia e por isso, já nos aos 1950s, os EUA forneceram ao Irã inúmeras tecnologias nucleares civis, sob programa Atoms for Peace. Segundo, o Irã também está engajado em pesquisa nuclear, também para finalidades médicas; e ter programa de pesquisa nuclear civil é fonte de grande prestígio.

Mas ainda mais importante que isso, o programa nuclear iraniano converteu-se em um símbolo de soberania. Tio Sam diz “não, você não pode”, e o Irã replica “ah, podemos sim, podemos e faremos.” Esse é o verdadeiro ‘crime’ cuja ‘culpa’ pesa sobre o Irã: ter desafiado a hegemonia anglo-sionista sobre o Oriente Médio.

Pode haver muitas razões pelas quais os EUA assinaram afinal esse acordo ‘P5+1’ com o Irã. Vão de simples “fadiga imperial” até um desejo, em Obama, de mostrar o ‘acordo’ como feito de sua presidência (absolutamente catastrófica, sem nem o acordo para exibir). Pode também ter acontecido de o establishment de segurança dos EUA ter feito contas (certas) e concluído que os EUA simplesmente não teriam fôlego para fazer guerra ao Irã. Seja qual for a causa, fato é que o acordo foi afinal firmado, e esse é resultado, mesmo que provisório, extremamente bom.

Potencialmente, o Irã pode desempenhar papel crucial e altamente benéfico no Oriente Médio, primeiro e sobretudo, como único país realmente capaz de dar conta do Daesh (também chamado “Estado Islâmico”, ISIL e ISIS) e de estabilizar o Iraque. Sim, é verdade: enquanto os EUA continuarem a apoiar a al-Qaeda na Síria, os horrores só continuarão. De fato, algum analista da CIA particularmente mais pervertido poderia argumentar que dar poder ao Irã pode tornar menos arriscada a derrubada do regime sírio, porque, mesmo no caso de Damasco cair frente à al-Qaeda, o Irã ainda teria meios para conter os terroristas.

Seja qual for o caso, a verdade é que, hoje, só o Irã e o Hezbollah estão impedindo o Daesh de assumir o controle de toda a região. Assim sendo, eu não descartaria totalmente a possibilidade de a CIA & Co. ter aliviado a pressão sobre o Irã, mesmo temporariamente, para dar ‘um aperto’ no Daesh (empurrando os dois lados na direção do conflito, como ensina a velha anglo-tradição).

Aqui tenho de voltar ao mea culpa inicial. Passei anos prevendo que os EUA atacariam o Irã e, em vez de ataque, o que se tem hoje é um Plano Amplo Conjunto de Ação (PACA) [ing. Joint Comprehensive Action Plan, JCAP] entre o Irã e o P5+1.

Confesso que estou tão feliz com o acordo, quanto descrente de que venha a ser implementado. Estou feliz, porque, se o acordo for levado a sério, pode realmente fazer sentido e diluir uma situação desnecessariamente perigosa. Mas também estou muito cético. Quando observo a reação histérica do lobby israelense nos EUA, custo a acreditar que o acordo, algum dia, venha a ser cumprido pelos EUA. Afinal de contas, se os neocons não controlam completamente a Casa Branca, com certeza controlam todo o Congresso e a imprensa-empresa nos EUA. E nem o fato de que a maioria dos judeus norte-americanos apoiam o acordo com o Irã os deterá. Como já disse incontáveis vezes, o sionismo não é questão étnica nem religiosa, é uma ideologia; e os judeus norte-americanos não têm mais influência sobre o regime dos 1% no poder, que os norte-americanos não judeus. Quanto aos 1%, eles só são leais a eles mesmos. Significa que os siodoidos [orig. Ziocrazies] conseguirão destruir o acordo com o Irã? Honestamente não sei, mas confesso que, por natureza, não tendo ao otimismo. *****

UN endorses Iran nuclear deal unanimously, paving way for sanctions relief

CrossTalk: Tehran Pivot? (Ft. Pepe Escobar & Gareth Porter)


16 de Março, 2014 – 18:00 ( Brasília )


Leonam dos Santos Guimarães

Diretor Técnico-Comercial da Amazônia Azul Tecnologias de Defesa SA
– AMAZUL e membro do Grupo Permanente de Assessoria em Energia Nuclear da AIEA.

Em 8 de dezembro de 1953, o presidente Eisenhower comprometeu-se em célebre discurso perante a Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas[i], em buscar firmemente resolver o aterrorizante dilema das armas nucleares, com determinação e dedicar todos os “corações e mentes” dos EUA para encontrar o caminho que permitiria que a inventividade milagrosa do homem não fosse dedicada à guerra e a morte, mas consagrada à paz e a vida. À época do discurso, somente possuíam armas nucleares os EUA e a Rússia, então URSS.

Sessenta anos se passaram desde que o discurso, denominado “Átomos para a Paz”, foi pronunciado. O programa dele decorrente[ii] deu origem à indústria nuclear global, e precipitou um progresso notável no uso de tecnologia nuclear para melhorar a saúde pública e o desenvolvimento humano. Poucos discursos na história foram ao mesmo tempo tão controversos, mal compreendidos e com legado tão duradouro.

Hoje, 31 países têm um total de 438 usinas nucleares e mais de 246 reatores de pesquisa operacionais. Aproximadamente 10.000 hospitais em todo o mundo usam radioisótopos para realizar mais de 30 milhões de procedimentos médicos por ano. As aplicações nucleares pacíficas incluem erradicação de insetos causadores de doenças e a produção de cultivares induzidos pela radiação que melhoraram o rendimento das culturas alimentares no mundo em desenvolvimento. Além disso, Átomos para a Paz forneceu a base ideológica para a criação da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica (AIEA) e do Tratado de Não Proliferação de Armas Nucleares (TNP).

Mas nem todo o legado foi positivo, já que o programa “Átomos para a Paz” contribuiu para aumentar os riscos de proliferação das armas nucleares, tanto horizontal (desenvolvimento de armas em países que não as possuem) como vertical (mais armas nos países que as possuem). O programa deu cobertura política para a proliferação vertical decorrente da corrida armamentista da Guerra Fria, apesar de propugnar, em tese, o desarmamento.

Cerca de 130 mil ogivas nucleares foram produzidas entre 1945 e 2013, sendo que mais de 10.000 delas permanecem atualmente nos arsenais de nove países: EUA, Rússia, China, Grã-Bretanha, França, Israel, Índia, Paquistão e Coréia do Norte. O programa ainda precipitou tanto a criação do regime internacional de salvaguardas contra a não proliferação nuclear horizontal assim como muitos dos desafios a esse próprio regime que surgiram posteriormente.

Eisenhower estava ciente de que a cooperação nuclear pacífica apresentava os riscos de desenvolvimento de armas nucleares em países que não as possuíam. No entanto, como muitos de seus sucessores, o presidente viu os benefícios que o programa traria para o equilíbrio da Guerra Fria e deu a isso maior prioridade do que quaisquer riscos de proliferação que o acompanhassem. A não proliferação horizontal é apenas um dos muitos, e muitas vezes conflitantes, interesses nacionais dos EUA. Não tem, e não pode ter sempre, a maior prioridade.

Enquanto o programa “Átomos para a Paz” apressou o surgimento de ameaças regionais de proliferação, foi também a base do regime internacional de salvaguardas moderno. Além disso, permitiu o desenvolvimento e a utilização generalizada das tecnologias nucleares civis para benefício da humanidade. Ainda que a barganha subjacente ao programa e ao TNP permaneça intacta, evoluiu muito em resposta às lições aprendidas e as mudanças na paisagem geopolítica. No balanço, sessenta anos depois, o discurso Átomos para a Paz de Eisenhower merece ser lembrado muito mais pelos benefícios que proporcionou do que pelos problemas que possa ter causado.