Argentina adota medida antidumping contra China e Brasil




Agência Estado

O governo da Argentina decidiu aplicar medidas antidumping na importação de multiprocessadores de alimentos fabricados no Brasil e na China e de tecidos de poliéster para cortinas de origem chinesa. A decisão assinada pela ministra de Indústria, Débora Giorgi, foi publicada no Diário Oficial hoje. A medida referente aos multiprocessadores é fundamentada nos relatórios das equipes técnicas da Secretaria de Indústria e Comércio, que apontam dano à indústria local pela importação a preços abaixo dos praticados nos mercados de origem. Fonte da diplomacia brasileira disse à Agência Estado que a medida “é inócua para o Brasil”. Já no caso da China, as medidas antidumping poderiam complicar as negociações entre os dois governos sobre as barreiras chinesas contra a soja argentina.

Segundo o Ministério de Indústria da Argentina, a participação dos multiprocessadores importados no consumo na Argentina aumentou de 69% para 81% desde 2006. Como resultado do processo de investigação, a aplicação do direito antidumping será calculado sobre os valores FOB de exportação declarados, de 24% para o Brasil e de 202,79% para a China.

No que diz respeito às importações dos tecidos de poliéster para cortinas fabricados na China, a participação no mercado argentino aumentou de 0,2 para 31%. Os importadores desses tecidos deverão pagar um valor mínimo de US$ 17,60 por quilo. Este mesmo produto de origem brasileira também foi objeto de investigação, mas os técnicos chegaram à conclusão de que não houve dano à indústria nacional, e, portanto, não haverá medidas de salvaguarda.


Postado por

Luiz Albuquerque


Contencioso na OMC a respeito de medidas antidumping norte-americanas sobre a importação de suco de laranja brasileiro

Nota nº 451

Contencioso na OMC a respeito de medidas antidumping norte-americanas sobre a importação de suco de laranja brasileiro / WTO dispute on US anti-dumping measures on the imports of Brazilian orange juice

16/07/2010 –

Concluiu-se hoje, 16 de julho, em Genebra, ao amparo do Mecanismo de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC, a primeira audiência do painel no caso relativo às medidas antidumping adotadas pelos Estados Unidos sobre a importação de suco de laranja brasileiro. O Brasil questiona a utilização, pelo Governo norte-americano, da prática do “zeramento” (“zeroing”) nas revisões administrativas das referidas medidas antidumping.

Na audiência, que durou dois dias, o Brasil procurou demonstrar ao painel que a prática de “zeramento” é incompatível com diversos dispositivos do Acordo Antidumping da OMC e do GATT 1994. Essa prática distorce o cálculo da margem de dumping ao ignorar aquelas operações nas quais o valor de exportação do produto é superior ao seu valor normal no mercado doméstico. Em consequência, os valores das margens de dumping calculadas para o produto são “infladas”.
Esse método já foi objeto de diversas disputas no sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC e tem sido condenado pelo Órgão de Apelação.

Participaram como terceiras partes no caso Argentina, UE, Japão, Coreia, Tailândia, Taiwan e México. Todas as terceiras partes manifestaram apoio às posições brasileiras


Postado por

Luiz Albuquerque

Nuking Westphalia: Obama’s Deep Convictions Point to War With Iran

Posted on July 16th, 2010 Nuking Westphalia: Obama’s Deep Convictions Point to War With Iran Posted In: Afghanistan & Iraq, History, Islam, Middle East, Obama, U.S. Foreign Policy

In spite of what some conspiracy-minded critics on the right think, mainstream journalists like Time’s Joe Klein do not often agree with Fidel Castro.  That both Klein and Castro think the chances of war between the United States and Iran have increased recently is worth noting.  I happen to think they are right.

The problem is not, as Castro would argue, that the United States under President Obama is bellicose and imperialist.  President Obama genuinely does not want war with Iran and would make any reasonable concession (and even a few unreasonable ones) to keep the peace.  And while what I hear matches Klein’s observation that the US military is more confident than it was a year or two ago about its ability to succeed against Iran (“The Iranians aren’t ten feet tall,” is what one soldier told me), the military isn’t exactly pulling on the leash.

Nevertheless, there is a significantly greater chance that President Obama will lead the United States into a war with Iran than many observers think — and that chance is growing rather than shrinking as the confrontation wears on.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addresses the general debate of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly (UN).

The failure to grasp the real possibility that Obama may confront the mullahs reflects the difficulty that many foreign policy experts have in understanding the way that President Obama’s world view differs from a conventional realist perspective.

Most analysts are looking at the US-Iranian confrontation from the standpoint of realpolitik.  Issues like the regional balance of power, US relations with key regional allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia, and economic factors (the price of oil) are being taken into account.  Those are important issues, and they are the kind of issues that under the right circumstances might have led other US presidents (like George H. W. Bush) towards confrontation with Iran.

But those are not the issues that move President Obama.  Under extreme conditions this president might respond to a realist threat to vital American interests with force, but the core of his global agenda isn’t about the balance of power or the Straits of Hormuz. Threats of that kind call forth Obama’s patience and summon him to diplomacy rather than war.

The conventional wisdom that Obama will end up learning to live with an Iranian bomb rather than risking a military confrontation to stop it rests on the perception, accurate as far as it goes, that the strictly realist case for confronting Iran is unlikely to move this president.  (Additionally, his perceived lack of love for the Jewish state means that the ‘solidarity with Israel’ argument might, some feel, carry  little conviction in the Oval Office.)

This relative indifference to realist concerns does not make President Obama indifferent to global affairs.  Far from it.  As laid out in the 2010 National Security Strategy and as President Obama has made clear on many occasions, the United States has a president with a vision for the kind of world he wants to build, and as he made plain in his Oslo Nobel speech, there are things for which he is willing to fight.  As columnist Phillip Stevens writes in that excellent newspaper the Financial Times, Strobe Talbott recently gave a speech in the UK that described President Obama’s Wilsonian vision very well.  As Talbott says, “it is hard to imagine an American president more committed … to the need for effective global governance.”  This is a theme I’ve written about myself in Foreign Policy.

To understand the way this President’s relations with Iran are likely to unfold, we have to look at the impact of Iranian policy on the issues that matter most deeply to President Obama. In my view, Iran and this President are headed toward a confrontation in which President Obama will either have to give up all hope on the issues he cares most about, or risk the use of force to stop Iran.

Ideas and ideals move this president more than the regional balance of power than or the price of crude.  In many ways a classic example of the Wilsonian school of American foreign policy, President Obama believes that American security can best be safeguarded by the construction of a liberal and orderly world.

The present international system, often (though to my mind somewhat crudely) identified with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, starts from the idea that each government is completely sovereign to police and rule its people as it thinks best, and to defend itself and advance its power and interests internationally in whatever ways seem good to it. Wilsonians hate Westphalia, which seems to make governments independent of both moral and legal restraints.  The essence of the Wilsonian project is to turn the system of Westphalian, sovereign states into a society of states under the rule of some basic laws and principles governing how they behave internationally and at home.

Think of the European Union blown up to a global scale; in the Global Union nations would have their own governments and their own laws, but an increasingly dense framework of commonly agreed-upon laws and norms, and an increasingly complex and effective web of global institutions would supplement and in many cases replace the authority of national governments.

President Obama is not a naif: he does not plan to build the GU tomorrow.  He knows that the construction of this order, if it happens at all, will likely take place over many years and through many small steps rather than a handful of big ones.  He is not dogmatic about the final form it will take; perhaps it will be a looser global association without the kind of political and legal identity of the EU.

President Obama discusses Iran with Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy (White House).

President Obama doesn’t think that creating the GU is going to be accomplished under his leadership, nor is he, I think, entirely certain that the world can ultimately reach even a modest version of this goal.  But he does believe that there is no other way to make the United States (and the other nations of the earth) secure, and he believes that the core strategic challenge facing American foreign policy is to gradually move the world in the direction of a post-Westphalian peace.

What does this have to do with the potential for a deadly clash between the ambitions of the Iranian mullahs and the ambitions of the American president?


The consequences of the Iranian nuclear drive for the President’s Wilsonian project are deadly; the Iranian nuclear program can fairly be called an existential threat to the Wilsonian ideal.  In particular a nuclear Iran will kill the two dreams at the heart of President Obama’s foreign policy and indeed of his view of the world: the dream that the genie of nuclear weapons can be forced back into the bottle and the dream that the nations of the world can build a post-Westphalian international order in which the world’s governments are bound by deepening networks of laws.

There are a lot of people in the foreign policy world who consider both of President Obama’s dreams to be hopelessly naive.  The idea that the world’s nuclear powers would ever agree to give up these expensive and powerful weapons strikes many realists as laughable.  There is a realist case (which I personally buy) for the President of the United States to advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons; the United States, with its overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons, would be safer and more powerful in a world without the big bomb.  Conceivably, the UK could go along as that county might welcome a chance to save money while looking idealistic.  Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and France won’t buy.  Those countries have good reasons for their nuclear arsenals and they won’t give them up.

The dream that the great powers of the world will ever form a kind of universal European Union also strikes many observers of world politics as naive.

The cynics may be right (and in fact I fear they are) but that isn’t the point just now.  Henry Kissinger may not believe in the creation of a post-Westphalian order, but President Obama does — at least he believes that without these noble hopes as guiding lights we will lose our way amidst the countless pitfalls of the world’s long night.  And he believes this deeply enough to continue to do his best to set American foreign policy in the service of these two transcendent goals. The President of the United States is a serious and strong-willed man; these values are the rocks on which he stands.

The problem is that Iran’s success means the complete, utter and historic destruction of everything President Obama wants to build.

Make no mistake about it.  If Iran gets nuclear weapons on his watch, the dream of non-proliferation comes to an end and Barack Obama will go down in history as the president who lost the fight to stop nukes.

It won’t just be Iran: if Iran defies western pressure to get nukes, every self-respecting country in the Middle East will want and need nukes.  Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and even some of the smaller fry will have to make their moves.  They won’t all get the bomb but enough of them will.  This will have a disastrous impact on America’s ability to carry out one of its principle global tasks and ensure the steady and uninterrupted flow of oil to the great industrial and commercial centers of the world — but that isn’t all.  The decisive failure of the nonproliferation agenda in the Middle East undermine nonproliferation everywhere, not only because the Bomb will become even more of a coveted symbol of first class international status than it already is, but because with all those proliferating states buying and selling the technology, it will be harder to stop countries from moving ahead.  The global black market in nuclear tech will spread like kudzu; there will be so many sources and so many destinations that the traffic will be harder than ever to stop.

At the same time, nobody will pay attention to UN sanctions and other huffings and puffings of an equally vain kind.  The birds will have figured out that the scarecrow can’t move; they will perch on its broomstick and poop on its head. 

It gets worse.  The collapse of nonproliferation will mark the definitive death of the post-World War Two legal regime, just as the League of Nation’s failure to protect Ethiopia from Italy brought an end to the interwar fling with a law-based world.

If solemn treaties, sacred oaths and decades of patient diplomatic effort can’t stop the spread of nuclear weapons, what can international law really accomplish?  What is the Security Council except an exalted talking shop if it can’t summon the unity and the resolve to act effectively in the face of a naked challenge to one of the foundations of international order?  If global institutions can’t solve this problem, how can such weak and unpredictable organizations be trusted with any urgent and vital problem?  If the treaty on non-proliferation is essentially a dead letter, what treaties still command respect? If countries only obey treaties as long as they want to, and the international system can take no effective action against those who break its most important laws, what becomes of the Wilsonian dream?  

If Iran gets the bomb, the world will change in ways that are deeply destructive of everything President Obama cares about.  A world in which nuclear weapons are widespread isn’t just a world in which the collapse of the non-proliferation movement has brought discredit on the concept of international law and binding treaties on security issues.  It won’t just be a world in which the bad guys have learned that the good guys will blink if you stand up to them.  It won’t just be a world in which emboldened Iranian adventurism will work more rashly and unscrupulously than ever to destroy our alliances and friends in the Middle East.

That brave new world that appears when Iran gets its nukes is an ultra-Westphalian world, a world of sovereign nation states forever emancipated from the dream of true international law.  Nuclear weapons give every state — and every dictator — the ability to veto troublesome interventions in their affairs by treaty-citing busybodies and international lawyers waving documents and babbling about binding accords.  If you have your finger on the button, nobody can make you do anything you truly don’t want to do: this is state sovereignty on steroids, and it is the what Barack Obama will leave as a legacy if he doesn’t stop Iran’s nuclear march. 

President Obama is probably hoping that luck or fate will spare him the horrible fate of presiding over the death of his dearest ideals and of being the American president who destroyed the credibility of the international system and let the nuclear genie loose in the most dangerous part of the world.  Maybe sanctions will work; maybe the Iranians will change their minds.  Maybe new technical problems will crop up and slow the Iranians down enough so that he can pass the problem on to his successor — as, indeed, his predecessors handed it down to him.

I hope he is spared this choice, as indeed I hope we are all spared it. And after George W. Bush’s failures on Iraq’s WMDs, we need to be extra careful that we don’t let our policies get too far ahead of the facts.

But those who think that President Obama’s interest in basing his foreign policy on values make it unlikely that he would go to war haven’t been paying attention.  For Iran to get nukes it will have to destroy the world Obama wants to build.

Will he, can he allow that to happen?

There’s a possibility that he will flinch — or, to put it another way, that his Jeffersonian instincts for restraint will triumph over his Wilsonian ambition to build a better world.  But Iran is not just on a collision course with America’s core interests from a realist perspective.  It is trying to destroy the world that American idealists want to build.  That makes a conflict hard to avoid.


Postado por

Luiz Albuquerque

NYTimes: Diante de sanções americanas, Rússia oferece ajuda ao Irã

Programa anunciado por Medvedev “convida” empresas russas a infringir proibições

The New York Times | 18/07/2010 08:00

O ministro de energia da Rússia anunciou nesta semana um amplo programa de cooperação com o Irã nos setores de petróleo, gás natural e petroquímica, que parece convidar empresas russas a infringir sanções adotadas pelo governo Obama há apenas duas semanas.

As sanções foram criadas como meio suplementar de punir o Irã por se recusar a encerrar o seu programa nuclear sigiloso, depois que os Estados Unidos conseguiram convencer Rússia e China a concordarem com limitadas novas restrições comerciais estabelecidas em uma quarta resolução do Conselho de Segurança da ONU contra o país, aprovada em junho. Austrália, Canadá e Europa também decidiram aplicar medidas adicionais contra o Irã.

Embora determinadas a evitar o tipo de investimento mencionado pelo ministro, as sanções americanas preveem permissões presidenciais para empresas de países que cooperem para desencorajar o Irã a obter arma nuclear.

O Irã, embora um grande exportador de petróleo, importa milhares de litros de gasolina por dia para compensar a sua fraca capacidade de refino, limitada por anos de isolamento internacional.

As sanções americanas impõem penalidades a entidades estrangeiras que vendam petróleo refinado para o Irã ou ajudem o país com sua capacidade de refino nacional, um foco que busca causar tribulações financeiras sobre o Corpo da Guarda da Revolução Islâmica, o grupo linha-dura que supervisiona o programa nuclear e de mísseis do país, além de controlar grande parte da sua indústria petrolífera.

O presidente da Rússia, Dmitri Medvedev, expressou oposição à adicionar quaisquer sanções ao país além daquelas impostas pelas Nações Unidas e o Ministério das Relações Exteriores advertiu os Estados Unidos contra a tentativa de punir empresas russas por causa das novas sanções unilaterais.

Na quarta-feira, o ministro da energia da Rússia adotou uma posição mais aberta contra as sanções americanas ao anunciar os planos para uma cooperação mais estreita entre os interesses petrolíferos russos e iranianos.

Mas não ficou imediatamente claro como qualquer ação será tomada.

O comunicado russo sugeriu que um grupo de trabalho será formado para identificar áreas de cooperação mais profunda nos setores do petróleo e petroquímica, propondo um estudo para a criação de uma companhia de petróleo russo-iraniana e um banco binacional para financiar esses projetos.

A declaração do Irã sugeriu que o petróleo será comercializado em bolsas de mercadorias russas.

Por Andrew E. Kramer


Postado por

Luiz Albuquerque

Pre-Trial Chamber I issues a second warrant of arrest against Omar Al Bashir for counts of genocide


Case: The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir
Situation: Darfur, Sudan

Today, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a second warrant of arrest against the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, considering that there are reasonable grounds to believe him responsible for three counts of genocide committed against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups, that include: genocide by killing, genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm and genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction.

This second arrest warrant does not replace or revoke in any respect the first warrant of arrest issued against Mr Al Bashir on 4 March, 2009, which shall thus remain in effect. In the previous arrest warrant, the Chamber considered that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Al Bashir is criminally responsible for five counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture and rape) and two counts for war crimes (intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, and pillaging).

On 4 March, 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I had rejected the Prosecutor’s application in respect of the crime of genocide. On 6 July, 2009, the Prosecutor filed an appeal against this decision. On 3 February, 2010, the Appeals Chamber rendered its judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal, reversing, by unanimous decision, Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision of 4 March, 2009, to the extent that Pre-Trial Chamber I decided “not to issue a warrant of arrest in respect of the charge of genocide in view of an erroneous standard of proof”. The Appeals Chamber directed the Pre-Trial Chamber to decide anew whether or not the arrest warrant should be extended to cover the charge of genocide. Applying the standard of proof as identified by the Appeals Chamber, Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded today that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Al Bashir acted with specific intent to destroy in part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups.

Pre-Trial Chamber I requests the Registrar of the Court to prepare a supplementary request for co-operation seeking the arrest and surrender of Mr Al Bashir for the counts contained in both the first and the second warrant of arrest, and transmit such a request to the competent Sudanese authorities, to all States Parties to the Rome Statute, and to all the United Nations Security Council members that are not States Parties to the Statute. The Registrar is also directed to transmit additional requests for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir to the Court to any other State as may be necessary.

The situation in Darfur was referred to the International Criminal Court by the United Nations Security Council’s resolution 1593, on 31 March, 2005. In this situation, four cases are being heard: The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun (“Ahmad Harun”) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (“Ali Kushayb”); The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir; The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda and The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus.

The International Criminal Court is the only permanent international court established with the mission to help put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, namely the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.

Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir

Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest

Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir”

Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir

Second warrant of arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir

Case information sheet “The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir


Postado por

Luiz Albuquerque

Delfim Netto: G-20 – Cada um por si




Antonio Delfim Netto

AO TÉRMINO DA REUNIÃO do G-20 em Toronto, no último domingo de junho, as lideranças mundiais retornaram a seus países mais ou menos cientes de que cada um vai fazer aquilo que achar melhor para si. Os países desenvolvidos (e mais endividados) assumiram o compromisso de reduzir à metade seus déficits fiscais até 2013 e estabilizar ou reduzir a dívida pública em relação ao PIB até 2016. Certamente os países da Europa vão ter de lidar com o maior peso das restrições em razão desse comprometimento. Cada qual terá de saber como fazer o ajuste fiscal, o que não quer dizer que, obrigatoriamente, isso os levará a uma recessão.
Com relação ao Brasil, o ministro Guido Mantega, que nos representou (o presidente Lula preferiu ficar no País, atendendo ao drama das inundações no Nordeste), mostrou com clareza que não precisamos de restrições de nenhuma natureza. E defendeu a manutenção dos estímulos ao crescimento.
Certamente o Brasil precisa mudar a qualidade dos gastos públicos, mas o déficit é perfeitamente aceitável: cerca de 2,5% do PIB, (um pouco mais, um pouco menos) e nossa dívida líquida situa-se em torno de 41% ou 42% do PIB. Mesmo a dívida bruta, que causa um pouco de preocupação, é menor que 70% do PIB, de forma que a parte fiscal do Brasil não apresenta nenhuma dificuldade maior. Por isso, o ministro Mantega fez muito bem quando argumentou que não é possível uma medida de caráter geral, envolvendo todos os países. Cada um tem de fazer aquilo que lhe pareça adequado para resolver o seu problema.

Uma coisa importante é entender que não existe nenhuma indicação na teoria económica, como algumas pessoas acreditam no Brasil, de que um choque fiscal seja necessariamente deflacionário. Keynes, lá por 1931, (em meio à Grande Recessão) tinha intuído que existem choques que podem ser expansionistas. Ele precisa ter credibilidade e ser muito bem-feito: quando não aumenta a carga tributária, corta corretamente despesas, quando estimula a competição, melhora um pouco a regulação das atividades financeiras e é acompanhado por uma desvalorização cambial.
Na Eurolândia, se todos os países fizerem esses ajustes, não significa que vão ter processos recessivos. Pelo contrário. Começando pela Alemanha, que tern uma política fiscal absolutamente crível. Ela tem condições de fazer um ajuste fiscal importante, ligeiro e, digo mais, tornando sua economia capaz de crescer rápido, fazendo com que ela aumente mais depressa que todas as demais. Como já tem aquelas condições, a Alemanha vai se aproveitar da desvalorização do euro. De todos os países da União Europeia é o que tem grande participação de comércio fora do euro. Como detém as maiores facilidades de fora da zona (dentro, a taxa de câmbio é fixada) pode-se suspeitar que o ajuste fiscal da Alemanha será um sucesso. Produzirá uma expansão económica mais rápida. E isso é a melhor coisa que pode acontecer para todos os países da Eurolândia. Porque a União Europeia precisa de uma locomotiva que puxe a economia, que lidere o seu crescimento com o mínimo de distorções.

Essa ideia que circulou por aí, de que todo ajuste fiscal é necessariamente recessivo, é um equívoco. Não tem suporte nem na teoria nem na prática. Existem vários experimentos, como no caso da Dinamarca, em que se fizeram os ajustes que pareceriam recessivos (de acordo com o keynesianismo de pé quebrado), e no fim se revelaram expansivos.
Modelos mais elementares esquecem o papel das expectativas: quando se reduz a demanda do Estado, que acontece no ajuste fiscal, é preciso que aumente a procura do setor privado. Só aumenta a demanda do setor privado se o corte dos gastos do Estado for de tal natureza, de tal ordem, que aumente as expectativas sobre o equilíbrio económico e, assim, se renove o espírito animal dos empresários para que eles ampliem seus investimentos. O aumento dos investimentos e das exportações compensa a queda da demanda do setor público. É isso que acredito que vai acontecer na Alemanha.


Postado por

Luiz Albuquerque

XVII Encontro do Comitê de Negociações Comerciais Mercosul – União Europeia Comunicado de imprensa conjunto

Nota nº 416

02/07/2010 –

O Mercosul e a União Europeia celebraram o XVII Encontro do Comitê de negociações comerciais birregionais para alcançar um acordo de associação.

As delegações do Mercosul e da União Europeia reuniram-se em Buenos Aires entre 29 de junho e 2 julho de 2010 para a sua primeira rodada formal de trabalho desde o anúncio do relançamento das negociações, efetuado pelos Chefes de Estado ou e Governo na última Cúpula de Madri, em 17 de maio.

O Comitê de Negociações Birregionais foi estabelecido no ano 2000 e celebrou dezesseis encontros até o ano de 2004, quando as partes decidiram realizar uma pausa nas negociações.

No decurso deste XVII CNB, as negociações foram conduzidas, por parte do MERCOSUL, pelo Embaixador Alfredo Chiaradía, Coordenador Nacional da Argentina no Grupo Mercado Comum, em exercício da Presidência Pro Tempore do MERCOSUL. A delegação da União Europeia foi chefiada por João Aguiar Machado, Diretor Geral Adjunto da Direção-Geral de Comércio da Comissão Europeia.

As conversações entre representantes de ambos os blocos incluíram os denominados três pilares da negociação: diálogo político, cooperação e comércio. Nesta último âmbito, as partes repassaram os textos e suas respectivas propostas nos diferentes temas da negociação.

Neste nível, produziu-se um frutífero intercâmbio, que permitiu acordar um ponto de partida e uma base de trabalho comum para o tratamento dos temas pendentes nos diversos capítulos do Acordo, levando-se em conta a evolução ocorrida nos últimos seis anos.

Ambas as partes estiveram de acordo sobre a necessidade de manter um formato e cronograma de trabalho flexível, de modo a atingir os consensos necessários sobre o conteúdo do Acordo e reiteraram sua disposição de alcançar um acordo ambicioso e equilibrado.

O próximo encontro do Comitê de Negociações Birregionais será acordado através dos canais diplomáticos habituais.

Buenos Aires, 2 de julho de 2010


Postado por

Luiz Albuquerque