AS SEDUTORAS GARRAS DO DRAGÃO CHINÊS: FINANÇAS E BIFURCAÇÃO DO CENTRO DA ECONOMIA GLOBAL

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Publicado em 05/04/2015

por Javier Vadell[i] e Leonardo Ramos[ii]

O Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) tornar-se-á a primeira organização multilateral que não estará sob controle direto dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) ou de seus aliados. Além disso, caso vire um membro, não o será como membro-fundador, já que o prazo que a República Popular da China (RPC) estipulou foi até o dia 31 de março de 2015.

A decisão da Grã-Bretanha de participar como sócio fundador do recém-criado AIIB liderado pela República Popular da China (RPC) movimentou as placas tectônicas do sistema internacional contemporâneo de maneira significativa: a partir daí, o que se viu foi uma corrida contra o tempo: Itália, República Federal da Alemanha, França, Suíça, Luxemburgo e Nova Zelândia à Grã-Bretanha. Até mesmo Christine Lagarde, diretora-gerente do FMI, afirmou que o FMI cooperaria de “bom grado” com o AIIB[1].

O AIIB se inicia com 33 membros[2], e há outros 21[3] esperando o resultado de suas candidaturas, que será divulgado até o dia 15 de abril de 2015[4], criando um dilema crucial aos Estados Unidos. Associar-se-á à China ou continuará a comandar os desprestigiados FMI e Banco Mundial, como afirmou o Secretário do Tesouro dos EUA, Jack Lew[5]? Em que medida esse movimento afeta a governança econômica e política global na hora em que quatro membros do G7 aceitaram formar parte deste processo institucional multilateral? Seria ele uma mostra da perda de influência econômica dos Estados Unidos frente às alianças do G7, após a grande potência ter tentado infrutuosamente boicotar a empreitada chinesa?

AIIB e a economia política da sedução

Numa visita à Indonésia em 2013, o presidente da RPC, Xi Jinping, anunciou a proposta de criação do AIIB e, no ano seguinte, em 24 de outubro de 2014, foi realizada a Cerimônia de Assinatura do Memorando de Entendimento sobre o Estabelecimento do AIIB. O Banco teria um capital inicial de US$ 50 bilhões e agiria como uma nova fonte de financiamento às economias emergentes regionais, fundamentalmente, como seu nome o indica, na área de infraestrutura (LOPES 2014; YANGPENG 2014). Desde um primeiro momento, os EUA tentaram persuadir seus aliados a boicotar a nova instituição (RACHMAN 2015) com os argumentos conhecidos. Isto é, a RPC não teria escrúpulos no fornecimento de empréstimos, não se importando com Direitos Humanos ou padrões ambientais – que compõem parte das condições impostas por instituições como o Banco Mundial e o FMI aos seus clientes/Estados.

A despeito de tais pressões, o Reino Unido, a Itália, a República Federal da Alemanha, a França, a Suíça, Luxemburgo, a Áustria, a Coréia do Sul e a Austrália se somaram aos 21 países que originalmente assinaram o memorando de entendimento, dando o pontapé inicial em um banco de desenvolvimento de proporções extremamente significativas.

O AIIB formará parte de uma rede de bancos de desenvolvimento que a China está criando e gerenciando e cujo centro de poder estará em Xangai e Pequim, centro de poder econômico e político da China. Essa rede envolve o China Development Bank(CDB), China-Africa Development Bank (CADB), New Development Bank (NDB), ou Banco dos BRICS, e agora o Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), foco da nossa análise.

A despeito da relevância do investimento em infraestrutura para o crescimento econômico, desde a crise financeira de 2008 é possível perceber um crescente déficit no investimento em infraestrutura, principalmente no mundo em desenvolvimento. De acordo com estimativa feita pela OCDE, seriam necessários aproximadamente US$70 trilhões até 2030 para atender às demandas de investimento em transporte, geração, transmissão e distribuição de eletricidade, água e telecomunicações (OECD 2006,2007). Ora, os principais investidores tradicionais têm diminuído seus investimentos em infraestrutura: o investimento privado em infraestrutura tem diminuído desde 2008, e provavelmente diminuirá ainda mais em função das demandas do Acordo da Basiléia III – um efeito colateral da crise financeira de 2008 (WIGGLESWORTH 2012). Além disso, os bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento e a ajuda oficial para o desenvolvimento têm limitado os investimentos (privados?), direcionando menos de 10% para projetos de infraestrutura e voltando tais recursos para os países mais pobres e não mais para as potências médias emergentes (CHIN 2014).

Neste contexto, iniciativas como o AIIB, CADB e NDB são extremamente interessantes e atraentes, em especial para os países asiáticos: de acordo com dados do Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento, eles necessitarão de cerca de US$8 trilhões de investimento em infraestrutura na próxima década para manter sua atual taxa de crescimento. Já a Europa vê as relações com a China em termos estratégicos: a China é seu segundo maior parceiro comercial e, além disso, há o interesse, por parte dos países europeus, de se tornarem a porta de entrada para o capital chinês no ocidente.

A falta de avanço nas reformas da arquitetura financeira mundial – reforma do FMI e do Banco Mundial, em especial –, é um elemento fundamental para compreender o contexto de emergência desta rede de bancos de desenvolvimento criada e gerida pela China, do qual o AIIB é parte fundamental. Assim, a emergência de tal rede aponta para o aprofundamento da crise do modelo neoliberal e do bloco histórico a ele associado: desde o pós-II Guerra Mundial – e em especial a partir da crise dos anos 1970 – as instituições de Bretton Woods têm sido fundamentais na manutenção da hegemonia neoliberal. Ora, todo grupo hegemônico deve ser capaz de garantir a reprodução/satisfação dos interesses e necessidades materiais básicas dos grupos subordinados, e como visto, nos últimos anos, as instituições criadas em Bretton Woods não têm sido capazes de suprir tais interesses e necessidades no que diz respeito ao investimento em infraestrutura e em equilibrar a relação de poder econômico existente outorgando mais peso de decisão aos emergentes. Neste sentido a rede bancária chinesa – incluído o AIIB – pode ser vista como um concorrente do Banco Mundial, FMI e do Banco Asiático de Desenvolvimento – este último liderado por Japão e EUA; mas um concorrente que apresenta o diferencial de fornecer empréstimos que as instituições de Bretton Woods não oferecem, isto é, financiamento em infraestrutura, essencial para a expansão do capitalismo global e para o impulsionar o desenvolvimento.

Bibliografia

BBC. 2015. Lagarde says IMF to co-operate with China-led AIIB bank. BBC 22 march 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32007090.

CHIN, Gregory T. . 2014. The BRICS-led Development Bank: Purpose and Politics beyond the G20. Global Policy 5 (3):366-373.

LOPES, Bárbara. 2014. A China como Grande protagonista na Criação dos Novos Bancos de Desenvolvimento. Blog do GPPM, 08 dec 2014,https://grupoemergentes.wordpress.com/2014/12/08/a-china-como-grande-protagonista-na-criacao-dos-novos-bancos-de-desenvolvimento/

OECD. 2006. Infrastructure to 2030: Telecom, Land Transport, Water and Electricity.OCDE Publishing, 16 mar 2015,http://www.oecd.org/futures/infrastructureto2030/infrastructureto2030telecomlandtransportwaterandelectricity.htm.

OECD. 2007. Infrastructure to 2030 (Vol. 2): Mapping Policy for Electricity, Water and Transport. OCDE Publishing, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/9789264031326-sum-en.pdf?expires=1428007137&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=2576D4166BD0AA9F6543D74DAF500CD0.

RACHMAN, Gideon. 2015. Diplomatic debacle over AIIB will make America look isolated and petulant. Financial Times, 16 mar 2015,http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cd466ddc-cbc7-11e4-aeb5-00144feab7de.html – axzz3UlomJ99V

TIEZZI, Shannon. 2015. America’s AIIB Disaster: Are There Lessons to be Learned?The Diplomat, 18 mar 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/americas-aiib-disaster-are-there-lessons-to-be-learned/.

WIGGLESWORTH, Robin. 2012. Infrastructure projects face funding gap. Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a3c51ee-9457-11e1-bb0d-00144feab49a.html – axzz3K7c1iY36.

XINHUA. 2015. 30 nations approved as AIIB founding members. Xinhua 01/04/2015,http://en.people.cn/business/n/2015/0331/c90778-8872045.html

YANGPENG, Zheng. 2014. Members named for Asia infrastructure bank. China Daily,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-10/24/content_18797512.htm.

[1] Lagarde expressou: “IMF to co-operate with China-led AIIB bank” (BBC 2015)

[2] Membros regionais: Bangladesh, Brunei, Camboja, Cazaquistão, China, Filipinas, Índia, Indonésia, Jordânia, Kuwait, Laos, Malásia, Maldivas, Mianmar, Mongólia, Nepal, Omã, Paquistão, Qatar, Arábia Saudita, Singapura, Sri Lanka, Tailândia, Tajiquistão, Uzbequistão e Vietnam.  Membros extra-regionais: Alemanha, França, Itália, Luxemburgo, Reino Unido, Nova Zelândia e Suíça

[3] Austrália, Áustria, Brasil, Coreia do Sul, Dinamarca, Egito, Espanha, Finlândia, Geórgia, Holanda, Hong Kong, Hungria, Islândia, Israel, Noruega, Portugal, Quirguistão,  Rússia,  Suécia, Taiwan e Turquia.

[4] Para mais detalhes ver: Xinhua (2015)

[5] Segundo The Diplomat, aparentemente os EUA subestimaram a frustração crescente que existe por parte dos Estados (e não só do Sul Global) em relação às instituições criadas em Bretton Woods, o Banco Mundial e o Fundo Monetário Internacional. O Secretário do Tesouro dos EUA, Jack Lew disse ao Congresso: “It’s not an accident that emerging economies are looking at other places because they are frustrated that, frankly, the United States has stalled a very mild and reasonable set of reforms in the IMF” (TIEZZI 2015).

[i] Professor do Departamento de RI da PUC Minas e coordenador do Grupo de potências Médias.

[ii] Professor do Departamento de RI da PUC Minas e coordenador do Grupo de potências Médias.

Fonte: Grupo de Pesquisa sobre POt~encias Médias

Pepe Escobar: Westward ho on China’s Eurasia BRIC road

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Pepe Escobar March 21, 2015 16 Comments
Empire of Chaos, Pepe Escobar
“…it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger (to the U.S.)

emerges capable of dominating Eurasia

and thus also of challenging America”

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, 1997

What’s in a name, rather an ideogram? Everything. A single Chinese character – jie (for “between”) – graphically illustrates the key foreign policy initiative of the new Chinese dream.

In the upper part of the four-stroke character – which, symbolically, should be read as the roof of a house – the stroke on the left means the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the stroke on the right means the 21st century Maritime Silk Road. In the lower part, the stroke on the left means the China-Pakistan corridor, via Xinjiang province, and the stroke on the right, the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh-India corridor via Yunnan province.

Chinese culture feasts on myriad formulas, mottoes – and symbols. If many a Chinese scholar worries about how the Middle Kingdom’s new intimation of soft power may be lost in translation, the character jie – pregnant with connectivity – is already the starting point to make 1.3 billion Chinese, plus the overseas Chinese diaspora, visualize the top twin axis – continental and naval – of the New Silk Road vision unveiled by President Xi Jinping, a concept also known as “One Road, One Belt”.

In practical terms, it also helps that the New Silk Road will be boosted by a special, multi-billion-dollar Silk Road Fund and the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which, not by accident, has attracted the attention of European investors.

The New Silk Road, actually roads, symbolizes China’s pivot to an old heartland: Eurasia. That implies a powerful China even more enriched by its environs, without losing its essence as a civilization-state. Call it a post-modern remix of the Tang, Sung and early Ming dynasties – as Beijing deftly and recently stressed via a superb exhibition in the National Museum of China consisting of rare early Silk Road pieces assembled from a range of regional museums.

In the past, China had a unifying infrastructure enterprise like the Great Wall. In the future it will have a major project of unifying Eurasia via high-speed rail. When one considers the breadth of this vision, depictions of Xi striving to be an equal of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping sound so pedestrian.

Of course China’s new drive may be interpreted as the stirrings of a new tributary system, ordered and centered in Beijing. At the same time, many in the U.S. are uncomfortable that the New Silk Road may be a geopolitical, “peaceful development”, “win-win” answer to the Obama administration’s Pentagon-driven pivoting to Asia.

Beijing has been quick to dismiss any notions of hegemony. It maintains this is no Marshall Plan. It’s undeniable that the Marshall Plan “covered only Western nations and excluded all countries and regions the West thought were ideologically close to the Soviet Union”. China, on the other hand, is focused on integrating “emerging economies” into a vast, pan-Eurasian trade/commerce network.

Achtung! Seidenstrasse! (Attention! Silk Road!)

It’s no wonder top nations in the beleaguered EU have gravitated to the AIIB – which will play a key role in the New Silk Road(s). A German geographer – Ferdinand von Richthofen – invented the Seidenstrasse (Silk Road) concept. Marco Polo forever linked Italy with the Silk Road. The EU is already China’s number one trade partner. And, once again symbolically, this happens to be the 40th year of China-EU relations. Watch the distinct possibility of an emerging Sino-European Fund that finances infrastructure and even green energy projects across an integrated Eurasia.

It’s as if the Angel of History – that striking image in a Paul Klee painting eulogized by philosopher Walter Benjamin – is now trying to tell us that a 21st century China-EU Seidenstrasse synergy is all but inevitable. And that, crucially, would have to include Russia, which is a vital part of the New Silk Road through an upcoming, Russia-China financed $280 billion high-speed rail upgrade of the Trans-Siberian railway. This is where the New Silk Road project and President Putin’s initial idea of a huge trade emporium from Lisbon to Vladivostok actually merge.

In parallel, the 21st century Maritime Silk Road will deepen the already frantic trade interaction between China and Southeast Asia by sea. Fujian province – which faces Taiwan – will play a key role. Xi, crucially, spent many years of his life in Fujian. And Hong Kong, not by accident, also wants to be part of the action.

All these developments are driven by China being finally ready to become a massive net exporter of capital and the top source of credit for the Global South. In a few months, Beijing will launch the China International Payment System (CIPS), bound to turbo-charge the yuan as a key global currency for all types of trade. There’s the AIIB. And if that was not enough, there’s still the New Development Bank, launched by the BRICs to compete with the World Bank, and run from Shanghai.

It can be argued that the success of the entire Silk Road hinges on how Beijing will handle restive, Uyghur-populated Xinjiang – which should be seen as one of key nodes of Eurasia. This is a subplot – fraught with insecurity, to say the least – that should be followed in detail for the rest of the decade. What’s certain is that most of Asia will feel the tremendous pull of China’s Eurasian drive.

And Eurasia – contrary to perennial Brzezinski wishful thinking – will likely take the form of a geopolitical challenge: A de facto China-Russia strategic partnership that manifests itself in various facets of the New Silk Road that also bolsters the strength of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

By then, both Iran and Pakistan will be SCO members. The close relations between what was ancient Persia and China span two millennia – and now they are viewed by Beijing as a matter of national security. Pakistan is an essential node of the Maritime Silk Road, especially when one considers the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar, which in a few years may double as a key transit point of the IP or Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. It may also be the starting point of yet another major Chinese Pipelineistan gambit parallel to the Karakorum highway, delivering gas to Xinjiang.

Beijing values both Iran and Pakistan – the intersection of Southwest Asia and South Asia – as fundamentally strategic nodes of the New Silk Road. This allows China to project trade/commerce power not only in the Indian Ocean but the Persian Gulf.

Got vision, will travel

Washington’s alarm at these developments betrays the glaring absence of an enticing made -in-the-USA vision to woo pan-Eurasian public opinion – apart from a hazy military pivoting posture mixed with relentless NATO expansion, and the TTIP “free trade” corporate racket, also known across Asia as “NATO on trade”.

The counter punch to the above could be already coming via the BRICs; the SCO; the non-stop strengthtening of the China-Russia strategic partnership. There’s also the expansion of the Eurasian Union (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia – with Kyrgyzstan soon acceding, followed by Tajikistan). In the Middle East, Syria is seriously studying the possibility, and a trade agreement with Egypt has already been clinched. In Southeast Asia, a pact with Vietnam will be a done deal by the end of 2015.

Russia and China’s “secret” agenda in helping to clinch an Iran-P5+1 nuclear deal paves the way for Tehran to be admitted to the SCO as a full member. Expect, as early as 2016, an SCO alignment that unites at least 60% of Eurasia, with a population of 3.5 billion people and a wealth of oil and gas that more than matches the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

So the real story is not how China will collapse, as peddled by David Shambaugh, the so-called second top China expert in the U.S. (who’s the first? Henry Kissinger?) This is a line that’s been soundly debunked by many sources. The real story, which a revived Asia Times will be covering in detail in upcoming years, is how the myriad aspects of the New Silk Road will be configuring a new Eurasian dream. Have vision, will travel. Bon voyage.

Pepe Escobar’s latest book is http://www.amazon.com/Empire-Chaos-Roving-Eye-Collection-ebook/dp/B00OYVYD3G/ref=sr_1_1?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1423800890&sr=1-1&keywords=empire+of+chaos

Empire of Chaos. Follow him on https://www.facebook.com/pepe.escobar.77377

Fonte: Asia Times

The Non-Problem of Chinese Currency Manipulation

CAMBRIDGE – America’s two political parties rarely agree, but one thing that unites them is their anger about “currency manipulation,” especially by China. Perhaps spurred by the recent appreciation of the dollar and the first signs that it is eroding net exports, congressional Democrats and Republicans are once again considering legislation to counter what they view as unfair currency undervaluation. The proposed measures include countervailing duties against imports from offending countries, even though this would conflict with international trade rules.
This is the wrong approach. Even if one accepts that it is possible to identify currency manipulation, China no longer qualifies. Under recent conditions, if China allowed the renminbi to float freely, without intervention, it would be more likely to depreciate than rise against the dollar, making it harder for US producers to compete in international markets.

But there is a more fundamental point: From an economic viewpoint, currency manipulation or unfair undervaluation are exceedingly hard to pin down conceptually. The renminbi’s slight depreciation against the dollar in 2014 is not evidence of it; many other currencies, most notably the yen and the euro, depreciated by far more last year. As a result, the overall value of the renminbi was actually up slightly on an average basis.
The sine qua non of manipulation is currency-market intervention: selling the domestic currency and buying foreign currencies to keep the foreign-exchange value lower than it would otherwise be. To be sure, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) did a lot of this over the last ten years. Capital inflows contributed to a large balance-of-payments surplus, and the authorities bought US dollars, thereby resisting upward pressure on the renminbi. The result was as an all-time record level of foreign exchange reserves, reaching $3.99 trillion by July 2014.
But the situation has recently changed. In 2014, China’s capital flows reversed direction, showing substantial net capital outflows. As a result, the overall balance of payments turned negative in the second half of the year, and the PBOC actually intervened to dampen the renminbi’s depreciation. Foreign-exchange reserves fell to $3.84 trillion by January 2015.
There is no reason to think that this recent trend will reverse in the near future. The downward pressure on the renminbi relative to the dollar reflects the US economy’s relatively strong recovery, which has prompted the Federal Reserve to end a long period of monetary easing, and China’s economic slowdown, which has prompted the PBOC to start a new period of monetary stimulus.
Similar economic fundamentals are also at work in other countries. Congressional proposals to include currency provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the mega-regional free-trade agreement currently in the final stage of negotiations, presumably target Japan (as China is not included in the TPP). Congress may also want to target the eurozone in coming negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
But it has been years since the Bank of Japan or the European Central Bank intervened in the foreign-exchange market. Indeed, at an unheralded G-7 ministers’ meeting two years ago, they agreed to a US Treasury proposal to refrain from unilateral foreign-exchange intervention. Those who charge Japan or the eurozone with pursuing currency wars have in mind the renewed monetary stimulus implied by their central banks’ recent quantitative easing programs. But, as the US government knows well, countries with faltering economies cannot be asked to refrain from lowering interest rates just because the likely effects include currency depreciation.
Indeed, it was the US that had to explain to the world that monetary stimulus is not currency manipulation when it undertook quantitative easing in 2010. At the time, Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega coined the phrase “currency wars” and accused the US of being the main aggressor. In fact, the US has not intervened in a major way in the currency market to sell dollars since the coordinated interventions associated with the Plaza Accord in 1985.
Other criteria besides currency-market intervention are used to ascertain whether a currency is deliberately undervalued or, in the words of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement, “manipulated” for “unfair competitive advantage.” One criterion is an inappropriately large trade or current-account surplus. Another is an inappropriately low real (inflation-adjusted) foreign-exchange value. But many countries have large trade surpluses or weak currencies. Usually it is difficult to say whether they are appropriate.
Ten years ago, the renminbi did seem to meet all of the criteria for undervaluation. But this is no longer the case. The renminbi’s real value rose from 2006 to 2013. The most recent purchasing power statistics show the currency to be in a range that is normal for a country with per capita real income of around $10,000.
By contrast, the criterion on which the US Congress focuses – the bilateral trade balance – is irrelevant to economists (and to the IMF rules). It is true that China’s bilateral trade surplus with the US is as big as ever. But China also runs bilateral deficits with Saudi Arabia, Australia, and other exporters of oil and minerals, and with South Korea, from which it imports components that go into its manufactured exports. Indeed, imported inputs account for roughly 95% of the value of a “Chinese” smartphone exported to the US; only 5% is Chinese value added. The point is that bilateral trade balances have little meaning.
Congress requires by law that the US Treasury report to it twice a year which countries are guilty of currency manipulation, with the bilateral trade balance specified as one of the criteria. But Congress should be careful what it wishes for. It would be ironic if China agreed to US demands to float the renminbi and the result was a depreciation that boosted its exporters’ international competitiveness

Jeffrey Frankel, a professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, previously served as a member of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers. He directs the Program in International Finance and Macroeconomics at the US National Bureau of Economic Research

Fonte: Project Syndicate

EU wins a WTO dispute on Chinese anti-dumping duties

A WTO panel today declared Chinese anti-dumping duties on European and Japanese imports of stainless steel tubes in breach of WTO rules.

In its report today, a WTO panel in charge of the dispute opposing the EU, Japan and China declared the Chinese anti-dumping duties on stainless steel tubes – imposed by China in 2012 – illegal in the light of the Organisation’s rules.

“In international trade we all need to play by the rules. I am glad that the WTO panel confirms this today asking China to bring its customs duties in line with the WTO obligations,” said EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström. “I hope to see China reacting to this ruling immediately and restoring fair trading conditions for EU producers.”

The WTO panel found that the Chinese measures did not fully respect the prescribed WTO methods to calculate dumping margins. Margins calculated for one of the EU’s exporting producers were found not to be correct. China failed also to justify its finding that the tubes imported from the EU had caused injury to China’s domestic industry. Finally, the panel concluded that the Chinese antidumping procedure came short of the WTO requirements in terms of due process and transparency.

The panel’s findings are also of systemic importance because they highlight recurrent shortcomings in trade defence investigations carried out in China. This is the second time that the EU has successfully challenged China in the WTO on anti-dumping duties. Following the previous ruling, China repealed its anti-dumping measures on x-ray scanners. Today’s report marks again a clear victory for the EU and sends a strong signal to all WTO Members that their trade defence instruments must respect WTO rules.

China will be expected to remove its anti-dumping duties on EU imports. The Chinese authorities can decide to appeal the ruling within the coming 60 days.

Background

The case concerns certain high-performance seamless tubes of stainless steel produced in the EU and Japan. China imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on those products in November 2012. The Chinese decision followed an EU investigation on similar products imported from China in June 2011. The WTO proceedings started in the end of 2012 initially between Japan and China. The EU joined the procedure in mid-2013.

For further information

EU requests WTO Panel on Chinese Anti-Dumping duties on Steel Tubes, 16 August 2013

EU Joins Japan in WTO Challenge against Chinese Anti-dumping Duties on Steel Tubes, 13 June 2013

Dispute Settlement and the World Trade Organisation

China — Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (“HP-SSST”) from the European Union

Fonte: Comissão Europeia

US files dispute against China over alleged export-contingent subsidies to enterprises

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11 February 2015

The United States notified the WTO Secretariat on 11 February 2015 of a request for consultations with China regarding certain measures that allegedly provide export-contingent subsidies to enterprises in several industrial sectors. These sectors include textiles, agriculture, medical products, light industry, special chemical engineering, new materials, and hardware and building materials.

According to the US, China designates a cluster of enterprises in a particular industry as a Demonstration Base and then provides export-contingent subsidies to those enterprises. In addition, the US argues that China provides certain other export-contingent subsidies to Chinese manufacturers, producers, and farmers.

Fonte: OMC

Keiser Report: Lucky Chinese Number (E666)

CrossTalk: The Bear & The Dragon (ft. Pepe Escobar)