Ministro Mauro Vieira apresenta relatório da Presidência Pro Tempore Brasileira do MERCOSUL

Publicado em 23 de jul de 2015

Foi realizada em Brasília, no dia 17 de julho de 2015, a 48ª edição da Cúpula dos Chefes de Estado do MERCOSUL e Estados Associados. O encontro foi precedido, no dia 16 de julho, pela Reunião do Conselho do Mercado Comum (CMC), que reúne os Chanceleres e os Ministros de Economia e de Indústria dos Estados Partes do MERCOSUL.

A realização da Cúpula de Chefes de Estado encerrou a Presidência Pro Tempore Brasileira (PPTB) do MERCOSUL, exercida durante o primeiro semestre de 2015. Ao final da Cúpula, a Presidência Pro Tempore do bloco foi transferida para o Paraguai

Fonte: MRE

Protocolo de Adesão do Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia ao MERCOSUL

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Brasília, 17 de julho de 2015

A República Argentina, a República Federativa do Brasil, a República do Paraguai, a República Oriental do Uruguai, a República Bolivariana da Venezuela e o Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia, doravante as Partes:

REAFIRMANDO os princípios e objetivos do Tratado de Montevidéu de 1980 e doTratado de Assunção de 1991;

REAFIRMANDO a importância da adesão do Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia ao MERCOSUL para a consolidação do processo de integração da América do Sul, com base no reforço mútuo e convergência dos diferentes esforços e mecanismossub-regionais de integração;

CONSIDERANDO que o processo de integração deve ser um instrumento para promover o desenvolvimento integral, enfrentar a pobreza e a exclusão social, baseado na complementação, na solidariedade, na cooperação e na busca de mitigação de assimetrias;

RECORDANDO que, em carta do Presidente Evo Morales à Presidência ProTempore do MERCOSUL de 21 de dezembro de 2006, o Governo do Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia manifestou sua disposição de iniciar os trabalhos quepermitam sua incorporação como Estado Parte do MERCOSUL;

DESTACANDO que o MERCOSUL acolheu favoravelmente a disposição do Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia de iniciar os trabalhos com vistas à sua plena incorporação ao MERCOSUL e que, por ocasião da XXXII Cúpula de Presidentes do MERCOSUL, foi adotada a Decisão CMC Nº 01/07, de 18/1/07, pela qual se criou o Grupo de Trabalho Ad Hoc para a Incorporação da Bolívia ao MERCOSUL;

ASSINALANDO que, ao amparo desse processo, foram realizadas em 2007 duas reuniões do referido GT Ad Hoc, com vistas à plena incorporação do EstadoPlurinacional da Bolívia ao MERCOSUL;

RESSALTANDO que, por ocasião da XLI Reunião Ordinária do CMC, os Estados Partes do MERCOSUL reiteraram o convite ao Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia para aprofundar sua relação com o MERCOSUL;

TENDO EM VISTA que o Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia desenvolverá sua integração no MERCOSUL conforme os compromissos emanados deste Protocolo, sob os princípios da gradualidade, flexibilidade e equilíbrio, o reconhecimento das assimetrias e do tratamento diferenciado, assim como dos princípios de segurança alimentar, meios de subsistência e desenvolvimento rural integral.

ACORDAM:

ARTIGO 1° O Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia adere ao Tratado de Assunção, ao Protocolo de Ouro Preto, ao Protocolo de Olivos para a Solução de Controvérsias no MERCOSUL, ao Protocolo Modificativo ao Protocolo de Olivos para a Solução de Controvérsias no MERCOSUL, ao Protocolo de Assunção sobre Compromisso com a Promoção e Proteção dos Direitos Humanos do MERCOSUL, e ao Protocolo Constitutivo do Parlamento do MERCOSUL, que constam como anexos I, II, III, IV, V e VI, respectivamente, nos termos estabelecidos no Artigo 20 do Tratado de Assunção. As Partes se comprometem a realizar as modificações na normativa MERCOSUL necessárias para a aplicação do presente Protocolo.

ARTIGO 2° O mecanismo de solução de controvérsias estabelecido no Protocolo de Olivos e em seu Protocolo Modificativo se aplicará às controvérsias nas quais o Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia esteja envolvido, relativas às normas que referida Parte haja incorporado a seu ordenamento jurídico interno.

ARTIGO 3° O Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia adotará, gradualmente, o acervo normativo vigente do MERCOSUL, no mais tardar em quatro (4) anos contados a partir da data de entrada em vigência do presente instrumento. Para tanto, o Grupo de Trabalho criado no Artigo 12 deste Protocolo estabelecerá o cronograma de adoção da referida normativa.

As normas MERCOSUL que, na data da entrada em vigor do presente instrumento, estiverem em trâmite de incorporação, entrarão em vigência com a incorporação ao ordenamento jurídico interno dos demais Estados Partes do MERCOSUL. A incorporação pelo Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia de tais normas realizar-se-á nos termos do parágrafo anterior.

ARTIGO 4° No mais tardar em quatro (4) anos, contados a partir da data da entrada em vigência do presente instrumento, o Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia adotará a Nomenclatura Comum do MERCOSUL (NCM), a Tarifa Externa Comum (TEC) e o Regime de Origem do MERCOSUL. Para esse fim, tendo em conta o Artigo 5°, o Grupo de Trabalho criado no Artigo 12 deste Protocolo estabelecerá o cronograma de adoção da TEC, contemplando as exceções de acordo com as normas vigentes do MERCOSUL, buscando preservar e aumentar a produtividade de seus setores produtivos.

ARTIGO 5°No processo de incorporação do Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia ao MERCOSUL, será levada em consideração a necessidade de estabelecer instrumentos que promovam a mitigação de assimetrias entre os Estados Partes, de forma a favorecer um desenvolvimento econômico relativo equilibrado no MERCOSUL e assegurar um tratamento não menos favorável que o vigente entre as Partes.

ARTIGO 6°As Partes acordam alcançar o livre comércio recíproco a partir da data de entrada em vigência do presente Protocolo, considerando o disposto no Artigo 7°.

ARTIGO 7°No mais tardar em quatro (4) anos, contados a partir da data de entrada em vigência deste Protocolo, ficarão sem efeito entre as Partes o disposto no Acordo de Complementação Econômica Nº 36 e no Acordo de Comércio e Complementaridade Econômica entre a República Bolivariana da Venezuela e o Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia.

ARTIGO 8° O Grupo de Trabalho criado no Artigo 12 deste Protocolo definirá as condições a serem negociadas com terceiros países ou grupos de países para a adesão do Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia aos instrumentos internacionais e acordos celebrados pelos demais Estados Partes com aqueles, no âmbito do Tratado de Assunção.

ARTIGO 9° As Partes acordam que, a partir da assinatura do presente Protocolo, e até a data de sua entrada em vigor, o Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia integrará a Delegação do MERCOSUL nas negociações com terceiros.

ARTIGO 10° Com vistas ao aprofundamento do MERCOSUL, as Partes reafirmam seu compromisso de trabalhar conjuntamente para identificar e aplicar medidas destinadas a impulsionar a inclusão social e assegurar condições de vida digna para seus povos.

ARTIGO 11 A partir da data da entrada em vigência do presente Protocolo, o Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia adquirirá a condição de Estado Parte e participará com todos os direitos e obrigações do MERCOSUL, de acordo com o Artigo 2° do Tratado de Assunção e nos termos do presente Protocolo.

ARTIGO 12 A fim de desenvolver as tarefas previstas no presente Protocolo, cria-se um Grupo de Trabalho integrado por representantes das Partes. O Grupo de Trabalho deverá concluir tais tarefas no mais tardar em um prazo de cento e oitenta (180) dias a partir da data de sua primeira reunião.

ARTIGO 13 O presente Protocolo entrará em vigência no trigésimo dia contado a partir da data de depósito do último instrumento de ratificação incluindo as ratificações a respeito do instrumento subscrito com antelação que estabelece obrigações e direitos idênticos aos previstos no presente Protocolo que estejam de posse de seu depositário.

A República do Paraguai será o depositário do presente Acordo e de seus instrumentos de ratificação. O depositário deverá notificar às Partes a data dos depósitos dos instrumentos de ratificação. O depositário notificará a entrada em vigor do Protocolo e enviará cópia devidamente autenticada do mesmo.

FEITO na cidade de …., República Federativa do Brasil, aos …. dias do mês de …..

de dois mil e quinze, em um original, nos idiomas português e espanhol, sendo

ambos os textos igualmente autênticos.

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Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): The “Foreign Terrorist Fighter” as an International Legal Person,

Published on November 20, 2014        Author: 

This is Part I of a two-part post. Read Part II here.

Introduction

At a summit meeting of 24 September in which over 50 government representatives were heard, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2178 (2014) which foresees measures to contain the travel of and support for persons intending to participate in terror acts, notably against the background of the rise of the group “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and the Al-Nusra front and other affiliates of Al-Qaida.

Resolution 2178 “reaffirms” what previous resolutions since 9/11 had found, namely that “terrorism [normally committed by natural persons] … constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” (preamble first indent; see previously, e.g., UNSC res. 1368 (2001)). In preamble indent 12, the Council defines a “new threat”, namely the “foreign terrorist fighter threat” which “includes, among others, individuals supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida and its cells”.

Most paragraphs of the res. 2178 are, in their structure, not novel. They oblige states to adopt measures, and “ensure in their domestic laws” (para. 6) to suppress, combat, prosecute, and penalise the recruiting, organising, transporting, and equipping of individuals travelling for the purpose of perpetrating terrorist acts, e.g. in paras 2, 5, 6, 8. The obligations to criminalise certain behaviour seem, however, quite far reaching as also pointed out by Kai Ambos.

One interesting feature of res. 2178 is that it directly addresses individuals: Operative para. 1 “demands that all foreign terrorist fighters disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in the conflict”. The three interrelated questions discussed in this post are whether res. 2178, firstly, creates binding international legal obligations for individuals themselves; secondly, whether (some of) the resolution’s provisions are directly applicable in the domestic order of the UN Member states; and thirdly, whether the non-observance of these individual obligations constitute a crime by virtue of the resolution itself.

International individual obligations flowing from Res. 2178?

The question is whether Res. 2178 is able to impose legally binding international obligations on the individuals addressed. Is the resolution itself the legal basis for an obligation of “foreign terrorist fighters” to desist from forging identity papers, to desist from travelling to the combat field of ISIS, to recruit volunteers, and of course to refrain from committing terrorist acts, and the like?

According to the wording of Article 25 of the UN Charter, the resolutions of the Security Council appear to oblige only the UN Member states: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”. In its Kosovo advisory opinion, however, the ICJ found that it could “establish, on a case-by-case basis, […] for whom the Security Council intended to create binding legal obligations.” (para. 117). The ICJ did not rule out a binding effect of Security Council resolutions on individuals in principle. It did not even limit the potential binding effect to non-state actors that enjoy international legal personality. In the Kosovo proceedings, the ICJ merely found that resolution 1244 did not give any “indication” that it was directed at the authors of the declaration of independence, but rather only at the UN Member states, the UN itself, and its organs (para. 115). The focus on a mere “indication” suggests that it would be possible to impose obligations on non-state actors where such obligations can be inferred by the circumstances, even if they are not explicit.

What speaks in favour of accepting that – in principle – a Security Council resolution, such as res. 2178, can create binding obligations for individuals? The doctrinal explanation for a binding effect of resolutions on the individuals addressed surely does not consist in any consent of those individuals subject to the resolution. Neither does the explanation lie in any presumed legislative competence of the Member states which have consented to the resolution in regard to all actors on their territory. The explanation is rather that the UN Charter, which enjoys a special legal quality (in the view of some, as a world constitution), endows the Security Council with a special authority that – within the boundaries of the principle of legality – also is effective erga omnes vis-à-vis individuals. It follows that its resolutions are in principle suitable as a legal basis for international obligations. This power of the Council flows from the Charter itself, in the interpretation given to it through subsequent practice as accepted by the UN Member states (see below), and by the ICJ in its Kosovo Opinion.

The most important normative justification for this power is the need to avoid a regulatory gap. If a Security Council resolution aims to have a pacifying effect, it must, especially in the context of fragile or failed statehood (as it is now the case in parts of Syria and surrounding regions), directly address dangerous, armed, criminal individuals or groups. It would not be sufficient and would maybe even be counterproductive if the Security Council were to call upon only the states involved to suppress the terrorist or military activities. The Council’s power to address individuals and groups must, to be effective, go beyond the formulation of purely political wishes (as opposed to binding legal orders), but whether this is indeed the case depends on a concrete resolution’s substance.

A very important limit on such direct obligations incurred by individuals is, however, the principle of legality. That principle states that the resolutions may give rise to real individual legal obligations only if those obligations are foreseeable for the individuals addressed. This is the case only if the obligations and their addressees can be derived from the wording of the resolutions with sufficient contextual determinacy, and when the resolutions are indeed published. For this reason, merely implicitly expressed obligations (as insinuated by theKosovo Court) must be viewed critically because they risk violating the principle of legality.

I submit that probably only the wording of para. 1 of Res. 2178 is sufficiently clear, and also clearly addressed to individuals themselves. The main problem seems to be the lack of definition of “terrorist act”. Arguably, an international common ground on the notion of “terrorism” has already emerged; manifest in various international legal conventions, but no undisputable customary law-based definition exists. The prevailing understanding is, for example, embodied in para. 3 of res. 1566(2004), mentioning

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

It is submitted that the reference, in res. 2178, to “terrorism” and “terrorist acts”, is sufficiently clear so as to prohibit terrorist acts (but not clear enough to justify a criminal sanction based on the resolution, see below). The resolution thus is the legal basis for everyone’s obligation not to commit terrorist acts or participate in the armed conflict surrounding ISIL.

Direct effect of Res. 2178?

What happens if a UN member state does not properly implement res. 2178 and does not adopt the legislation or administrative measures required? The Security Council’s demands are very far-reaching. For example the Council “encourages Member states to employ evidence-based traveller risk assessment and screening procedures including collection and analysis of travel data” (para. 2). Beyond this mere “encouragement”, the Council “decides that all states shall ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offences sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute (…) their nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a state (…) for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation or participation in, terrorist acts” (para. 6 lit. a). The Security Council here requires the Member states to create and enforce criminal offenses which relate to mere preparatory behaviour (possibly) leading to the commission of terrorist acts.

What if a Member state’s population rejects the excessive data-collection demanded, and what if a Member state’s parliament refuses to adopt such broad and “anticipatory” criminal law provisions? Could any administrative authority, prosecutor and domestic court then directly apply the Security Council resolution?

We should at this point distinguish between administrative law-measures such as refusing a passport to travel into Syria (cf. res. 2178 para. 6), new legislative measures, such as laws requiring airlines to collect advance passenger information (para. 9), and adopting and enforcing criminal law, e.g. on the preparation of terrorist acts (para. 6).

I submit that a possible direct effect of a Security Council resolution, whether restraining individuals, as res. 2178 does, or benefiting them, should be assessed according to the same criteria as applied when examining the direct applicability (or direct effect or self-executingness) of the provisions of an international treaty, but that these criteria need some modification. Three reasons for using those criteria can be given: Firstly, from the perspective of the domestic law-applier, the binding effect of Security Council decisions resembles that of a treaty. Secondly, it could be said that the decisions’ binding effect derives from a treaty (the Charter) and that therefore their legal nature is conventional rather than unilateral. Thirdly, direct effect has also become an issue with regard to judicial or quasi-judicial decisions of international courts or monitoring bodies. Security Council decisions, in their binding effect, resemble such decisions, too.

The traditional criteria of suitability for direct application, namely unconditionality and precision of the international act (looking at its content, objective, and wording) normally do not pose a problem for Security Council decisions. In this scenario, the question of legitimacy stands in the foreground: Should the Council decision bind the domestic institutions, as precedence or at least as a normative guideline? It is submitted that the response should be guided by concern for national constitutional principles such as self-determination/democracy, legality, and legal certainty, but that the direct effect of the Council decision should not be ruled out as impossible from the outset. Domestic bodies which seek to reject a direct effect of a Council decision which specifically addresses individuals must justify this on the basis of constitutional principles.

One normative consideration relates to the democratic legitimacy of international law. If one considers domestic authorities, especially courts, as the gate keepers of legitimacy of all law which is applicable in the domestic sphere, and especially as the guardians of democratic self-government, one could argue that it is incumbent on them to safeguard these constitutional principles through rejecting the direct effect of international treaty norms. This reasoning would a fortiori apply to Security Council resolutions, because they are adopted in a non-inclusive procedure, and are binding upon third states which did not consent to them.

Leaving this aside, the most important aspect of any direct effect (besides the questions of the separation of powers, and of democracy) of res. 2178 (or rather parts of it) is the principle of legality. Under the rule of law, especially obligations imposed on individuals must be based on a clear legal basis. The question then is whether a Security Council decision constitutes a sufficient legal basis. That question is most acute when it comes to the establishment of a crime through a rule of international law (see below).

But it is also relevant for other types of obligations imposed on individuals, especially when these obligations involve the curtailment of individual freedoms and human rights. For example, the “foreign terrorist fighters’” obligation to desist from travelling to join ISIS forces requires that he does not exercise his human right to travel in this regard (Art. 12 ICCPR). That human right can only be limited on the basis of law (Art. 12(3) ICCPR: ”The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.” I submit that a Security Council resolution can constitute a law in this sense – a “law” does not always need to be a domestic parliamentary act. It can be an international act which has been applied in an inclusive and transparent procedure. It is not its “international” character but rather deficits of inclusiveness and transparency which might damage the authority of a Security Council resolution – but which can and should be overcome. Note that res. 2178 was adopted unanimously and was acclaimed by 50 states taking the floor at the summit, but still the procedure of deliberation and adoption could and should be improved.

Overall, with due respect for the principles mentioned, I do not see any reason which wouldab initio foreclose the possibility of applying Security Council resolutions directly. Notably para. 1 of res. 2178 can be applied by Member states’ authorities and courts as a basis for administrative law-type measures.

Res. 2178 is no basis for criminal sanctions

Resolution 2178 is not in itself the basis for criminalising the behaviour it seeks to suppress. On the contrary, it resembles the classic suppression conventions, i.e. international treaties imposing the obligation on contracting parties to prohibit individual forms of conduct in their national law and, where applicable, to criminalise and punish them.

So no foreign fighter-suspect could be tried and sentenced on the legal basis of Res. 2178 alone. But the reason is not, I submit, that a Security Council resolution could never – from the perspective of international law − function as a “lex” in the sense of the principle nulla poena sine lege. The reason is that the “lex” here does not in itself explicitly establish the crime, but on the contrary explicitly asks states to do to, through their domestic criminal law. Res. 2178 makes it amply clear in its wording that it does not intend to establish the criminal offence directly. It may well be that under the domestic law of some countries, the understanding of nulla poena is stricter. However, if we want to uphold a functioning system of global governance, states and scholars must develop an “internationalised” principle of legality that need not consist only in the lowest common denominator but which is informed by values of global constitutionalism.

Previous Security Council resolutions directly addressing individuals

Resolutions combatting terrorism and piracy

Previous Security Council resolutions had not imposed any obligations on terrorists or terror-suspects as such; they addressed only states (for instance, res. 1624 (2005), para. 1(a); res. 1540 (2004) on weapons of mass destruction). The same is true of all UN Security Council resolutions on piracy (e.g., UNSC res. 1838 (2008)).

Sanctions resolutions

The sanctions resolutions (both comprehensive regimes of economic sanctions and targeted sanctions) aim at influencing the conduct of individuals. However, these resolutions again oblige only States to take measures under their national law, especially to prohibit private individuals within their jurisdiction from engaging in trade, to prohibit them from leaving or transiting through the country, and to freeze their accounts (the classic one being UNSC Res. 1267 (1999) against the Taliban). The typical formulation of the Security Council is that it

calls upon all States to take appropriate measures to ensure that individuals and companies in their jurisdiction (…) act in conformity with United Nations embargoes, (…) and, as appropriate, take the necessary judicial and administrative action to end any illegal activities by those individuals and companies; (…). (random example of para. 21 of UNSC res. 1343 (2001) on Sierra Leone).

Technically speaking, the individuals here are still mediated through their states (or, in the case of the EU, through the EU).

Sometimes it looks as if the Security Council had directly imposed financial and travel sanctions on individuals, for example on individuals who recruit child soldiers, or who attack peacekeepers (see the latest sanction resolution concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, res. 2136 (2014), para. 4). However, this resolution refers to its “mother-resolution”, res. 1807, whose para. 1 “decides (…) that all States shall take the necessary measures (…).”

The closest to directly obliging individuals to comply with a sanction have been formulas such as in res. 1474 (2003) whose para. 1 “stresses the obligation of all States and other actors” to comply with a previous resolution imposing an arms embargo in respect of Somalia.

Moreover, the sanctions committees (subsidiary organs of the Security Council as referred to in Art. 29 of the UN Charter) make decisions that are binding on individuals. For instance, the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee designates individuals (Res. 1333 (2000), para. 8(c)). It is mandated to consider requests for the listing and delisting of persons (See, e.g.,Guidelines of the 1267 Committee of 7 November 2002, most recently amended on 15 April 2013, para. 4(c)). The committee makes these decisions itself; for instance, it decides to delist a person on the recommendation of the ombudsperson.

Because the powers of the sanctions committees are considered to be delegated powers of the Security Council, the sanctions committees must act within the scope of recognised principles of delegation. A key precondition for delegation is that the Security Council cannot delegate more powers than it may exercise itself. The Security Council itself must therefore be entitled to impose obligations on individuals if the committees are expected to do so with legal effect.

Recommendations to individuals

Other resolutions expressly direct recommendations to individuals and groups. Several times, the Security Council has called upon private persons, NGOs, and companies to support UN sanctions policy. In regard to Sierra Leone, the Security Council “encouraged” the diamond industry to cooperate with the official government (res. 1306 (2000) of 5 July 2000, para. 10). In a resolution on the crisis after the presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire (extension of the UNOCI mandate), the Security Council “calls upon the government and all international partners, including private companies, involved in assisting the Government in the reform of the security sector, to comply with the provisions of resolution 1980 (2011)” (res. 2000 (2011) of 27 July 2011, para. 16).

Resolutions on NIACs

The Security Council has so far imposed unambiguous strict legal obligations on individuals only in NIACs (including conflicts potentially “internationalised” through the involvement of third states or international organisations); this includes the current ISIL situation. In this connection, several resolutions have called upon not only the involved states but also other political groups and individuals to immediately cease hostilities, to comply with previously agreed ceasefire agreements, and the like (on Kosovo Res. 1160 (1998), para. 2; res. 1199 (1998) para. 1; res. 1203 (1998) para. 4). Res. 814 (1993) on Somalia addresses “all Somali parties, including movements and factions” (para. 8). Res. 1010 (1995) paras 1 and 2, demanded that the Bosnian Serb party give access to UN and ICRC personnel and respect their rights, and so on.

The practice sketched out here constitutes “subsequent practice” in the sense of Art. 31(3) lit b.) VCLT, and must therefore be taken into account when interpreting Art. 25 UN Charter with a view to determining the normative power of res. 2178.

Conclusion

Domestic authorities which do not want to apply para. 1 of SC res. 2178 directly would have to justify the non-application of that resolution. They should rely, in their justification, on the mentioned principle of legality which ultimately seeks to protect individual liberty.

Under due respect for the principle of legality, notably in its strict version of nulla poena, resolution 2178 surely cannot deploy any criminalising effects. But the obligations to cease and desist from all terrorist acts directly flow from the Security Council resolution 2178. It could even be argued (although with some difficulty) that the individuals’ obligation not to travel into a region to participate in the financing, planning, preparation, or perpetration of terrorist acts also flows from the resolution itself (paras 1, 6 and 8).

That would mean that a domestic authority, in the absence of a domestic boundary control law, could – from the perspective of international law − rely on res. 2178 to refuse the issuance of a passport, for example. It would have to respect international humans rights law, namely the human right to leave one’s country (12(2) ICCPR), for this. It seems as if the limits spelt out in Art. 12(3) ICCPR are prima facie satisfied, because the travel ban and control is, as argued above, “provided by law”, and seems to be “necessary” to protect national security, public order, and the rights and freedoms of others.

Fonte: EJIL

US files dispute against China over alleged export-contingent subsidies to enterprises

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11 February 2015

The United States notified the WTO Secretariat on 11 February 2015 of a request for consultations with China regarding certain measures that allegedly provide export-contingent subsidies to enterprises in several industrial sectors. These sectors include textiles, agriculture, medical products, light industry, special chemical engineering, new materials, and hardware and building materials.

According to the US, China designates a cluster of enterprises in a particular industry as a Demonstration Base and then provides export-contingent subsidies to those enterprises. In addition, the US argues that China provides certain other export-contingent subsidies to Chinese manufacturers, producers, and farmers.

Fonte: OMC

Fracassa tentativa da oposição de anular acordo nuclear com o Brasil

Num breve debate, partidos da coalizão do governo garantem prorrogação da parceria por mais cinco anos. Partido Verde, autor de moção pelo cancelamento, alega que pacto não condiz com atual política energética alemã.

Numa sessão de cerca de 30 minutos e com pouco menos de 50 parlamentares presentes, o Bundestag (câmara baixa do Parlamento alemão) garantiu na noite desta quinta-feira (06/11) a prorrogação do acordo nuclear entre Brasil e Alemanha por mais cinco anos.

A coalizão do governo, formada pela União Democrata Cristã (CDU) e pelo Partido Social-Democrata (SPD), votou contra a moção que pedia o cancelamento da cooperação bilateral, garantindo assim a maioria necessária para a manutenção da parceria com o Brasil. O Partido Verde, autor da moção, foi apoiado pela legenda A Esquerda.

No entanto, a CDU e o SPD se comprometeram a analisar o documento para verificar a necessidade de alterações no texto.

“Estou decepcionada, principalmente com o SPD. Tendo em vista como o partido se comportou e agiu no último governo, ele deveria ter apoiado a moção. O fim do acordo deveria ter sido importante para o SPD, devido à nossa credibilidade perante a comunidade internacional ao mostrarmos que realmente estamos falando sério sobre banir a energia nuclear”, disse a deputada Sylvia Kotting-Uhl em entrevista à DW Brasil após o plenário.

Segundo Kotting-Uhl, uma das autoras da moção do Partido Verde, agora a oposição vai exigir que as promessas de análise do acordo e alterações sejam cumpridas, garantindo que ele seja focado somente nas questões da segurança, do armazenamento do lixo atômico e do desligamento de usinas e não voltado a fomentar a geração de energia nuclear.

Agitação no plenário

Durante o debate, Kotting-Uhl e o deputado da legenda A Esquerda Hubertus Zdebel e defenderam o fim do acordo nuclear com o Brasil, alegando que a cooperação nesse setor não condiz com a atual política alemã de mudar sua matriz energética e desligar todas as usinas do país.

No entanto, o deputado da CDU Andreas Lämmel defendeu a manutenção da cooperação no setor, afirmando que o fim do acordo nuclear poderia colocar em risco a parceria entre os dois países em outras áreas. “É um erro cancelar o acordo. Cada país tem o direito de escolher sua política energética”, afirmou.

O parlamentar causou alvoroço entre os colegas verdes ao afirmar que a Alemanha possuía as usinas nucleares mais seguras do mundo e, com o acordo bilateral vigente, poderia repassar ao Brasil esse conhecimento e experiência. O deputado do Partido Verde e ex-ministro alemão do Meio Ambiente Jürgen Trittin ficou visivelmente irritado com a afirmação.

No debate, as deputadas do SPD Nina Scheer e Hiltrud Lotze também apoiaram a continuação da parceria com Brasil, mas, assim como Kotting-Uhl, ressaltaram é preciso fazer uma avaliação minuciosa do acordo para verificar se mudanças são necessárias para garantir que ele não seja destinado à construção de novas usinas ou ao uso militar da tecnologia.

Ao se pronunciar, Lotze acusou Trittin de não ter feito nada para finalizar o acordo na época em que foi ministro do Meio Ambiente.

Acordo controverso

O acordo de cooperação no setor nuclear entre os dois países foi assinado em 1975. Com ele, o Brasil se comprometia a criar um programa com empresas alemãs para a construção de oito usinas nucleares, além do desenvolvimento de uma indústria teuto-brasileira para a fabricação de componentes e combustível para os reatores.

A parceria também previa o repasse da tecnologia alemã ao país. A vigência inicial do acordo era de 15 anos, podendo ser prorrogado por períodos de cinco anos, caso nenhuma das partes o cancelasse.

Pouco do previsto na proposta inicial se concretizou. Já nos primeiros anos, o pacto começou a fracassar, devido à pressão americana, às críticas internacionais e à crise econômica que afetou o Brasil na década de 1980.

Apenas duas das oito usinas programadas saíram do papel: Angra 1 e Angra 2. Além disso, quatro anos após o início da parceria, o governo brasileiro começou a desenvolver um programa nuclear paralelo, que visava ao total conhecimento do ciclo de enriquecimento de urânio, o que possibilitaria a fabricação de uma bomba atômica.

Apesar de algumas propostas terem ficado de lado, o acordo já foi renovado cinco vezes. Para ser anulado, um dos países precisa manifestar o desejo de cancelamento um ano antes do fim da vigência. Com o resultado da votação de hoje, ele será renovado pela sexta vez em 2015.

Essa foi a segunda tentativa alemã de encerrar a parceria. Em 2004, ela esteve prestes a ser cancelada, segundo Trittin, então ministro alemão de Meio Ambiente, mas o Brasil voltou atrás.

Atualmente, no âmbito da parceria, são realizados encontros anuais entre representantes da Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN) e da Sociedade Alemã para a Segurança de Usinas e Reatores Nucleares (GRS), para a troca de informações e experiências, além de workshops e cursos.

“É um erro cancelar o acordo. Cada país tem o direito de escolher sua política energética”, afirma o deputado Andreas Lämmel

Oposição vai exigir que promessas de análise do acordo e alterações sejam cumpridas, diz Sylvia Kotting-Uhl

FONTE: http://www.dw.de/fracassa-tentativa-da-oposição-de-anular-acordo-nuclear-com-o-brasil/a-18046353

Matheus Luiz Puppe Magalhaes

CIJ – “The International Court of Justice is “committed to fulfilling its high judicial mission impartially and effectively”, declares the President of the Court to the United Nations General Assembly”

His Excellency Judge Peter Tomka, President of the International Court of Justice (“the ICJ”), declared yesterday to the United Nations General Assembly that the Court “always strives to ensure that the disputes submitted to it are settled promptly”, emphasizing that “hearings have been held and deliberations are underway in every case on the Court’s General List in which the written procedure has closed”.

In his address, the President gave a brief overview of the Court’s judicial activities. He recalled that, during the reporting period, the total number of contentious cases pending before the Court had been 13 (and now stood at 14); in four of these the Court had held hearings. Three of these hearings had dealt with requests for provisional measures: in October 2013 in the case concerning Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua); in November 2013 in the case concerning Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica); and in January 2014 on Questions relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia).

In addition, in March 2014 the Court had held hearings on the merits in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia). The President explained that the Court was now deliberating the case, and was in process of drafting its Judgment, which it planned to deliver ahead of the triennial renewal of its composition next February.

President Tomka went on to inform the Assembly that the Court had handed down three Judgments during the reporting period, the first in the case concerning the Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Cambodia v. Thailand), the second in the Maritime Dispute (Peru v.Chile) and the third in the case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan); it had also issued three Orders on requests for the indication of provisional measures.

The President then summarized the cases submitted to the Court since August 2013, including the proceedings instituted on 28 August last — and thus after the end of the Court’s reporting period — by the Federal Republic of Somalia against the Republic of Kenya with regard to a dispute concerning the delimitation of the two countries’ respective maritime areas in the Indian Ocean. The President observed that this case had brought to 14 the total number of cases currently entered on the Court’s General List.

Fonte: http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/6/18386.pdf

STF: Ministro considerou “procedente” decisão italiana sobre Pizzolato

BRASÍLIA  –  O ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) Marco Aurélio Mello classificou nesta terça-feira como “procedente” a decisão da Corte de Apelação de Bolonha, na Itália, que negou a extradição do ex-diretor de Marketing do Banco do Brasil Henrique Pizzolato, que fugiu do Brasil após ser condenado no julgamento do mensalão.

Uma das razões alegadas pela defesa e acatadas pelos juízes para negar a extradição foi a situação dos presídios brasileiros. “O motivo foi não termos penitenciárias que preservem a integridade física e moral do preso. Para nós, brasileiros, é uma vergonha. Ele exerceu o direito natural de não se submeter às condições animalescas das nossas penitenciárias”, declarou Marco Aurélio.

E acrescentou: “Ele [Pizzolato] tem dupla nacionalidade e o óbice vislumbrado pela Itália foi justamente o que o nosso ministro da Justiça [José Eduardo Cardozo] apontou como masmorras. Se considerarmos algo que talvez esteja em desuso no Brasil, que é a dignidade do homem, é procedente o pronunciamento italiano.”

Para Marco Aurélio, a decisão não seria um revide pelo caso do italiano Césare Battisti, em que o Brasil negou a extradição. “Não, eu não presumo o excepcional, o extraordinário, o extravagante, mas o ordinário”, falou. O governo brasileiro pedia que Pizzolato fosse extraditado para cumprir no país a pena de 12 anos e 7 meses de prisão, pelos crimes de corrupção passiva, peculato e lavagem de dinheiro.

Fonte: Valor Econômico S.A