The Partition: The British game of ‘divide and rule’

Texto 52

10/08/2017, by Sashi Tharoor

On August 15, 1947, India won independence: a moment of birth that was also an abortion, since freedom came with the horrors of the partition, when East and West Pakistan were hacked off the stooped shoulders of India by the departing British.

Seventy years later, it is hard to look back without horror at the savagery of the country’s vivisection, when rioting, rape and murder scarred the land, millions were uprooted from their homes, and billions of rupees worth of property were damaged and destroyed. Within months, India and Pakistan were embroiled in a war over Kashmir, the consequences of which still affect us today.

There was an intangible partition, too. Friendships were destroyed, families ruined, geography hacked, history misread, tradition denied, minds and hearts torn apart. The creation and perpetuation of Hindu-Muslim antagonism was the most significant accomplishment of British imperial policy: the colonial project of “divide et impera” (divide and rule) fomented religious antagonisms to facilitate continued imperial rule and reached its tragic culmination in 1947.

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O que diferencia ‘erro’ de ‘crime’ na invasão britânica ao Iraque em 2003

Publicado Originalmente em: 10/07/2016

POR: João Paulo Charleaux

Relatório culpa ex-premiê do Reino Unido Tony Blair por invadir e ocupar território iraquiano há 13 anos sem respaldo da ONU. Custo político é certo. Consequências legais, nem tanto.

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Depois de ouvir 120 pessoas, num trabalho que consumiu sete anos de pesquisas e US$ 13,3 milhões em recursos, a comissão oficial britânica criada para analisar a decisão do Reino Unido de invadir e ocupar o Iraque em 2003 concluiu que o então premiê Tony Blair estava errado.

A conclusão tem consequências imediatas para Blair, uma das figuras de maior destaque no Partido Trabalhista, que governou o país por dez anos (1997-2007) e nunca deixou de estar no primeiro plano da política britânica. Ao longo de seus 12 volumes, o relatório afirma que Blair enganou os cidadãos do Reino Unido e a opinião pública mundial, oferecendo falsos argumentos para embasar uma polêmica ação militar contra o Iraque, cujas consequências se fazem sentir ainda hoje.

À época, o Reino Unido agiu atendendo a um pedido de cooperação apresentado pelos EUA. Após os atentados de 11 de Setembro, cometidos pela rede terrorista Al-Qaeda, os americanos expandiram sua ação contra o terrorismo e contra governos apontados pela Casa Branca como coniventes ou cooperantes com o terror.

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O então presidente americano George W. Bush tentou de diversas formas provar que o então presidente iraquiano Saddam Hussein possuía arsenais de armas de destruição em massa que ameaçavam a segurança internacional. A ONU nunca encontrou esse arsenal. Mesmo assim, EUA e Reino Unido formaram uma aliança militar que invadiu e ocupou o Iraque, capturando Saddam Hussein, que terminou enforcado por ordem de um tribunal local instaurado sob comando americano.

A queda do governo iraquiano – que a despeito do debate sobre as armas de destruição em massa, já era responsável por inúmeros crimes de guerra e crimes contra a humanidade – deu início a um período de desintegração do governo e de maior instabilidade na região. Esse processo facilitou, anos depois, a ascensão do Estado Islâmico, que, em seguida, expandiria sua ação para a Síria e a Turquia, chegando a realizar atualmente atentados de grande envergadura na França e na Bélgica.

Esse encadeamento dos fatos é apresentado por diversos autores dedicados ao estudo da dinâmica do conflito na Síria e no Iraque, mas foi rechaçada por Blair.

O episódio de 2003 marcou a primeira vez, desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, que o Reino Unido participou de uma coalizão militar que “invadiu e ocupou em larga escala uma nação soberana”.

179

É o número de militares britânicos mortos no Iraque

Respostas duras

A comissão responsável pelo relatório foi criada para responder duas questões principais.

Era necessário invadir o Iraque em 2003?

Sob esse tópico, a conclusão foi de que “o Reino Unido escolheu fazer parte da invasão conjunta do Iraque antes de exaurir as opções pacíficas para o desarmamento. A ação militar naquela época não foi o último recurso. O juízo a respeito da severidade da ameaça representada pelas armas de destruição em massa foi apresentado com uma certeza que não se justificava”.

O Reino Unido também falhou no pós-guerra?

Aqui, os autores do estudo dizem que “apesar dos alertas explícitos, as consequências da invasão foram subestimadas. O planejamento e os preparativos para o Iraque pós-Saddam Hussein foram completamente inadequados. O governo falhou em alcançar os objetivos”

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A Carta da ONU proíbe explicitamente as ações militares, salvo em situações específicas como numa resposta legítima a uma agressão internacional ou quando o Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas – formado por Reino Unido, EUA, França, China e Rússia – aprova por unanimidade uma ação militar.

No caso do Iraque, foi adotada no dia 8 de novembro a Resolução 1441, que dava ao país uma oportunidade final para o desarmamento, sob a ameaça da imposição de “severas consequências”. As armas mencionadas não existiam – fato que foi comprovado posteriormente – e, por isso, nunca foram entregues.

Ainda assim, britânicos e americanos pressionaram por uma nova resolução, que autorizasse o uso da força, mas ela nunca foi aprovada. Mesmo sem aprovação, a invasão aconteceu – completamente à margem do direito internacional e sob forte condenação de parte da opinião pública mundial.

“O relatório não determina se a ação militar foi legal. Isso só poderia ser determinado, é claro, por uma corte formalmente estabelecida e internacionalmente reconhecida. Nós concluímos, entretanto, que as bases legais para uma ação militar britânica estiveram longe de ser satisfatórias”

John Chilcot

Chefe da comissão de inquérito, no pronunciamento de divulgação do relatório final, em 6 de julho

Caminhos para a responsabilização

O relatório deixa claro que não tem a intenção de julgar Tony Blair. Mas ele apresenta todos os argumentos para qualquer um que queira fazê-lo no futuro.

Os primeiros interessados são os parentes dos 179 militares britânicos mortos numa operação que – agora se sabe – foi não apenas ilegítima e repetidamente contestada, mas também possivelmente ilegal, de acordo com as conclusões do relatório.

Teoricamente, há quatro possibilidades de que Blair, como pessoa, e o Reino Unido, enquanto Estado, sejam julgados.

O professor de direito internacional da PUC-RJ Gustavo Senechal disse ao Nexo que é “improvável” que isso aconteça. Para ele, a ação de Blair foi “absolutamente ilegal”, mas “o direito objeto depende do interesse político, que depende da hegemonia de poder na ordem internacional”, favorável hoje a potências como os EUA e o Reino Unido.

Caminhos da justiça

JUSTIÇA DOMÉSTICA

Uma primeira hipótese de julgamento – e a mais provável também, dentro da improbabilidade apontada por Senechal – é que as próprias cortes britânicas comecem a receber demandas de cidadãos locais contra Blair e contra o governo, seja para pedir indenização, seja para responsabilizá-los por uma ação militar ordenada à margem da Carta da ONU.

TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNACIONAL

Essa corte foi criada para julgar exatamente casos como esse, mas Senechal diz que “jamais veremos Bush ou Blair aí, pois essa corte foi criada para julgar líderes do terceiro mundo”. De fato, essa crítica é recorrente, sobretudo porque todos os investigados atuais são de países africanos. Os procuradores do Tribunal teriam autonomia para abrir uma investigação.

CORTE DE HAIA

Existe a possibilidade de que o governo do Iraque use o relatório para acionar o governo do Reino Unido na Corte Internacional de Justiça de Haia, na Holanda. Essa instância não julga pessoas, apenas Estados. O problema, segundo Senechal, é que o artigo 36, conhecido como “cláusula facultativa de jurisdição obrigatória”, determina que ambos os Estados têm de reconhecer a jurisdição da corte sobre o caso para que ele tenha andamento, o que é improvável no caso britânico.

TRIBUNAL AD HOC

É a possibilidade mais remota de todas. Nesse caso, a ONU tomaria a iniciativa de criar um tribunal específico para julgar exclusivamente o caso da invasão do Iraque em 2003. Sua criação, entretanto, dependeria de uma aprovação unânime do Conselho de Segurança, do qual o Reino Unido é um dos cinco membros permanentes, com poder de veto.

Foto 1: Stefan Rousseau/ Reuters 29.03.2003

Foto 2: Nexo Jornal

Foto 3: Kevin Lamarque/ Reuters 08.04.2003

Fonte: NEXO JORNAL

Eight reasons Leave won the UK’s referendum on the EU

The UK has voted to quit the European Union following a referendum on its membership. So how did the Leave campaign win?

 

1. Brexit economic warnings backfire

Mark Carney with the UK's new £5 noteImage copyrightEPA

What started off as a trickle soon became a steady stream and ended up as a flood.

The public was bombarded with warnings about how they would be poorer if they voted to leave the EU but, in the end, weren’t convinced by what they were told and/or believed it was a price worth paying.

The CBI, the IMF, the OECD, the IFS – an alphabet soup of experts lined up to say economic growth would be hobbled, unemployment would go up, the pound would plummet and British business would be left in a no man’s land outside the EU.

The Bank of England raised the prospect of a recession while The Treasury said it would be forced to put income tax up and slash spending on the NHS, schools and defence.

If that wasn’t enough, President Obama suggested the UK would go to the “back of the queue” in terms of securing a trade deal with the US while top EU official Donald Tusk hinted at the end of Western political civilization.

Some on the Remain side accepted this was overkill and that so-called “Project Fear” had got a bit out of hand while the Leave campaign was quick to dismiss the naysayers as wealthy, unaccountable elites with their own vested interests talking down Britain.

But the fact the public discounted so readily the advice of experts points to something more than just a revolt against the establishment. It suggested far more people felt left behind and untouched by the economic benefits of five decades of EU involvement being trumpeted.

How will Brexit affect your finances?


2. £350m NHS claim gets traction

Vote Leave battle busImage copyrightGETTY IMAGES

The assertion that leaving the EU would free up £350m a week extra to spend on the NHS is the kind of political slogan that campaigns dream of: striking, easy to understand and attractive to voters of different ages and political persuasions.

No surprise then that Vote Leave chose to splash it across the side of their battle bus.

The fact that the claim does not stand up to much scrutiny – the figure is calculated using sums which were disputed by the Treasury Select Committee and described as potentially misleading by the UK Statistics Authority – did not reduce its potency.

Remain campaigner Angela Eagle may have told her opponents to “get that lie off your bus” but polling suggests it gained traction and was the single most remembered figure from the campaign, with many people believing that money handed over to the EU to be a member should be spent in the UK instead.

In that sense, it served as a powerful illustration of how the UK could be better off outside the EU.


3. Farage makes immigration the defining issue

Nigel Farage at the launch of a UKIP posterImage copyrightEPA

If they didn’t quite bet the farm on the issue of immigration, Leave played what they knew was their trump card often and they played it successfully.

The issue fed into wider questions of national and cultural identity, which suited Leave’s message – particularly to lower income voters.

The result suggested that concerns about levels of migration into the UK over the past 10 years, their impact on society, and what might happen in the next 20 years were more widely felt and ran even deeper than people had suspected.

Just as crucially, it suggested Leave’s central argument that the UK cannot control the number of people coming into the country while remaining in the EU really hit home.

Turkey was a key weapon in Leave’s armoury and, although claims that the UK would not be able to stop it entering the EU were firmly denied, there was enough uncertainty about this – a fact that the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe unquestionably fed into.

The language and imagery used by the Leave campaign came in for criticism and there were recurring tensions between the Conservative dominated official Leave movement, Nigel Farage’s UKIP roadshow and the separate Leave.EU group.

But their various messages resonated and segued with their central proposition that a vote to leave was a once in a generation chance to take control and assert national sovereignty.


4. Public stop listening to PM

David Cameron on the BBC's Question Time showImage copyrightPA

David Cameron may have won one leadership contest, one (or two if you include the 2010 coalition-forming one) general elections and two referendums in the past ten years but this was the moment his luck ran out.

By putting himself front and centre of the Remain campaign, and framing the decision as a question of trust, he staked his political future and personal reputation on the outcome.

Having put so much store on his ability to secure a fundamental change in the UK’s relationship with the EU, it was inevitable that the concessions he came back with following nine months of negotiations would be dismissed as a damp squib by Eurosceptics in his party.

But this summed up a deeper problem. Having constantly stated that he would “not rule anything out” if he didn’t get what he wanted, trying to enthuse the UK to stay in on the basis of reforms most believed were modest at best was always going to be a difficult sell.

Throughout the process, he found himself at odds with many Conservatives who have never quite reconciled themselves to his decision to go into coalition after the 2010 election and the compromises that brought.

Unsuited to winning over Labour supporters, the prime minister was not able to persuade enough floating voters to give him the benefit of the doubt.

It was his failure to get the outcome he wanted, coupled with his desire to try and unify the country after the bruising campaign, that prompted him to say he would stand down as PM by October.


5. Labour fail to connect with voters

Labour's shadow cabinetImage copyrightPA

The Remain campaign always needed Labour voters to win the referendum and the fact that they did not play ball will be the subject of a long and acrimonious post-mortem within the opposition.

Not only did Labour – 90% of whose MPs backed staying in the EU – badly misjudge the mood of its supporters, when it realised something was wrong during the campaign, it was unable to do much about it.

Despite sending in big beasts such as Gordon Brown and Sadiq Khan to talk up the benefits of the EU, and hinting that further controls on immigration would be needed, it was unable to shift the impression of a growing schism between those running the party and its base.

Although Alan Johnson, the head of Labour In, has been singled out for criticism, it is likely that Jeremy Corbyn – who declined to share a platform with pro-EU politicians of other parties – will take most of the blame.

Critics have said his lukewarm support for the EU – which he summed up as 7 out of ten in one appearance – filtered through to the entire campaign and his emphasis on the need for a “social Europe” simply did not resonate with enough people.


6. Big beasts – Boris Johnson and Michael Gove

Boris Johnson holding a lobster on a visit to SuffolkImage copyrightPA

We always knew a handful of cabinet ministers would support Brexit but it was Michael Gove and Boris Johnson’s declaration of support which really put rocket boosters under the campaign.

The justice secretary brought intellectual heft and strategic nous to the table while the former mayor of London, after a bout of soul-searching, brought star appeal and ability to appeal across the party divide.

The two men were deployed deftly, Boris Johnson cast in the role of foot soldier as he criss-crossed the country on the Vote Leave bus, pulling pints and brandishing cornish pasties in his wake.

Meanwhile, Mr Gove did much of the heavy lifting, helping to put together Leave’s post-Brexit manifesto as well as facing the public in TV referendum specials on Sky News and the BBC.

Then there was Nigel Farage, the face of Euroscepticism in the UK but also a potential loose cannon for the Conservative dominated official campaign? The UKIP leader, as is his forte, did his own thing and occasionally provoked controversy but also played a vital role on the ground in motivating his party’s supporters and numerous others to go to the polls.


7. Older voters flock to polls

A man and a woman on a stroll in SussexImage copyrightPA

While experts will pore over the finer details of turnout over the coming days and weeks, the cry will inevitably go up that it was older voters which won it for Leave – particularly in the south, south-west, Midlands and the north east.

It is a matter of fact that the older you are, the more likely you are to make the effort to vote – 78% of those 65 or over voted in the 2015 election, compared with 43% of 18-24 year olds and 54% of 25-34 year olds.

Despite the last minute rush to register – which saw 2.6 million people sign up, many of them younger voters, between 15 May and the extended deadline of 9 June – the breakdown may not be radically different this time.

Factor in research suggesting that support for Brexit was significantly higher among those aged 55 and over than among younger age groups – three out of every five voters aged 65 or over said they wanted to leave – then you have the foundation for Friday’s result.

Of course, it is not as simple as that, with many younger voters will also have supported Brexit across England and Wales. But a big inter-generational divide in voting patterns is just one of the many talking points going forward.


8. Europe always slightly alien

Couple wearing Union Jack suitsImage copyrightAFP

The UK’s relationship with Europe has never been simple nor static.

It took the country years to join what was then the European Community and, even then, when it was last put to the vote in 1975 many backed it grudgingly or for narrow economic reasons.

Many of those have since changed their minds, with their earlier ambivalence turning into outright hostility. There have been decades of scepticism towards the EU among politicians and in large parts of the UK media.

The younger generation were generally seen as pro-EU but it remains to be seen – once the details of the voting is looked into – how the result broke down by age.

What appears clear from the campaign is that the vote to Leave was as much a statement about the country’s national identity, and all that involves, as it was about its economic and political future.

Fonte: BBC News

Família de Jean Charles perde último recurso na tentativa de punir policiais

Publicado Originalmente: 30/03/2016

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A Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos decidiu nesta quarta-feira que as autoridades britânicas acertaram ao não processar os policiais que mataram o brasileiro Jean Charles de Menezes em Londres, em 2005, após confundi-lo com um terrorista.

O recurso à corte, sediada em Estrasburgo, na França, era a última tentativa da família para responsabilizar o governo britânico e processar os policiais envolvidos na morte do eletricista.

A família de Jean Charles argumenta que os policiais envolvidos na operação que culminou na morte do brasileiro não deveriam poder alegar que agiram em legítima defesa, uma vez que o eletricista não representava uma ameaça real e não teve chance de esboçar reação.

Mas a corte entendeu que as autoridades britânicas investigaram o caso e concluíram que não havia provas suficientes para processar nenhum policial.

Segundo os juízes, a decisão das autoridades britânicas não feriu nenhuma lei de direitos humanos.

O governo do Reino Unido defendeu o posicionamento da corte.

“Os fatos neste caso foram trágicos, mas o governo considera que a corte defendeu o importante princípio de que indivíduos só são processados quando há uma perspectiva real de condenação”, disse um porta-voz.

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Imbróglio jurídico

A família de Jean Charles questionou na corte o teste usado pelos promotores britânicos para decidir se eles têm evidências suficientes para acusar alguém de um crime.

No chamado “teste dos 51%”, é avaliado se, com base nas evidências levantadas até então, há mais chances de condenação que absolvição, os promotores fazem a acusação.

Os advogados da família afirmaram que as evidências eram grandes e que a decisão era incompatível com o Artigo 2 da Convenção Europeia de Direitos Humanos. Segundo esse texto, o Estado nunca deve tirar arbitrariamente a vida de alguém e deve proteger aqueles que estão sob seus cuidados.

Outro argumento usado foi de que os policiais não poderiam dizer que agiram em legítima defesa.

No entanto, a corte em Estraburgo sustentou a definição de legítima defesa adotada na Inglaterra e no País de Gales – segundo a qual é necessário existir uma franca crença de que o uso da força é necessário.

A tese da família foi derrotada por 13 votos a 4.

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‘Frustração compreensível’

No julgamento, a corte europeia afirmou que o caso era, “sem dúvidas, trágico”, e que a frustração da família de Jean Charles pela ausência de processos individuais contra policiais era compreensível.

Porém, concluiu que a decisão de não processar nenhum dos agentes não ocorreu por causa de qualquer falha nas investigações “ou por tolerância ou conivência do Estado com atos contra a lei”.

Patricia da Silva Armani, prima que morava com Jean Charles à época da morte, afirmou que a família não desistirá da busca por Justiça.

“É inacreditável que meu primo inocente tenha levado sete tiros na cabeça pela Polícia de Londres enquanto não fazia nada de errado, e que ainda assim a polícia não tenha de responder por suas ações”, afirmou ela.

“É como nós sempre sustentamos: acreditamos que decisões sobre culpa e inocência deveriam ser tomadas por júris, e não por burocratas sem rosto. Estamos profundamente tristes que tenham negado, de novo, essa oportunidade.”

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O caso

Numa sucessão de erros já comprovados, a polícia confundiu Jean com Hussain Osman, um dos envolvidos nas tentativas de atentados a bomba contra a capital britânica na véspera.

Quinze dias antes, Londres foi alvo de atentados que causaram a morte de mais de cinquenta pessoas no sistema de transporte público.

Um endereço descoberto em uma das malas repleta de explosivos que não detonaram – Scotia Road, Tulse Hill, coincidentemente o prédio onde Jean Charles morava – teria sido o ponto de partida para a morte.

O eletricista foi atingido por diversos tiros na cabeça no metrô de Stockwell, no sul de Londres, em 22 de julho de 2005.

A Polícia Metropolitana de Londres (Scotland Yard) escapou de um processo criminal e não houve ações contra indivíduos – a corporação pagou uma multa por violações à segurança pública.

Veja, a seguir, a cronologia jurídica do caso:

  • 22 de julho de 2005: Jean Charles é morto pela polícia na estação Stockwell do metrô londrino
  • 17 de julho de 2006: Promotores afirmam que nenhum agente será processado, mas que a Polícia de Londres será julgada por violar as leis de saúde e segurança
  • 1º de novembro de 2007: Polícia de Londres é considerada culpada por violar as leis de saúde e segurança e é multada
  • 22 de outubro de 2008: Juiz afasta a possibilidade de um veredito de morte ilegal
  • 12 de dezembro de 2008: Júri do inquérito decide que a morte é suspeita, mas que não é possível chegar a um veredito
  • 16 de novembro de 2009: Polícia de Londres firma acordo de indenização com a família
  • 10 de junho de 2015: Família contesta, na Corte Europeia de Diretos Humanos, a decisão de não processar policiais
  • 30 de março de 2016: Corte nega ação da família.

Fonte: BBC Brasil

Assange on ‘US Empire’, Assad govt overthrow plans & new book ‘The WikiLeaks Files’ (EXCLUSIVE)

STUDY LXXVIII B – PRINCIPLES AND RULES CAPABLE OF ENHANCING TRADING IN SECURITIES IN EMERGING MARKETS

Background


Introduction

 

In 2001, the Governing Council approved and the General Assembly adopted the triennial Work Programme including a multi-item project “Transactions on Transnational and Connected Capital Markets”. In view of the rapid progress made by the Committee of governmental experts negotiating the draft Convention on Harmonised Rules regarding Intermediated Securities the Governing Council, in 2005, recommended that the General Assembly authorise, following indications of preferences by Member States Governments, work on the next item, i.e. the preparation of principles and rules capable of enhancing trading in securities on emerging markets.

 

 

Objectives and possible content

 

Both on the occasion of fact finding seminars, held in Asia and Latin America in the context of the work on intermediated securities, and in comments submitted to the Governing Council Member State Governments from those regions voiced the urgent need to have basic commercial law rules applicable to trading in securities developed in the context of a multilateral Organisation with special expertise such as UNIDROIT.

The Secretariat submitted the following list of problem areas which might merit further analysis for the Council’s consideration. The Council discussed the items and stressed the need to focus on transactional law.

• Nature and types of securities.

• Fungibility of securities and (degree of) dematerialisation: immobilised, fully dematerialised securities, substitutes.

• Transactional structure of bond issues: private-law restrictions on debt financing; direct placement by (specific types of) issuers; mandatory involvement of intermediaries; contractual and proprietary relationships between issuer, intermediaries/underwriters and investors (internal relationship between underwriters to the extent that local underwriters are involved and local law is governing that internal relationship and/or their rights and obligations vis-à-vis the issuer); standard contract terms and their – ex ante or ex post – scrutiny; potential conflicts between applicable company law and applicable contract law; legal or contractual community of bond holders.

• Transactional structure of share issues (IPOs) and in addition to problem areas common to bond issues: enabling or limiting rules of underlying company law; methods for determining initial share price (fixed, bookbuilding, auctions) and respective transactional law; differentiation private placement/public offering; allotment of shares, in particular equal treatment of investors/bidders; status and impact of codes of conduct for issuers and intermediaries; IPOs over the Internet, including conflict-of-laws issues; the issuer’s prospectus as the basic information provided in the event of a public offering, its content and liability of the issuer and intermediaries for inaccuracies.

• Organisational and transactional provisions to enhance liquidity on secondary markets, including role and legal position of intermediaries and central counter parties; conflict-of-laws rules regarding foreign market participants.

• General contract law or special regimes for trading in securities; impact of trade usages; impact of standard contract terms legislation; consumer/retail investor protection; special regimes for options, futures and other derivatives.

• Contractual and proprietary issues of clearing, settlement and custody as well as use of securities as collateral (to the extent not sufficiently addressed in the preliminary draft Convention on Intermediated Securities for the needs of any specific emerging market).

• Securities lending

• Private law framework for disclosure, prevention of insider trading and other forms of market abuse and for the conduct of market participants.

 

 

Hypotheses regarding work process

 

Regarding the type of instrument envisaged, it is obvious that a binding instrument (convention) and even a model law is not only an unrealistic objective but also undesirable, especially from the point of view of the many emerging securities markets, their varied stage of evolution and their interest in building their individual competitiveness. On the other hand, the formulation of benchmark principles, developed in a legislative guide that focuses on the private law aspects would appear to be very challenging yet feasible. With respect to a number of issues such an instrument would provide relatively detailed guidance as to the available options for the transaction-related implementation of regulatory recommendations prepared by IOSCO and in other fora.

Given the considerable variety of types and degrees of evolution of emerging markets and their respective needs, work might usefully be organised in a decentralised fashion where UNIDROIT would assume the responsibilities of scientific preparation and co-ordination and where interested regional Organisations or member States would provide platforms for the work of Study Groups, etc. To the extent conflict-of-laws issues are to be addressed, co-operation with the Hague Conference on Private International Law would be desirable. To the extent issues of secured transactions in general become topical, close co-operation with UNCITRAL would be sought.

 

 

Project status

 

The UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (to be known as the ‘Geneva Securities Convention’) was adopted in Geneva, Switzerland on 9 October 2009 by the diplomatic Conference to adopt a Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Intermediated Securities.

The Conference adopted a Resolution relating specifically to activities to support promotion of the entry into force and implementation of the Geneva Securities Convention. To this effect UNIDROIT, in its capacity as Depositary of the Convention, was requested to make all appropriate efforts to organise activities such as meetings, conferences and seminars with a view to promoting awareness and understanding of the Convention and assessing its continued effectiveness.

The diplomatic Conference established a Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation to assist the Secretariat in its task. This Committee met twice. For the first time in Rome from 6 to 9 September 2010 and for the second time in Rio de Janeiro on 27 and 28 March 2012 (see documentation below).

The Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-Up and Implementation is co-chaired by Brazil and China. The members are: Argentina, Cameroon, Chile, France, Greece, India, Japan, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, South Africa, United States of America and the European Community. The observers are: Indonesia, European Central Bank, European Issuers, Hague Conference on Private International Law and Trade Association for the Emerging Markets.

On the occasion of the first meeting of the Committee, the Secretariat organised, on 6 and 7 September 2010, a Colloquium on “The law of securities trading in emerging markets: lessons learned from the financial crisis and long-term trends”, with a view to identifying possible topics suitable for insertion in a future legislative guide on Principles and Rules capable of enhancing trading in securities in emerging markets. 25 speakers made presentations on a wide range of topics related to securities trading and the functioning of capital markets.

As a first step toward the development of a Legislative Guide on Principles and rules capable of enhancing trading in securities in emerging markets, the UNIDROIT Secretariat is preparing a guidance document intended to provide advice for countries that ratify the 2009 Geneva Securities Convention on how best to incorporate the Convention and integrate it into their domestic legal systems (“Accession Kit”). A draft was submitted to the Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation at its first session (UNIDROIT 2010 – S78B/CEM/1/Doc. 3) which decided to divide the document. The first part contains an explanatory memorandum for the assistance of States and Regional Economic Integration Organisations on the system of declarations under the Geneva Securities Convention. It became an Unidroit document in its capacity of Depositary of the Geneva Securities Convention (the Declarations Memorandum, Unidroit 2011 – DC11/DEP/Doc. 1)). The second part containing references to sources of law outside the Convention is still under discussion within the Committee as a basis for the prospective Legislative Guide.

The second meeting of the Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-Up and Implementation was held in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) on 27 and 28 March 2012. The first day of the meeting was devoted to a Colloquium on financial markets law which considered the actions taken by emerging markets to create a favourable environment for trading in intermediated securities and discussed how emerging markets have reacted to the financial crisis and which means are to be adopted to increase legal security and the investors’ protection. In the second day, Committee members and observers meeting examined the reception given to the 2009 Geneva Securities Convention in the various countries, in particular in emerging countries, were presented the Official Commentary on the 2009 Convention, considered legislative measures to implement the Convention and incorporate it in domestic law as well as concrete proposals for its promotion. It also considered future work by UNIDROIT in the area of financial markets law.

The third meeting of the Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-Up and Implementation was held in Istanbul (Turkey) from 11 to 13 November 2013.

Documentation

 

Third meeting of the Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation, Istanbul 11 – 13 November 2013

 

Colloquium: Programme and presentations

Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation. Third meeting – Istanbul, 11-13 November 2013. Colloquium “Enhancing Financial Integrity in Emerging Markets: The Geneva Convention and the UNIDROIT Principles on Close-Out Netting under National Law”. Istanbul, 11-12 November 2013.

UNIDROIT 2013 – S78B/CEM/3/Doc. 2

Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation. Third meeting – Istanbul, 11-13 November 2013. Annotated draft outline: Legislative Guide on Principles and Rules Capable of Enhancing Trading in Securities in Emerging Markets – October 2013

UNIDROIT 2013 – S78B/CEM/3/Doc. 1

Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation. Third meeting – Istanbul, 11-13 November 2013. Annotated agenda – July 2013

Second meeting of the Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation, Rio de Janeiro 27 and 28 March 2012

Colloquium: Programme and presentations

Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation. Second meeting – Rio de Janeiro, 27 and 28 March 2012. Colloquium ” Promoting investor confidence and enhancing legal certainty for securities trading in emerging markets”. Rio de Janeiro, 27 March 2012.

UNIDROIT 2012 – S78B/CEM/2/Doc. 3

Committee on emerging markets issues, follow-up and implementation. Second meeting, Rio de Janeiro, 27 and 28 March 2012. Report (prepared by the UNIDROIT Secretariat)

UNIDROIT 2011 – S78B/CEM/2/Doc. 2

Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation. Second meeting – Rio de Janeiro, 27 and 28 March 2012. Information for Contracting States in respect of the Convention’s references to sources of law outside the Convention – November 2011

UNIDROIT 2011 – S78B/CEM/2/Doc. 1

Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation. Second meeting – Rio de Janeiro, 27 and 28 March 2012. Annotated agenda – November 2011

 

 

First meeting of the Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation, Rome 6-9 September 2010

Colloquium: Programme and presentations

Committee on Emerging Markets Issues, Follow-up and Implementation. First meeting – Rome, 6-9 September 2010. Colloquium “The law of securities trading in emerging markets: lessons learned from the financial crisis and long-tem trends”, Villa Aldobrandini, Via Panisperna 28, 00184 Rome, 6-7 September 2010.

The integral versions of some of the presentations have been published in the Uniform Law Review, vol. 15 (2010) and vol. 16 (2011).

UNIDROIT 2010 – S78B/CEM/1/Doc. 4

Committee on emerging markets issues, follow-up and implementation. First meeting, Rome, 6 to 9 September 2010. Report (prepared by the UNIDROIT Secretariat)

UNIDROIT 2010 – S78B/CEM/1/Doc. 3

Committee on emerging markets issues, follow-up and implementation. First meeting, Rome, 6 to 9 September 2010. Accession Kit to the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (“Geneva Securities Convention”). Information for Contracting States in respect of the Convention’s declarations and references to sources of law outside the Convention. Draft prepared by the Secretariat

UNIDROIT 2010 – S78B/CEM/1/Doc. 2

Committee on emerging markets issues, follow-up and implementation. First meeting, Rome, 6 to 9 September 2010. Proposal for an international instrument on the Netting of Financial Instruments – August 2010

UNIDROIT 2010 – S78B/CEM/1/Doc. 1

Committee on emerging markets issues, follow-up and implementation. First meeting, Rome, 6 to 9 September 2010. Annotated agenda – June 2010

Fonte: http://www.unidroit.org/work-in-progress-studies/current-studies/emerging-markets

Matheus Luiz Puppe Magalhaes

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