LANÇAMENTO – Jurisprudência Internacional

Prezados usuários, pesquisadores, alunos e amigos.

A jurisprudência dos Tribunais Internacionais é de grande relevância na pesquisa e na consolidação do Direito Internacional. O NECCINT trabalhou durante alguns meses para disponibilizar as principais decisões das principais Côrtes de forma a facilitar a pesquisa de todos. Apresentamos jurisprudências das seguintes casas:

Côrte Internacional de Justiça

Tribunal Penal Internacional

Côrte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos

Acordos da Organização dos Estados Americanos

Convenções da Organização Internacional do Trabalho

Casos da Organização Mundial do Comércio


O link para o serviço pode ser encontrado aqui ou

Barra 2

Esperamos que todos aproveitem e contribuam com sugestões e críticas para aumentarmos ainda mais nosso banco de dados e melhorarmos este serviço.

Um grande abraço

Raphael Amaral

Colaborador do NECCINT

John J. Mearsheimer on “Rational Theory of International Politics,” by Charles L. Glaser

John J. Mearsheimer on “Rational Theory of International Politics,” by Charles L. Glaser

Part of a Roundtable on “Rational Theory of International Politics,” by Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, GW

Held at The American Political Science Association
2010 Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.
Friday, September 3, 2010

Fonte: American Political Science Association

Entrevistas com Kenneth Waltz, o mestre do neorealismo em Teoria das Relações Internacionais

On this edition of Conversations with History, UC Berkeley’s Harry Kreisler talks with renowned political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz, about theory, international politics, and the U.S. role in world affairs. Series: “Conversations with History” [6/2003]

Fonte: Conversations with History, UC Berkeley

The Annual Review of Political Science presents an interview with Kenneth Waltz, Senior Research Associate at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

Fonte: Annual Review of Political Science

Citações de “A Sociedade Anárquica: Estudo da Ordem na Política Mundial” de Hedely Bull (1977)

The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World politics

by Hedley Bull

Columbia University Press, New York, 1977,  ISBN 0-231-10297-6

Review Copyright © 1999 Garret Wilson January 8, 1999, 11:00am

Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society has become a classic International Relations text in the United Kingdom since it was first published in 1977. Its name in large part describes Bull’s thesis: the current system of states is anarchical in that there is no higher level of authority over states, each state having ultimate sovereignty over its citizens within its borders; and the system forms a society in that there are certain “common rules and institutions” (25) which provides order to the international arena. Neither statement seems very novel to a student of International Relations; indeed, it seems to be an overview of the common neo-realist/neo-liberal position. The Anarchical Society’s value seems to be that it was one of the first books to comprehensively present such ideas in a book that most of all helps one to analyze world politics from many angles – albeit always from a neo-realist/neo-liberal perspective.

Having said that, The Anarchical Society can be rather boring for the International Relations student for the main reason that Bull says little that is new, at least in hindsight. In fact, Bull’s statements don’t seem that profound at all, and in many cases he seems to be saying the obvious (but this may be like reading Isaac Newton and saying that inertia seems to be common sense.) Perhaps my worst complaint is that, in painting a picture of his world, Bull sets forth definitions that he has carefully constructed so that his world will fit his definitions. It is inevitable that the world fit Bull’s theory because of the way Bull has constructed his definitions.

Part 1: The Nature of Order in World Politics

One doesn’t have to go much further than the concept of an “anarchical society” to find the point of Bull’s work. Reminiscent of Kant (if I can remember back five years ago), Bull first sets out to define each of the terms he is working with – Bull seems consciously intent on forming a classic-to-be from the very start. He spends pages discussing exactly what is meant by order, both in general and referring to the international sphere. It is here that he makes an important distinction between a system of states and a society of states. An international system simply means that there are states which have contacts and dealings with each other (9). An international society, on the other hard, while presupposing an international system, share a set of rules an institutions (13). Bull’s point then is simple: although the modern system of states are anarchical in that no hierarchical level of sovereignty exists above that of each state, the states do to some extent form a society with common rules and institutions, although this society “is always in competition with the elements of a state of war and of… conflict,” and one should not think that “international society were the sole or [even] the dominant element” (49).

Part 2: Examining Order in the Contemporary International System

After some further discussion on exactly how the states system has evolved and an explanation of how rules are formed and used, Bull turns to “Part Two: Examining Order in the Contemporary International System,” in which he simply looks closer at certain rules and institutions (the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war, and the great powers) contribute to modern international order. Having made his point, this section is simply supportive and seems to almost be a distinct discussion. The student of International Relations will find this reading useful, again not because of its novelty or profoundness, but because of its analysis. Here are some items I found important and/or interesting:

The Balance of Power and International Order

Bull makes a distinction between general and local balances of power, and dominate and subordinate balances of power (98). A balance in the international system is a recent idea, originating in 15th century Italy (101). The chief function of the balance of power is to preserve the system of states (103, 111). The current balance of power doesn’t share a common culture, as did the 18th and 19th century European balances of power (110). I would ask, since the latter ended up more in something like a community, why couldn’t the former do the same, with more of a homogenous culture?

International Law and International Order

“States obey international law in part because of habit or inertia; they are, as it were, programmed to operate within the framework of established principles” (133). That gives credence to the notion that international relations are at least in part socially constructed, and it makes for interesting thoughts about social conditioning in general.

The presence of international law in our current system of states is very much a product of the current system evolving from Western Christendom and its system of laws and values (137).

Diplomacy and International Order

Bull cites Nicolson as holding that the New Diplomacy of “open covenants” is OK, but “openly arrived at” is not always preferable, because it precludes secret or confidential negotiations (169). This sounds exactly like what Abba Eban says in Diplomacy for the Next Century.

War and International Order

Bull notes that we currently see states at war as an alternative to states at peace, but when the power to make war was first confined to states, the alternative to war was “more ubiquitous violence” (179). In other words, when states were first given the sole right to wage war, war was thought to actually reduce the violence present in the previous medieval setting. Interesting.

Bull thinks that if war would have broken out between the US and the USSR, if would have been for security reasons. This is in contrast to Halliday, who thinks it would have been because of ideological reasons (188).

I wonder if Raymond Aron’s idea of “slowing down of history” came before Fukuyama’s “end of history” phrase, and if one of them was playing on the phrase of the other (190).

Bull feels that, “The balance of power remains a condition of the continued existence of the system of states...”. He also points out the relative rise of civil wars after 1945.

The Great Powers and International Order

Bull states that, “…just as during the Cold War period the general character of any country’s foreign policy was determined by its attitude to the first two” (198). Since The Anarchical Society was written in the 1970′s during a period of detente, does Bull think the Cold War is over at this point?

Bull describes the various ways in which great powers can contribute to order, but he clarifies (?) that this is not necessarily what great powers actually do, or even what they should do – it is rather what they could do (201). I’m not sure what this clears up…

Bull makes the distinction among dominance (the “habitual use of force by a great power against the lesser states” it has control over without regard to their sovereignty), primacy (clear one-way influence and control without threat of military force or violation of sovereignty, such as the US and the other NATO members), and hegemony (between dominance and primacy, involving control with force or threat of force that isn’t habitual, such as the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European states) (207).

Bull notes that the hegemony of the USSR has kept “territorial disputes” – like those between Poland and Russia, Poland and East Germany, Hungary and Rumania, of which the world has heard nothing in the post-1945 era” held in check and has prevented them “from reaching the surface of conscious political activity” (212). With the fall of the Soviet Union, have these territorial disputes have come to the surface? Is hegemony over an area analogous to a state keeping its internal disputes in check through the state’s laws?

Although Bull claimed earlier that, “The contribution of the great powers to international order derives from the sheer facts of inequality of power as between the states that make up the international system” (199), he asserts that, “the great powers cannot formalize and make explicit the full extent of their special position.” He claims (somewhat contradictorily) that “international society is based on the rejection of a hierarchical ordering of states,” so if the great powers are to “make explicit” that they have special rights and duties “would be to engender more antagonism than the international order could support” (221). This is quite paradoxical; he seems to be saying that the great powers have inequality of power, which contributes to the international system, but that making these inequalities explicit would undermine international order. I’m not sure if this is correct.

Part 3: Alternative Paths to World Order

Bull’s last section, “Alternative Paths to World Order,” is very insightful. This section is more closely linked to the first and helps not only to reaffirm that an international society exists, it goes on to essentially claim (again using Bull’s own specially-made definitions, of course) that the current international society should exist for some time; Bull sees no contenders that have a chance of taking its place in the near future. Although Bull presents several alternatives to the current order, the ones presented below are certain ones I felt were particularly interesting for my essay, “Changing Times: Alternatives to the Balance of Power as a Basis for International Order,” and the following is quoted from that essay, after which I present various other thoughts I had on this section.

A Disarmed World

The balance of power depends on violence or the threat of violence by one or more states in the system to counteract another state’s rise in power. This assumes on both sides the presence of weapons. For one state to become any sort of threat by expansion assumes that the state has the ability of aggression. To counteract this expansion, the other state(s) must also be armed. Removing this variable, then, has the consequence of making a balance of power meaningless, because there would be no military power to balance (226).

In the real world, as Bull notes, any complete disarmament of the world is not an option. Even if it were somehow possible to destroy all weapons on a worldwide level (which possibility would seem odd, given that individual states cannot even eliminate certain weapons within their own borders), violence would still be possible, if only on a “primitive level” ( 227). Each state would still have the ability to increase its relative threat, if only by growing more trees from which to make clubs.

World Government

Somewhat more realistic is the option of a higher entity to which all the states in the world would be subject. This could either present itself as a loose confederation of states entering into an agreement of cooperation, or the states could be fashioned in a similar manner to the structure of the United States, in which each state has some autonomy but power over the entire system is consolidated in one geographical area... [S]tates could then afford to be altruistic without fear of being taken advantage of, as either the worldwide legal system would prevent misuse or coordinate the altruistic process in the first place. Analogous to farmers in Oklahoma sending hay to feed the Texas cows during the drought of 1998, states would be free from a threat of aggression from other states, allowing them to freely exercise altruistic intentions.

The formation of a world government is a more plausible alternative, since it is evident that such formations have taken place on a smaller scale throughout history. Indeed, governments can be formed in several ways, mostly through conquest or consent. Herein lies a problem: plausibility does not necessarily begat probability, or even desirability. If we are seeking an alternative to the violence present or implied in a balance of power, a world government by conquest is hardly acceptable. On the other hand, the probability of the current system of states voluntarily forming a world-wide government seems as low now as it did to Bull in 1977 (253).

A New Mediaevalism

Another alternative to the balance of power is to revert to the worldwide situation that was found immediately before the rise of the current international system of states. In the Middle Ages, the West was organized by multiple layers of authority, each of which shared sovereignty with the others. These layers of sovereignty were overlapping and were not supreme; authority was shared among rulers, the vassals beneath them, and the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor above ( 245).

A secular alternative to such an organization, in which multiple governments share authority over a geographical area, might be possible today. Such a crisscrossing of authority could result in a more stable world system, reducing the inherent trend of violence between powers, since these powers would in many cases share authority (246). This alternative is even more plausible than the others, since already it can be seen that governments are becoming interdependent in economics and technology, the United Nations is now a familiar part of world affairs, and Non-Governmental Organizations are increasingly prevalent. For these reasons, Bull admits that to a secular “neo-mediaeval order” being possible (255), although he doubts whether it would be inherently more orderly than the current balance of power situation (246).

One other similar alternative which Bull seems to immediately dismiss is that of “pairs and groups of states – the pairs and groups which Karl Deutch calls ‘pluralistic security-communities’ – among which there have been not only long periods of peace, but also long periods in which neither party has seriously expected that disputes would be resolved by resort to force” (273). Just as it is unthinkable that the United States would go to war with Canada or (in modern times) Great Britain, other states could conceptually form similar “pluralistic security-communities” in which violence would simply not be an option – it would indeed be unthinkable.

Such configurations are plausible, already existing within the present states system, and should immediately make one question why in these areas armed conflict is not accepted by the parties involved. One would expect great interest in such a system that not only promises an alternative to balance of power politics but has even shown itself to exist in the contemporary states system. Bull however, while granting that the concept of this scenario being extended on a worldwide basis may “offer hope,” he quickly qualifies his statement by asserting that “we have no present reason to expect that… such a vision will be realized” (274).

How can Bull claim that a world government would impede on the rights and liberties of an individual (245) when a world government could conceptually be no different than a modern state, except that its boundaries encompass the earth? How does an individual’s liberties change based upon the existence or nonexistence of other states?

Bull seems to sometimes needlessly duplicate alternative international systems in the discussion (245, 254). Bull recognizes that the current state system is connected with modern technology and communication (251).

Bull says that, even if Western Europe formed some sort of super-state, that would only be a regional phenomenon (257). Why couldn’t that eventually spread to the entire world?

Bull’s (and Brzezinski’s) recognize that the initial feelings brought about by “technological unification” is that of feelings of fragmentation (263, 270).

Bull rejects the idea of “pluralistic security-communities” (273). But we can now see signs of a conducive environment for them.

Bull argues that economically less-well-off states are holding onto their “statehood” to keep a larger system from further exploiting them economically. I think this absurd. For example, if Pakistan and Bangladesh were thinking purely in terms of economics, they would not have split away from India and Pakistan, respectively (281).

Bull seems to want to claim the state system to be superior regardless. If alternative system is unlikely, he readily states it. But if a situation is unlikely in the states system, he holds onto the possibility: “We have no reason to assume that this will happen,” he says, speaking about the states system promoting worldwide economic well-being, but maybe, “this now so delicate plant, will survive and grow” (282).

Bull recognizes a forming global culture, at least among the elite (305).

Bull does present some ideas that even today (in 1999) are actively being investigated in International Relations, such as the presence of order without rules through conditioning (52). Bull at times sets out his view of history, such as his notion that states’ ideas of justice evolved from individual ideas of justice (79). Bull comments about current events, such as his contention that the current United Nations Charter places international order at a higher priority than human rights (85). Throughout, you will find his viewpoint very much in neo-realist camp, especially in his assumption that states are the main actors on the international stage (78, 81), although his idea of international society seems firmly neo-liberal.

The Anarchical Society is therefore a major work not in its novelty but its extensiveness. It would not be incorrect to say that it is biased. It is true that some things are ignored. Sometimes it seems to twist a few facts a bit, and an (many) other places it seems monotonous and pointless. But its examination of the international system is useful and has its place in the evolution of international relations theory. Should you read it in an International Relations course? Maybe. On one hand, it’s a classic, so your professors will be discussing it, especially in the UK. On the other hand, you’re bound to pick up some of the book’s major ideas in other later works. If you have the time, go ahead and read it so you can say you have. Make sure you read Part 1, skim Part 3, and skip around to sections that interest you in Part 2. And feel free to switch to something else when it gets boring.

Fonte: Escolha dos trecho citados por Garret Wilson


Precisamos saber mais sobre a Rússia. Conheçam a Gazeta Russa (em português)!

O Observatório de Relações Internacionais acaba de conhecer o site da Gazeta Russa.

A Rússia a é uma país extremamente importante na arena internacional. Apesar da recente aproximação entre Brasil e Rússia através do BRICS,  temos ainda pouca informação sobre a Rússia em português. As notícias e as análises sobre a Rússia que são mais divulgadas no Brasil geralmente são oriundas de fontes indiretas, como do jornalismo da grande mídia corporativa anglo-americana.

Por isso, foi muito bom que o nosso Observatória tenha sido contato pelo editor da Gazeta Russa, Dmitry Golub. Esperamos aumentar a divulgação de notícias sobre a Rússia multiplicando por aqui as notícias que eles nos trazem de lá.

O Observatório está a disposição para divulgar o trabalho de vocês e ansioso pelo intercâmbio de informações entre nossos sites.

Vejam mais matéria sobre a Rússia.

Luiz Albuquerque

As inscrições para o VIII Curso de Inverno já estão abertas! Não perca essa oportunidade e garanta já sua vaga! Preços promocionais até o dia 21 de maio. VAGAS LIMITADAS

Alain Pellet (França)
“Curso Geral”
André Nollkaemper (Holanda)
“Responsabilidade Compartilhada no Direito Internacional”
Aziz Saliba (Brasil)
“Autodeterminação e integridade territorial no Direito Internacional”
Bruno Wanderley (Brasil)
“A Definir”
Catherine Maia (França)
“A noção do Direito Imperativo na ordem jurídica internacional”
Ministro de Estado da Defesa
Celso Amorim (Brasil)
“Soberania e o Direito Internacional”
Danny Zahreddine (Brasil)
“A Definir”
Délber Andrade Lage (Brasil)
“A Definir”
Emmanuel Decaux (França)
“A Convenção Internacional contra os Desaparecimentos Forçados”
José Luiz Quadros (Brasil)
“Direito Internacional e o e Estado Plurinacional”
Leonardo N C Brant (Brasil)
“A Definir”
Mário Lúcio Quintão (Brasil)
“O Sistema Interamericano de Proteção aos Direitos Humanos e a lei de Anistia no Brasil”
Rafael Arturo Prieto (Colômbia)
“A Definir”
Santiago Villalpando (EUA)
“Tendências Recentes na Codificação do Direito Internacional”
Faculdade de Direito da UFMG
Av. João Pinheiro, 100, Centro, Belo Horizonte
Data do Curso
De 09 a 27 de julho
Até dia 08 de julho (vagas limitadas)
Valores promocionais até 21 de maio
Profissionais: R$420,00
Estudantes: R$330,00
Estudantes de instituições parceiras: R$290,00
Instituições Parceiras
UFMG, Uni-BH, UNA, FUMEC, PUC-Minas, Faculdade Novos Horizontes, Faculdades Milton Campos.
O Certificado será de 67 horas de atividades extra-curriculares.
Será exigida freqüência mínima de 75% para obtenção do Certificado.
Outras Informações
O curso está aberto para os estudantes e profissionais de todas as áreas.
Durante o curso haverá tradução simultânea para o português.

TV Justiça: Como o Direito Internacional regula a solução pacífica de conflitos internacionais. Aula com o prof. Malheiros

Programa Prova Final da Rede de Ensino Luiz Flávio Gomes – LFG apresenta no Curso de Direito Penal Internacional uma exposição do tema ‘Controvérsias Internacionais’, apresentado pelo professor Emerson Malheiro.
Nesse programa o professor explica que irá cuidar das responsabilidades e dos conflitos internacionais. E ainda destaca que cada Estado quando atua no cenário das relações exteriores possui uma responsabilidade, ou seja, deve responder por seus atos nas relações exteriores.
Destaca o professor que o Tribunal Penal Internacional é um tribunal de natureza criminal permanente e que foi criado para julgar importantes delitos que atingem os direitos humanos na ceara internacional.
Quem quiser escrever para o programa Prova Final, basta entrar em contato pelo e-mail:
As aulas são exibidas na TV Justiça, de segunda a sexta-feira, às 6h da manhã.

A visita de Dilma a HARVARD: O que você não leu na “grande” mídia brasileira

Compartilhado do site do Nassif


Como Harvard viu a visita de Dilma

Olá Nassif, boa tarde.

Eu li um pouco, na mídia brasileira, a respeito da visita da Presidente Dilma ao MIT, mas quase nada da visita dela a Harvard University, uma das mais importantes do mundo.

Aqui encontrei a página festiva da universidsade de Harvard e uma lembrança, o último dirigente brasileiro a visitar a universidade foi Dom Pedro II, há quase um século e meio atrás.

Segue o link -

Mais um capitulo da série O BRASIL QUE O BRASIL NÃO VE.


President of Brazil comes to Harvard

Agreement signed, ends financial barriers for Brazilian science students



Photos by Stephanie Mitchell/Harvard Staff Photographer
“In my capacity as president of Brazil I am here because we want to build our joint future,” said Brazil President Dilma Rousseff (left), who visited with Harvard President Drew Faust. Harvard signed a five-year agreement with the government of Brazil to eliminate financial barriers for talented Brazilian science students pursuing undergraduate and graduate studies at Harvard. 

Harvard University today signed a five-year agreement with the government of Brazil to eliminate financial barriers for talented Brazilian science students pursuing undergraduate and graduate studies at Harvard.

Under the fellowship agreement, funding provided by Brazil’s National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) will make it possible for 30 to 40 Brazilian doctoral students, 40 postdoctoral fellows, and a small number of undergraduates who are majoring in science or engineering areas to study at Harvard. Additionally, the agreement calls for Brazil to support up to 75 Brazilian medical students during a year of study at the Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH). Brazil also has agreed to provide support for up to 25 graduate students to spend a year at Harvard’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (SEAS), working under the direction of an SEAS faculty member.

“Knowledge and talent know no national boundaries, and the most pressing challenges humanity faces must be considered in the broadest possible context, a context that is interdisciplinary, a context that is international,” Harvard President Drew Faust said. “With the signing of this agreement, the Brazilian government will be making a Harvard education in the fields of science and technology available to talented Brazilian students without regard to financial status, further strengthening the University’s ongoing efforts to increase access to education to the widest possible array of talent.”

President of Brazil Dilma Rousseff (left) speaks with Harvard President Drew Faust during the signing ceremony at Loeb House. Glaucius Oliva (seated from left), Jorge I. Dominguez, and Jorge Almeida Guimarães sign the agreement. 

Harvard faculty and administrators from across the University with ties to Brazil, including representatives from the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, gathered in Loeb House for the official signing.

Guests enjoyed iced tea, lemonade, and a selection of pastries and cakes before Faust escorted Brazil President Dilma Rousseff into the room. Among the guests were HSPH Dean Julio Frenk and SEAS Dean Cherry Murray, as well as several diplomats and members of Rousseff’s cabinet, including Brazil’s ministers of education and of science, technology, and innovation.

During the event, Rousseff thanked Faust and through a translator called Harvard, “one of the world’s most distinguished research and education institutions.”

“We intend to build permanent, consistent ties between [Brazil] and Harvard,” said Rousseff, indicating that she hoped the agreement would be followed by other initiatives.

Harvard Vice Provost for International Affairs Jorge I. Dominguez, Glaucius Oliva of Brazil’s National Council for Scientific and Technological Development, and Jorge Almeida Guimarães from the Brazilian Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education signed the agreement as Faust and Rousseff looked on.

The signing hearkened back, Rousseff said, to the visit of Emperor of Brazil Dom Pedro II to Harvard in 1876. He had the foresight to realize then that educational ties between the country and the University “should know no boundaries.” And today, she said, Harvard and Brazil could look forward to a “joint future.”

“In my capacity as president of Brazil I am here because we want to build our joint future.”

In acknowledgement of Pedro’s historic visit, Faust presented Rousseff with a collection of documents from the Harvard Archives related to his trip including a copy of an article from a 1903 issue of the Harvard Graduates’ Magazine. In the story, then-Harvard President Charles W. Eliot called Pedro “the most assiduous visitor that I ever conducted through the University buildings, intelligently interested in a great variety of objects and ideas.”

Meanwhile, the University and Brazil also announced a visiting professorship that would send Brazilian scholars to Harvard for one-year terms.

Dominguez said, “The number of Brazilian students at Harvard has been rising over the past 20 years. There are at least two to three times as many now as there were in the 1990s, and I hope this agreement will consolidate that growth. This arrangement is extremely farsighted on the part of the Brazilian government.” Dominguez added, “It means the government is saying to its people that a Harvard education will be available to them without regard to family resources. That is a worthy goal the government of Brazil should be proud of.”

The agreement specifies that the government of Brazil will establish a fund to pay the tuition and related expenses of the students, and that all the students will go through Harvard’s normal, highly competitive admissions process, and must meet the standards that apply to all applicants.

The agreement is especially important in the case of doctoral candidates, because the training grants from the U.S. National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation, which support American science Ph.D. candidates during their first two years of study, are only available to U.S. citizens. Under the agreement, Brazil will pay the costs for the first two years, and pay Harvard tuition for the remaining years of study, while Harvard will pick up other costs after the first two years, as it does for most U.S. students.

In addition to the agreement with CNPq to support Brazilian science students, Harvard also has signed an agreement for a visiting professorship with the Brazilian Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education (CAPES/MEC). Under the five-year agreement, CAPES/MEC will annually nominate a number of outstanding candidates, whom Harvard will then consider for a one-year visiting professorship.

At the John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum April 10, President Dilma Rousseff described her country’s remarkable economic progress over the last several decades and her administration’s work in moving Brazil even further toward economic prosperity. To read the full story.

Fonte: Nassif