Sobre Luiz Albuquerque

O Núcleo de Estudos sobre Cooperação e Conflitos Internacionais (NECCINT) da Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto em parceria com as Faculdades Milton Campos, sob a coordenação do professor Luiz Albuquerque, criou o Observatório de Relações Internacionais para servir como banco de dados e plataforma de pesquisas sobre relações internacionais e direito internacional . O site alimenta nosso trabalho de análise de conjunturas, instrumentaliza nossas pesquisas acadêmicas e disponibiliza material para capacitação profissional. Mas, além de nos servir como ferramenta de trabalho, este site também contribui para a democratização da informação e a promoção do debate acadêmico via internet.

Putin: Anything US touches turns into Libya or Iraq

CrossTalk: Who is Mr Putin?

Soros and CIA Suffer Huge Defeat in Brazil

Wayne MADSEN | 28.10.2014 | 00:00

The Central Intelligence Agency and its George Soros-funded «democracy manipulators» in Brazil suffered a major defeat with the re-election as president of Brazil of Workers’ Party standard bearer and ex-Marxist guerrilla Dilma Rouseff. In the hours prior to Rousseff’s handy re-election, the corporate Western media was still reporting that the election was «too close to call» even as exit polling indicated that Rousseff would trounce her CIA- and Soros-backed conservative opponent Aecio Neves by at least 2 percentage points. The New York Times, Globe and Mail, Reuters, and other corporate media outlets were obviously disappointed by Rousseff’s victory, with many of these pro-Wall Street contrivances that masquerade as journalistic enterprises referring to Neves as a «centrist» who «narrowly» lost to Rousseff.

The Associated Press wistfully wrote, «There are not enough outstanding votes left to be counted to allow her [Rousseff] rival [Neves] to catch up with her». And Alberto Ramos, Goldman Sachs’s chief economist for Latin America, warned that Rousseff should abandon her policies that help Brazil’s poor or «market confidence» in Brazil will continue to suffer. Bloomberg News predicted the value of Brazil’s real currency would continue to be weakened with Rousseff’s win and when the markets opened on October 27, Bloomberg’s wishes were realized. The Financial Times of London happily reported that the real slumped 3.1 percent in value against the U.S. dollar and that its performance was worse than that of the Mozambican metical, which also was deflated by the global vulture bankers after the long-governing leftist Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) won the election against the Soros- and banker-backed and CIA-created Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO). For the democracy manipulators of Soros and the CIA, the election news from the Lusophone capitals of Brasilia and Maputo was hardly encouraging.

The «usual suspects,» Goldman Sachs, Bloomberg, and The New York Times, all wailed in anger over Rousseff’s decisive win over Neves. The neo-conservative Rupert Murdoch-owned Wall Street Journal lamented that Brazil had opted to stick with «statism,» which for the Wall Street vulture capitalists who worship the Journal as if it were a Talmudic scroll, is a blasphemy.

Neves was advised on economic policy during the campaign by Arminio Fraga Neto, a former executive for Soros’s Quantum hedge fund and on foreign policy by Rubens Barbosa, the senior director in the Sao Paulo office for former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s Albright Stonebridge Group (ASG).

The reaction of Wall Street and London to immediately devalue Brazil’s currency after Rousseff’s victory indicates the strategy of the global capitalists in dealing with Brazil. Undoubtedly, Brazil is to be subjected to the same type of economic warfare that has been meted out to Venezuela since the re-election victory last year of Venezuelan Socialist President Nicolas Maduro. Venezuela has been pressured by artificially-created shortages of basic commodities and foreign transaction problems as a result of Wall Street’s – and the CIA’s — sabotage of the Venezuelan economy.

The CIA’s and Soros’s heavy interest in defeating Rousseff was aimed at derailing the emerging BRICS economic alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa that threatens to weaken the domination that global bankers and their inherently corrupt World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) contrivances wield over the world economy. The bankers and their CIA centurions believed that with Neves or Marina Silva, a Green Party operative groomed by Soros, in charge, Brazil would withdraw from BRICS and re-enter the global banker community with Brazilian state assets such as the Petrobras oil company being sold off in a «fire sale». Soros and his CIA friends failed to understand that Brazil’s poor owe their relative new social standing to the state-led economic policies of Rousseff and before her, those of Workers’ Party icon Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

With Rousseff now re-elected, the BRICS will continue to develop the New Development Bank (NDB) and its $100 billion currency reserve arrangement (CRA), or currency basket, that member countries can loans draw from, thus weaning themselves away from the Western political controls of the World Bank and IMF. Rousseff’s re-election will also permit BRICS, which faced losing Brazil as a member had Rousseff lost the election, to expand its membership base.

Argentina, which has faced a concerted economic campaign from New York vulture capitalist, right-winger, and committed Zionist Paul Singer to seize Argentine assets, has expressed a strong interest in joining BRICS. Argentine Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman has stated that Argentine intends to join BRICS and recent trade agreements between Argentina on one hand, and China, Russia, and India, on the other, indicate that Argentine would be welcome in the anti-U.S. «club» of emerging economic powerhouses. Iran, Indonesia, and Egypt have also expressed an interest in joining BRICS. Indonesia’s new president Joko Widodo is a member of the party of former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of President Sukarno, ousted by the CIA in a bloody 1965 coup d’état aided and abetted by President Barack Obama’s Indonesian stepfather Lolo Soetoro and his USAID/CIA mother Ann Dunham Soetoro. Indonesia’s Sukarnoist foreign policy makes its alliance with BRICS a natural alignment.

The interventionist forces of the CIA and Soros will now look to obtain a consolation electoral victory in Latin America in order to apply pressure on both Brazil and Argentina. Uruguay’s president José «Pepe» Mujica, a former Marxist Tupamaro guerrilla, is barred from running for re-election and his Broad Front’s standard bearer is his predecessor Tabare Vasquez. Winning 45 percent of the vote in the first round election on October 26, the same day of Brazil’s election, Vasquez is now forced into a run-off with right-wing National Party presidential candidate Luis Lacalle Pou, the son of former Uruguayan conservative president Lacalle Herrera, who placed Uruguay under the economic control of the World Bank and IMF. Just as the CIA banked on Neves, the grandson of Brazil’s former elected president Tancredo Neves, who died from a suspicious ailment just prior to being sworn in as president in 1985, the CIA and Soros are now placing their bets on Pou to defeat Vasquez to be able to brag that Latin America’s progressive base of nations is not permanent. Pedro Bordaberry, the third place finisher in Uruguay, who has now endorsed Pou in the same manner that the Soros-financed Silva endorsed Neves in Brazil after losing the first round, is the son of the brutal CIA-installed Uruguayan dictator Juan Maria Bordaberry, arrested in 2005 for ordering the assassination of two Uruguayan legislators.

Ironically, Vasquez, who like Mujica, favors legalization and government regulation of marijuana sales is facing opposition from his Soros-financed opponent who is against marijuana legalization, citing nebulous and unfounded statistics on a rise in crime under the Broad Front presidencies. Soros is on record as favoring the legalization of marijuana. However, Soros compromises on his stance in countries like Uruguay where his and the CIA’s interests dictate opposition to marijuana legalization.

In Brazil and Uruguay, the CIA- and Soros-backed candidates and their major supporters represent reactionary forces who wish to turn Latin America’s clock back to the days of fascist rule. The Brazilian election threw a spanner in the CIA’s and Soros’s works. The November 30 Uruguayan run-off will provide the deadly duo of the CIA’s John Brennan and George Soros with another opportunity to place a roadblock not only in Latin America’s steady march toward steady progressive rule but also in the plans of the BRICS alliance to expand into a permanent economic and political force to challenge the neo-imperialism of the Washington-London-Brussels-Israeli true «axis of evil».

Fonte: Strategic-Culture

G20 Rap with Tony Abbott – feat. Scott Ludlam [RAP NEWS 29]

Mais um número do Conjuntura Internacional, desta vez com um dossiê África.

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Prezad@s,
Acabamos de lançar mais um número do Conjuntura Internacional, desta vez com um dossiê África.
Lembro a todos da chamada de artigos para o dossiê “A Escola Inglesa e o debate das normas nas Relações Internacionais” – aberto até 25 de fevereiro de 2015.
Agradecemos a ajuda na divulgação – de nossa nova edição e de nossa chamada de artigos.
Conjuntura Internacional – v. 11, n. 2 (2014).
Latindex e EBSCO
ANÁLISE CONJUNTURAL
Daniela Vieira Secches
Ana Garcia
 
DOSSIÊ
Rodrigo Teixeira
Joelton Carneiro Lima
Marília Bernardes Closs, Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira
Diego Pautasso, Fernando Scholz
María Noel Dussort
Duarte Luciano Antunes
Wilson Pedro Te
 
ENTREVISTA
abraços,
Leonardo Ramos
Relações Internacionais – PUC Minas

Javier Vadell: O Banco do BRICS: Consenso asiático e os resistentes elos do neoliberalismo global

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O Banco do BRICS: Consenso asiático e os resistentes elos do neoliberalismo global

por Javier Alberto Vadell

O acordo da VI Cúpula dos BRICS consolida institucionalmente um processo de mudanças econômicas e políticas globais que vem ocorrendo desde inícios do século XXI. A crise econômica nos países em desenvolvimento, e especialmente na América Latina, em 2001, foi o detonante de importantes mudanças no cenário político regional. A virada à esquerda da maioria dos governos da região foi uma resposta ao fracasso do modelo de desenvolvimento neoliberal baseado nas políticas de a) privatizações; b) desregulamentações e c) abertura unilateral do comércio e as finanças. Esse programa foi aplicado de maneira sistemática, embora diferenciado de acordo aos casos nacionais. O modelo do ‘Consenso de Washington’ foi o elo material e ideológico que interligou uma rede de poder global – Network Power  (Grewal, 2008) – entre os países em desenvolvimento (África, América Latina, Europa de Leste) aos centros de poder econômico e político internacionais, liderados pelos Estados Unidos da América (EUA). Nesse esquema do Consenso de Washington, o governo dos EUA e as instituições econômicas criadas em Bretton Woods – mas  alheias ao espírito de Bretton Woods e a suas preocupações com o pleno emprego, desenvolvimento e prosperidade dos países do Sul (Helleiner, 2013) – o FMI e o Banco Mundial (BM), jogaram um papel determinante como componentes institucionais orgânicos das redes de poder transnacional no neoliberalismo hegemônico global.

por Javier Alberto Vadell[1]

O acordo da VI Cúpula dos BRICS consolida institucionalmente um processo de mudanças econômicas e políticas globais que vem ocorrendo desde inícios do século XXI. A crise econômica nos países em desenvolvimento, e especialmente na América Latina, em 2001, foi o detonante de importantes mudanças no cenário político regional. A virada à esquerda da maioria dos governos da região foi uma resposta ao fracasso do modelo de desenvolvimento neoliberal baseado nas políticas de a) privatizações; b) desregulamentações e c) abertura unilateral do comércio e as finanças. Esse programa foi aplicado de maneira sistemática, embora diferenciado de acordo aos casos nacionais. O modelo do ‘Consenso de Washington’ foi o elo material e ideológico que interligou uma rede de poder global – Network Power  (Grewal, 2008) – entre os países em desenvolvimento (África, América Latina, Europa de Leste) aos centros de poder econômico e político internacionais, liderados pelos Estados Unidos da América (EUA). Nesse esquema do Consenso de Washington, o governo dos EUA e as instituições econômicas criadas em Bretton Woods – mas  alheias ao espírito de Bretton Woods e a suas preocupações com o pleno emprego, desenvolvimento e prosperidade dos países do Sul (Helleiner, 2013) – o FMI e o Banco Mundial (BM), jogaram um papel determinante como componentes institucionais orgânicos das redes de poder transnacional no neoliberalismo hegemônico global.

A pergunta que muitos analistas e estudiosos se fazem é: em que medida os resultados da IV Cúpula do BRICS desafiam ou superam o capitalismo, o neoliberalismo global, o poder econômico e político dos Estados Unidos e dos países desenvolvidos, ou as instituições de governança econômica global? Em que medida esse acontecimento desafia algum aspecto destacado ou todos eles ao mesmo tempo? Somos cientes de que respostas acabadas e assertivas a essa questão podem beirar a futurologia e perder o sentido analítico por nós proposto. Com esse intuito, nosso exercício pretende analisar a VI Cúpula do BRICS não como uma acontecimento específico e sim como resultado de um processo, de uma dinâmica de transformações que vêm ocorrendo no cenário político internacional, nas instituições multilaterais e na estrutura econômica global. É a partir da ideia de processo dinâmico e contraditório que achamos mais adequado ancorar nossa análise de um caso particular, sem perder a noção do geral[2].

Nessa direção, a nossa hipótese é que esse processo de transformações consubstanciado no novo arranjo institucional do Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento do BRICS (NBDB)[3] e o Arranjo Contingente de Reservas (ACR), com capital inicial de US$ 50 bilhões e US$ 100, respectivamente, é simultaneamente uma resposta aos mecanismos de governança econômica global tradicionais (FMI e BM), uma consolidação de uma alternativa de rede comercial e financeira de poder global ao Consenso de Washington e, além disso, uma oportunidade reformista para as economias dos países em desenvolvimento – abrindo a possibilidade para um novo pacto social desenvolvimentista, embora a dinâmica do Consenso Asiático estimule a especialização produtiva (Vadell, et al, 2014; Dyer, 2011).

Em outros termos, os países que compõem o BRICS, Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul, estão configurando uma institucionalização paralela, mas não substitutiva das instituições econômicas tradicionais, sediada no novo ‘focal point’ das finanças globais, Xangai, pólo de interligação global do capital financeiro e produtivo global. O surgimento deste novo pólo é produto de um deslocamento geográfico do eixo da acumulação capitalista para o Sudeste da Ásia, desde a década de 1980. Não obstante, esse processo liderado pela República Popular da China (RPC) vai se configurando como um conjunto de respostas/acomodações ao neoliberalismo global, onde se reforçam algumas dinâmicas contraditórias: por um lado, elementos contestatórios ao status quo multilateral liderado pelos EUA e a União Europeia (UE): (a) novas alternativas de financiamento, doações e acordos de cooperação liderados pela RPC para os países em desenvolvimento (África e a América Latina) com empréstimos sem condicionalidades políticas, normativas ou institucionais;  (b) rejeição às políticas de austeridade e de ajuste desigual aplicadas nos países em desenvolvimento e intermediadas pelas instituições econômicas internacionais tradicionais (FMI e BM),  aos países em desenvolvimento; (c) crítica ao sistema financeiro global e (d) crítica aos postulados do Consenso de Washington como uma única via de desenvolvimento dos países do Sul Global[4].

Por outro lado, esse bloco lidera diferentes tipos de reivindicações que fazem pensar numa acomodação aggiornata ao neoliberalismo global, em que a RPC lideraria o grupo de nações emergentes num processo de restauração global. Nesse sentido os membros dos BRICS mostram: (i) reivindicação para um maior espaço dos países emergentes na arquitetura de governança econômica global existentes – especificamente, na Cúpula do G20 de Seul acordou-se uma mudança nos votos e quotas no interior do FMI[5], e está prevista uma revisão da participação acionária no Banco Mundial; ii) Há um evidente discurso pró-liberalização comercial no âmbito da Organização Mundial de Comércio (OMC) por parte das nações exportadoras decommodities, principalmente, mas não exclusivamente, do Brasil. Na direção da liberalização, a RPC fez um esforço unilateral impressionante de abertura comercial para conseguir o ingresso à OMC em 2001[6]; iii) Novas reformas liberalizantes na China estão previstas nas finanças e no comércio desde a ascensão  do Presidente Xi Jinping.

Referências Bibliográficas:

Dyer, Geoff, Jamil Anderlini, and Henny Sender. (2011). China’s lending hits new heights. Financial Times. [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/488c60f4-2281-11e0-b6a2-00144feab49a.html#axzz2lxZFQ2l2] Disponibilidade: 17/10/2013.

Grewal, D. S. Network power : the social dynamics of globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

Helleiner, Eric. Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order.  Cornell University Press, 1 edition, 2014.

Ramos, Leonardo; Vadell, Javier; Saggioro, Ana; Fernandes, Márcia. A Governança econômica global e os desafios do G-20 pós-crise financeira: análise das posições de Estados Unidos, China, Alemanha e Brasil, RBPI, Dez 2012, vol.55, no.2, p.10-27.

Stiglitz, “Nobel Economist Joseph Stiglitz Hails New BRICS Bank Challenging U.S.-Dominated World Bank & IMF”, Democracy Now, Disponível em: Hyperlinkhttp://www.democracynow.org/2014/7/17/nobel_economist_joseph_stiglitz_hails_new

Vadell, J. Ramos, L Neves, P.  “The international implications of the Chinese model of development in the Global South: Asian Consensus as a network power”, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Special Issue, no prelo, 2014

Weisbrot, Mark, “BRICS’ new financial institutions could undermine US-EU global dominance” , Aljazeera America. 18/07/2014. Disponível em:http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/brics-developmentbankimffinance.html Acesso: 19/07/2014

[1] Professor e Pesquisador do Departamento de Relações Internacionais da PUC Minas. Líder do Grupo de Pesquisa sobre Potências Médias (GPPM).

[2] Ver Stiglitz (2014) e Weisbrot (2014).

[3] Em inglês: New Development Bank and Reserve Currency Pool Arrangement.

[4] Esse ponto é explicitamente reconhecido na Cúpula do G20 realizada em Seul em novembro de 2010, onde se reconhece a ausência de uma única fórmula para o desenvolvimento (Ramos et. al. 2012).

[5] Para observar a composição de votos e quotas, antes e após as reforma não implementada no FMI ver: Ramos et. al (2012).

[6] Embora aliados no G20 comercial da OMC, Brasil tem um postura mais liberalizante na área agrícola do que os demais membros.

Fonte Grupo de Pesquisas sobre Potências Médias

Is there any way to break the Doha Round impasse in agriculture negotiations?

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Andrew L. Stoler 08 October 2014

The structure of the Doha Round

The origins of the current impasse can be found in political and structural mistakes made at Doha in 2001. So long as these mistakes remain uncorrected, there is no hope for successful completion of the Doha agricultural negotiations. And without agriculture, there is no hope for the Round overall.

Adopting a ‘single undertaking’ approach to the negotiations – where all members are expected to be a party to all negotiations and results – was a serious, and I will argue, totally unnecessary political mistake.

In 2001, many would have argued that the Uruguay Round agriculture negotiations produced a ‘sloppy result’ where big players like the US and the European Community had far too much flexibility in how they implemented their commitments.

Reacting to this, developing modalities for the Doha negotiations that attempted to cover every single concern for every one of the more than 160 participants, without the national flexibilities that were accommodated in the Uruguay Round, is our big structural mistake.

These mistakes created a situation where very little happened in the Doha talks between 2004 and 2008, and virtually nothing has happened in the six years since 2008.

Bali Package

The so-called ‘Bali Package’ offered some hope to multilateralists that the single undertaking approach might yet be applicable. It seemed as though consensus agreement was reached on a package of measures that would allow Doha to progress. But when India and a few disreputable allies killed the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) at the end of July, we saw again just how unworkable the single-undertaking approach really is.

Anyway, even if the Facilitation Agreement package had gone through, what would have been the implications for the Doha Round of the Bali Package?

What happened at Bali on agriculture was never more than an illusion of progress. We all know that the real problem in the Doha agriculture talks is the market access pillar. This is where things blew up in 2008, and nothing in the Bali Package does anything to move this part of the talks forward. If we want to break the impasse, we need to fix the mistakes referred to earlier.

Critical mass

For a number of years now, negotiators seem to have been operating under the assumption that single undertaking agreements are the normal way of negotiating in the multilateral system. This is wrong. Historically, most of the important steps forward have come through critical-mass agreements. This is true for market access, and it is also true for rules.

What is a critical-mass agreement? It’s an opt-in agreement among a subset of WTO members who agree that the portion of international trade in a particular sector that they collectively account for is sufficient for them to conclude a trade deal among themselves. Other members only marginally involved in the trade need not participate and the insiders accepting the critical-mass agreement’s obligations agree to provide the benefits of the agreement to all WTO Members on a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) basis. Examples of WTO-era critical-mass agreements include the 1996 Information Technologies Agreement and the 1997 Telecommunications Services Agreement.

But a critical-mass agreement wouldn’t work for agriculture, would it?

Simulating critical mass

In fact, it would work, and in 2009 researchers from Australia, India, China, Indonesia, and Brazil collaborated on a research project that demonstrated just how well – from a technical standpoint – a critical-mass approach to agriculture could work.

In our 2009 project, we used the International Trade Centre’s ‘Market Access Map’ database to identify the most-traded 30 agricultural products (at the six-digit level of the Harmonised System) and a group of 38 WTO member countries that account for 80% or more of that trade across all 30 products. We modelled the benefits of an agreement among these 38 members on these 30 products and compared the results against the likely results of a single undertaking negotiation concluded on the basis of the 2008 draft modalities.

If the Doha Round modalities of December 2008 were implemented, we projected a static net global welfare gain of almost $15 billion. A critical mass agreement that substantially eliminated duties on just 30 products among 38 countries would achieve about two-thirds of the same level of gains. If, however, the 38 countries agreed that it would be unfeasible to maintain trade-distorting production subsidies (‘amber-box’) once borders were open and eliminated both those subsidies and all forms of export subsidy, the gains from a critical-mass approach on the 30 products almost double to $19 billion.

In other words, our simulations showed that, under reasonable assumptions about what would be a feasible coalition of interest in opening world agriculture markets (the ‘critical mass’ coalition), and what the scope of such an agreement would be, a technically simple agreement engaging less than one quarter of all WTO members would achieve a significantly bigger global result than the laborious, complex modalities of the global Doha Round.

What about the politics? Would a critical-mass approach to agriculture negotiations be politically feasible?

At the end of our research project in 2009, we organised a small conference in Canberra where we heard the views of representatives from the EU, Brazil, Australia, and the US. The government representatives at the conference pointed out a number of problems they saw with adopting a critical mass approach for future negotiations on agriculture, including:

  • A mercantilist-motivated need to obtain concessions in other sectors to balance the losses in an agriculture negotiation;
  • An inability to tolerate ‘free-riders’ (like India) should a major developing country elect to stay out of the agreement; and
  • The perceived risk that a critical mass approach to agriculture would contribute to a multi-speed WTO system.

What the conference discussion revealed is that governments believed they were stuck with an approach that is not working, but they were still not willing to consider seriously moving to another framework such as the critical mass.

Colleagues who have contributed to the debate on this question have observed – quite rightly – that many of the ‘problem’ countries in the agriculture negotiations have been countries like Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Japan … and the US and EU. They wonder how the negotiation could be made easier by eliminating (through critical mass) many of the small developing countries and problematic players like India and Indonesia. I do not for a minute think that the other problem countries would jump onto a critical-mass approach in moments, but it would have to be easier if we did not have to worry about all of the small, vulnerable economies (SVEs) and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

Conclusion

It seems to me that the fact that many of the countries that want to see some multilateral progress have exited the single undertaking in the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiations shows they might be willing to consider a similar approach in the agriculture sector. And remember that we advocate getting rid of the Doha agriculture modalities and returning to a simpler, more flexible approach that many governments would find (I think) politically easier to use as a basis for negotiations (a good number of the overly complex draft Doha agriculture modalities were designed to deal with problems of countries that would be outside of our critical-mass approach).

The WTO got a small breath of life in Bali, but the multilateral trading system negotiations based on a single undertaking have now been discredited again by the actions of India and its rag-tag allies at the end of July.

Maybe governments are now more willing than they were in 2009 to consider an alternative approach. Maybe they are not. But sooner or later, somebody has to think outside the box.

Fonte: VOX